Life and times of Alexander Downer the right man for the right time
Charting his transformation from failed leader to Australia’s longest-serving foreign minister, Alexander Downer did not want this book to be written.
Few politicians have had the roller-coaster career that Alexander Downer did, from being born into the establishment, arriving in parliament with youthful promise and climbing the opposition ranks only to crash and burn as Liberal leader, then transform to become a significant foreign minister, diplomat and party elder.
When he became Liberal leader in 1994, on a so-called dream team ticket with Peter Costello as deputy, he skyrocketed in the polls. Paul Keating’s government seemed doomed. But Downer soon became beset by gaffes and blunders. Downer was not sure he was ready for the job and was relieved when he resigned the following year.
The party turned back to John Howard, Lazarus-like, and Downer smoothed the transition, extracting a promise to be foreign affairs spokesman. The Coalition was back in power in 1996 and Downer became the longest-serving foreign minister. But he remained both controversial and consequential, with a devilish sense of humour and a hide as thick as an elephant’s.
By 2007, when the tide was running out for the Howard government, behind in the polls and facing an ascendant Kevin Rudd-led Labor, Downer convened a meeting of ministers to discuss whether Howard should tap the mat and resign. Howard asked Downer to test the mood, and the response was that he should go, but nobody wanted to force it. (Downer thought he should quit.)
Thirteen years earlier, it was Howard telling Downer that time was up. Now the roles were reversed. No minister was closer to Howard than Downer between 1996 and 2007. Downer proved resilient, determined, driven to show he was not frozen in time as that youthful ham-handed leader. He was now a party statesman with authority, a trajectory that could not have been predicted.
This story is told in Tony Parkinson’s new biography of Downer, A Step to the Right, published in December. Parkinson, a former journalist, was senior adviser to Downer. He provides an insider account of a life in politics focused on his nearly 12 years as foreign minister with insights into the September 11 terror attacks and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, interventions into Bougainville and Solomon Islands, relations with the US, China and Russia, and East Timor’s independence.
Downer, who co-operated with interviews, is a gregarious storyteller and illuminating about people and events. (I have seen this up close in my own interviews with Downer and sharing several stages with him through the years.) Parkinson draws out this other side of Downer, despite being parodied as foolish or foppish, a relic of the born-to-rule generation.
Parkinson succeeds in providing a multidimensional portrait of Downer and draws on interviews with Howard (who wrote the foreword), former public servants and staff, and his family. While not ignoring criticisms and misjudgments, Parkinson sought to challenge the “lazy stereotypes” about Downer.
Eager to “focus on the substance and achievements”, Parkinson examines the field of view at the time, noting “anyone can be an expert in hindsight”. Indeed, Downer is frank in identifying errors in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, for example. Downer, however, did not want the book to be written and urged Parkinson to speak to people who do not like him. “They won’t be hard to find,” he said.
In 1996, Downer posed with his leg on a table, pants drawn up “to reveal a fishnet stocking and a faux leopard-skin stiletto”, an image Parkinson says “went viral” before smartphones and social media. It was to promote a Rocky Horror Show charity night. It was used to lampoon Downer for years but he liked the photo and brushes it off as water off a duck’s back.
But by the end of the Howard government’s first year, there were rumblings within the government that he should be moved on. “Downer is too frivolous, we can’t have him,” critics told Howard. “No. We’re sticking with him,” was the reply.
Downer’s approach to foreign policy was encapsulated in his framework of “enlightened realism”, which meant Western Enlightenment principles such as freedom, democracy and human rights were inviolable but must be applied in a rational way – essentially realpolitik, mindful of what is pragmatic and achievable.
This world view reflected his upbringing, experiences and values. Downer’s father was a minister and ambassador, and his grandfather was premier of South Australia. He was educated in Australia and in Britain. He entered parliament in 1984, aged 33, after working as a diplomat, adviser to Malcolm Fraser and Andrew Peacock, and running an industry association.
When Robert Menzies became prime minister in 1939, he told Australians he was not “born to the purple”. But Downer undoubtedly has a lineage of power and wealth, and was accused of growing up with a silver spoon in his mouth and out of touch with everyday Australians. His accent, a relic of study in Britain, seemed to affirm this.
“I grew up believing in the value of public service,” Downer says. He would describe his family as “nation builders”. Politics is in the blood but no political career is pre-ordained, and promotion and longevity are dependent on resilience and performance.
The foreign policy of the Howard government remains its most contestable legacy. Parkinson expertly guides readers through a range of events, relying on interviews with key players and references to contemporary histories and analyses. The cabinet papers of the period, much of which are now open, would have added another layer.
It is a testament to Downer that he was able to attract high-calibre public servants and staff. The heads of his department were Philip Flood, Ashton Calvert and Michael L’Estrange. Staff included chiefs of staff Mike Smith, Bill Tweddell and Peter Woolcott, and advisers Josh Frydenberg, Greg Hunt and Innes Willox.
In 1998, Howard sent a letter to Indonesian president BJ Habibie suggesting the people of East Timor be offered greater autonomy with a process of self-determination later to decide whether to remain part of Indonesia or be a free country. The letter was developed within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, not Defence, which felt blindsided.
The idea was that it would be a circuit-breaker to help “douse international agitation” over East Timor. Nobody expected Habibie would move straight to a vote on remaining or leaving – independence. The Australians expected East Timor to remain part of Indonesia. After the vote in 1999 overwhelmingly backed independence, deadly violence broke out.
Despite the bumpy process and missteps, the Australian-led peacekeeping force ended the violence and restored stability.
Downer is critical of the US for refusing to provide “boots on the ground”. Howard was indignant when president Bill Clinton told him the US could provide only “logistical support” and an amphibious assault ship offshore with 1000 troops as a “strategic reserve” if needed.
After September 11, it was Downer who suggested invoking the ANZUS Treaty. The war on terror began with an invasion of Afghanistan to destroy al-Qa’ida bases and remove the Taliban from power, and hunt down Osama bin Laden. In 2021, after 20 years, the US hastily withdrew and the Taliban regained power. It showed a lack of judgment and resolve, Downer thought. He favoured “a negotiated ceasefire” and “power-sharing” with the Taliban.
The subsequent invasion of Iraq to disarm it of weapons of mass destruction was the most controversial decision of the Howard government. Although Saddam Hussein was removed from power, no such weapons were found and the country descended into an ungovernable mess rather than a beacon for democracy as some hoped, Downer maintains it was “the right thing” to do.
But he cannot explain the massive intelligence failure over WMD. Where were the weapons? He does, however, strongly criticise the US for how it managed the occupation with its so-called de-Ba’athification process: dismantling the Iraqi army and removing senior officials from government administrative roles.
The US got it “badly wrong” in Iraq, he says. The US should have had more soldiers after Baghdad fell, handed power to an interim Iraqi government and paid soldiers to stay in the Iraqi army.
Downer insists concerns were raised with Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, but he was “completely dismissive”. As early as 1998, when UN weapons inspectors withdrew from Iraq and the US was contemplating a military strike and potential invasion, Howard told Clinton that Australia would send special forces personnel and aircraft.
“I hope you will be with us,” US secretary of state Madeleine Albright said to Downer. By mid-2002, after meeting defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Downer knew the US would go to war to remove Hussein.
By the end of that year, Downer and Howard reached “an informal understanding” that if the US went to war, Australia would be alongside. The US wanted 2000 Australian troops to back up US marines going into Baghdad but this was not agreed to. The SAS is what they had in mind. Polling presented to ministers, Downer reveals, showed the public mostly against going to war.
There are other interesting accounts in the book, including: refusing to land the MV Tampa with its load of refugees in 2001 and how the Pacific Solution came about; that Guantanamo Bay detainee David Hicks was helped only “for political reasons”; the response to the horrific Bali bombings in 2002; and the disaster relief operation after the Boxing Day tsunami devastated Indonesia in 2004.
In 2016, Downer met Donald Trump aide George Papadopoulos, who told him Russia had intelligence on Hillary Clinton. He reported it to Canberra. Then WikiLeaks dumped Russian-hacked Democratic emails. Downer reported the Papadopoulos conversation to the US embassy in London. An FBI investigation followed with wild claims made by Papadopoulos that Downer dismisses as a “bizarre” conspiracy theory.
Downer expresses regret over supporting the creation of the International Criminal Court. He ridicules claims the Australian Wheat Board paid kickbacks to Saddam’s regime. He does not confirm Australia bugged East Timor negotiators to gain advantage in Timor Sea oil and gas negotiations. And he praises the Albanese government’s Pacific outreach, saying the Morrison government “dropped the ball” in the region.
The book, an easy and informative read, is filled with fascinating stories and anecdotes.
As high commissioner to London, Downer was present when Prince Philip received his knighthood – an initiative of Tony Abbott – from Queen Elizabeth II in 2015. “I only heard through the media that I was to receive this award,” Philip told Downer. Charles told Downer it was “very strange” he had not been asked if he wanted it. Nor, he says, did the queen hint that the honour should be given to her husband.
A large part of the book has Downer reflect not only on what he did but on the world as it is now, ruminating on China and the US in the Asia-Pacific, the conflict in the Middle East, the war between Russia and Ukraine, and what he makes of Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. There is much wisdom, drawn from experience, in these assessments.
Looking back on the Howard government, Downer says its success and longevity was due to four factors: underlying liberal values; the courage to act on convictions; clear and concise communication; and unity of purpose. Those essential elements, which Menzies and Howard had, remain as relevant as ever in politics.
Tony Parkinson’s A Step to the Right: The Life & Times of Alexander Downer is published by Connor Court in December.
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