After much ‘soul searching’, Victoria Police has vowed to learn from Bourke St attack mistakes
A secret report on Victoria Police’s handling of the Bourke St massacre has revealed the significant failures of officers involved in monitoring Dimitrious Gargasoulas before his murderous rampage.
VIC News
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A secret report into the actions of Victoria Police on the day of the Bourke St tragedy accuses officers of “failing” and details how they allowed Dimitrious Gargasoulas to control them in the hours before his murderous attack.
In a stinging rebuke, the report writer, Assistant Commissioner Stephen Fontana singles officers out for failing to take ownership, basic errors, lack of communication and being “ill-prepared” for their duties.
Police have previously fought to keep the 496-page report from the public but it was tendered to the coronial inquest into the tragedy on Wednesday afternoon.
It contains explosive criticism of a number of areas police interacted with Gargasoulas, who killed six people and injured dozens more when he mowed down pedestrians in Melbourne’s CBD on January 20, 2017.
He had been granted bail six days earlier and Asst Comm Fontana believed not enough was done to monitor him.
“There was no active offender management plan put in place to monitor Gargasoulas’ compliance with bail, despite the express intent of some members involved in his initial arrest to ensure he was arrested and remanded as a matter of priority following his release on bail. Active monitoring of his bail may have provided police with an opportunity to identify significant breaches that would have warranted revocation of his bail,” he wrote in the report.
Gargasoulas almost stabbed his brother to death early on January 20 and then embarked on a cat-and-mouse chase throughout Melbourne. Asst Comm Fontana said there were a number of failings.
Appearing as a witness at the inquest, he today said “the biggest failing was no was tasked to look at where the [Gargasoulas’ mobile phone] pings were. It wasn’t that hard to ask.”
He told Coroner Jacqui Hawkins no one showed any “interest” in taking charge of the plan to arrest Gargasoulas.
As a result there was a “lack of ownership, thought or planning”.
Late that morning he was located in a stolen car and police began to follow him, in cars and via the police air wing.
The report found Port Phillip CIU, who were leading the investigation, treated the incident as a “vehicle follow” and not a pursuit “when it clearly met the criteria for a pursuit”.
He was critical of Detective Senior Constable Murray Gentner who was pleading with Gargasoulas via text messages to surrender. The responses from Gargasoluas were increasingly unhinged and threatening.
“Port Phillip CIU had only communicated that they were trying to communicate a surrender with Gargasoulas but did not come up on the air at any time to advise other units of the nature of the communications, nor their observations. They did not pass on critical information to other units and supervisors. “
His harshest criticism is levelled at Port Phillip CIU officers who failed to grasp the situation was worsening and did not change their approach - which was to continue to try and engage with Gargasoulas.
But they had not considered other options or avenues of inquiry and had not considered the ongoing risks presented as their operation continued. It was treated as a routine investigation when it should have been prioritised as an active ongoing investigation / incident with all relevant Incident Command and Control System (ICCS) structures and formal planning considered.
They did not “regroup and review” about what was needed to arrest Gargasoulas safely.
“This did not happen and I am of the view that this is a failing of Port Phillip CIU management. [DSS Darren] Humphries and [DSS David] Newman monitored the incident and were in phone contact with [Det Sgt David] Barry and the units following Gargasoulas. They should have taken steps to regroup to plan and consider options after the pursuit and should also have considered an alternative plan to that which they relied on. [Atg Snr Sgt Stephen] Russell, Barry and [DS Adam] Vohmann and upgraded members Gentner and Burnett should all have taken active steps to reconsider the situation given the pursuit outcome.
Asst Comm Fontana said Port Phillip CIU had the best knowledge of Gargasoulas’ offending and background but only took charge when challenged by an officer who was unimpressed by the lack of planning and ongoing risk assessment.
The officer was told DSS Humphries was in charge, but he didn’t initially come over the police radio which created “a void”.
DSS Vohmann then announced he was taking charge - a decision Asst Comm Fontana believed he was “ill-prepared” for.
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Vohmann was actually overseeing the processing of a crime scene in St Kilda at the time he took charge of this incident and I have formed the view that he was ill-prepared to do this. There is no doubt that he was receiving updates from CIU members involved but he would not have been fully across all aspects of this operation. In fact, other than issuing a few initial instructions before directing units to change channels, he effectively exercised no control of the ongoing pursuit.
This week both Snr Const. Gentner and Sgt Vohmann rejected the criticism made of them when they were asked to comment on the report.