US saw Hawke-Keating as a safe bet after Whitlam-era turbulence

Bob Hawke introduces Paul Keating to United States President Ronald Reagan in 1983.

When Bob Hawke seized the Labor Party leadership from Bill Hayden in February 1983, the CIA quickly prepared a detailed assessment of the prospects for a Labor government under new leadership.

Memories of strained relations between the US and Australia during Gough Whitlam’s government were front of mind. But top-secret reports that analysed Hawke, incoming treasurer Paul Keating and soon to-be foreign minister Hayden were met with relief in Washington.

“If Labor wins the national elections scheduled for 5 March, a government headed by Bob Hawke would not result in a major realignment of bilateral co-operation in security and ­defence,” concluded a 14-page ­intelligence assessment.

“Bilateral security relations would suffer only if the still radical left wing were able to ­increase its influence over the leadership — a remote possibility given Hawke’s potential as a strong leader of the party and his moderate views.

“Concern that a Labor government under Hawke would be a repeat of the 1972-75 Gough Whitlam government is, we ­believe, unfounded.”

This document is one in a trove of intelligence assessments released in recent years that became available online last month. Previously, accessing the documents required visiting the National Archives in Maryland.

US diplomats, plus officials in Washington, cultivate relationships with politicians, public servants and staff members. They comb through media reports and monitor parliament and political events. There is no “smoking gun” suggesting any spying ­activity in Australia.

But these reports provide a fascinating window into how the US viewed the incoming Labor government. The CIA believed the new government “could still create some nettlesome problems” if it followed party policy on a nuclear-free zone in the ­Pacific, greater say over joint ­intelligence facilities and restricting trade and investment.

In February 1983, the CIA perceptively saw Hawke and Keating as the fulcrum of a future Labor government. Hawke was “Australia’s best known and most popular Labor Party and trade union figure” whose leadership underscored “the party’s swing to more moderate politics”.

Keating was “a right-wing leader recognised for his imaginative policymaking and organisational abilities”. He was one to keep a close watch on, they surmised: “A formidable debater, Keating is considered a ‘comer’ within the party and is tipped by many as a future leader.”

The assessments were not sugar-coated. The Americans ­excoriated Labor’s Left faction for its hostility to the US alliance, concern over joint facilities and advocacy of nationalistic trade and investment policies. There were also hard-headed assessments of Hawke and Hayden. “Hawke’s main political strength rests in his popular ­appeal to voters,” a report argued. “Many view Hawke as a self-­serving glory seeker whose duty to the party is too often clouded by overwhelming personal ambition.”

“Hayden is fundamentally a moderate Labor politician,” judged the CIA. “Hayden benefited and suffered from his ­reputation as Labor’s competent — if uninspiring — leader … his lacklustre style tended to ­project ­uncertainty and attract challenge.”

The US understood that the Hawke government would maintain the ANZUS alliance, the joint defence facilities and the close economic relationship. But it also accepted that Labor would adopt a more “independent” ­approach to policymaking and participation in global affairs.

But there would be no repeat of the problems during the Whitlam government when the US feared the alliance might be at risk and intelligence sharing could be compromised if Labor’s Left faction, especially deputy prime minister Jim Cairns, exercised significant influence. But these concerns have often been exaggerated by some academics and journalists.

The US saw the moderate Whitlam, despite differences over Vietnam and his occasional intemperate remarks, as a reli­able ally. “Whitlam’s time in ­office ushered in a new era in US-Australia relations, characterised by greater Australian nationalism,” the CIA reflected in February 1983. “However, this caused no irreparable harm to the US-Australian alliance.”

A year later, in February 1984, the Americans identified Hawke’s biggest challenge as the “uneasy alliance” between government and unions: “Hawke’s political future depends, in large measure, on the success of his economic recovery program and this depends on his ability to control Australia’s often unruly ­labour movement.”

The CIA viewed the financial and political support of unions, in addition to the party’s structural relationship with ­unions, as a “double-edged sword”. Hawke had to “balance the demands of Australia’s labour movement against his economic and political programs”. This partnership with unions, largely via the ­Accord, would indeed underpin the government’s landmark ­reform program.

In the early years of the Hawke government, the relationship with the Reagan administration was not trouble-free. The US was concerned about Labor’s support for a South ­Pacific nuclear-free zone and the ­review of ANZUS and the joint facilities. Hawke was forced to back down on his pledge to monitor the testing of the MX missile after a caucus backlash.

The US also kept a watchful eye on Hayden, who led the ­“potentially dangerous” Centre-Left faction and might challenge Hawke’s leadership. In truth, the Centre-Left usually joined with Right to defeat the Left’s madcap conference proposals to exit the ANZUS ­alliance, shut the joint facilities and ban uranium mining and ­export.

Hawke’s central message was that his government wanted to “strengthen” the economic relationship and the alliance while adopting an independent global outlook.

The US had little to fear. Indeed, when Hawke sought ­re-election in December 1984, the CIA expected the “warm ­relations with Washington” and “a moderate course in foreign ­affairs” to continue in a second term.

From the earliest days after Labor’s election victory in March 1983, Hawke sought to reassure the US that his government would not represent a radical break with the past.

Another February 1983 intelligence assessment made an accurate prediction: “Bilateral relations probably would remain intact and co-operative.”

In June 1983, Hawke met ­Ronald Reagan at the White House. Keating joined them. They offered support for the ­alliance but signalled there would be a frank of exchange of views and more “balance” in the partnership moving forward. It was another sign to the US that this Labor duo was nothing like their Whitlam-era predecessors.