How China pulled a Pacific Islands forum from obscurity to hot ticket item
The annual Pacific leaders’ summit is suddenly the hottest ticket in town for major powers, all of whom have been locked out of this year’s meeting, as China redoubles efforts to isolate Taiwan.
For a window into the geopolitical brinkmanship playing out in the Pacific Islands region these days, one need only look to the stoush over who is in and who is locked out of next month’s Pacific Island Forum (PIF) in Honiara.
An annual regional leaders’ summit that has basked in glorious obscurity for most of its history is suddenly the hottest ticket in town for major powers from China to the US, UK, France and Japan, all of whom have found themselves uninvited this year thanks to Beijing’s relentless pursuit of Taiwan’s disenfranchisement.
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele may appear to have been channelling the wisdom of his country’s namesake by opting first to disinvite both China and Taiwan, and then all 21 dialogue partner nations – effectively deferring the regional annual equivalent of ASEAN’s East Asia Summit leaders meeting for a year – citing the need to complete an ongoing review of the Pacific Island Forum architecture and its unwieldy dialogue partnerships.
But his government’s refusal to grant visas to several Taiwanese officials earlier this year had already raised suspicions it would seek to block Taipei from attending this year’s meeting.
By striking the compromise he did, Mr Manele fulfilled Beijing’s standing demand for Taiwan’s exclusion while avoiding a walkout by the three Pacific Island nations – Palau, Marshal Islands and Tuvalu – that continue to recognise Taiwan and thus presiding over another splintering of the bloc.
Keeping China happy is clearly important for the Solomons, which has received hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese development money since it dropped Taiwanese recognition in 2019 in favour of the One China principle, and then signed a secretive security deal in 2023 sending shockwaves through Canberra.
But no one is pleased with the decision even if the general consensus is that it is the “least worst option”.
A significant consolation is that Australia and New Zealand – the region’s biggest donors – are still inside the PIF tent where they can continue to have a say in regional deliberations, even if they must wield that sotto voce.
But there is little else to celebrate in a decision that underlines just how much traction China has gained in the Pacific Islands region in recent years, and how emboldened it now feels to reshape Pacific the region’s relationship with Taiwan.
So confident is Beijing in its Pacific leverage, it demanded this week that regional leaders reverse a 33-year-old joint communique granting Taiwan special development partner status.
New Zealand certainly sees little upside in Honiara’s decision, with foreign minister Winston Peters thundering to Pacific counterparts recently; “Outsiders are now telling us who we can have as guests. That’s not the Pacific way!“
That “Pacific family first” language has been used to good effect by Canberra and Wellington – alongside their permanent seats at the Pacific Island Forum table – to keep China out of sensitive areas such as regional security co-operation.
But as China continues to chip away at Pacific unity, it may be losing its potency.
Lowy Institute Pacific Islands program director Mihai Sora says China has won this round by succeeding in having Taiwan excluded from the region’s most important annual political gathering, even if it too has to sit this one out.
“The mechanics of it means Taiwan loses out far more than China, as do other diplomatic partners like the US and individual European countries at a time when they’re trying to pitch their case to the region and Pacific countries as credible partners,” Mr Sora tells The Australian.
With little political capital of its own, and a diplomatic presence in only three Pacific Island nations, Taiwan needs the dialogue partner session to access not only other PIF member countries but international dialogue partners. America too has only a small diplomatic footprint in the Pacific and relies on PIF to build a rapport with individual leaders. Having all dialogue partners in the room is good access also for the smallest Pacific nations.
If the key to diplomacy is being in the room where it happens, then all have lucked out this year.
The United States’ exclusion is said to have gone down so poorly in Washington that a group diplomatic effort from like-minded dialogue partners was required to explain the wider context to deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau who was to have attended the summit before travelling on to Port Moresby to mark PNG’s fiftieth anniversary of independence. The US ambassador to PNG will now be dispatched in his stead for PIF sideline meetings.
“China has embassies in 10 Pacific island nations so doesn’t need the PIF meeting as much as some other partners,” says Mr Sora. “They’re already in Honiara, so you would expect Chinese diplomats to be all over the meeting.”
The latest dispute comes at a delicate time for PIF as a regional institution, under intense pressure from competing geopolitical interests and having suffered a series of temporary defections by Micronesian states as well as pro-China Kiribati and Solomon Islands which have all only recently returned to the tent.
While Palau, an outspoken defender of Taiwan and next year’s summit host, has accepted Mr Manele’s compromise, Tuvalu Prime Minister Feleti Teo has threatened to boycott the summit over the exclusions, and has speculated that China was behind the decision to block partners from the forum.
Anna Powles, a Pacific security expert and associate professor at Massey University, NZ, says Tuvalu’s boycott threat reflects frustration over the geopolitical circumstances behind Solomon Islands’ decision but also growing regional fragmentation in which national interest is trumping a more traditional collective approach to security.
“New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have been really vocal about the importance of the collective strength of the region, of Pacific regionalism and forum centrality,” Dr Powles tells The Australian.
Mr Sora says it is firmly in China’s interests to fracture the Pacific Island Forum given they are not a part of it and it is proving a roadblock to its strategic ambitions.
“They want to be the principle security actor in the Pacific to give themselves elbow room to act against the US and to cut Australia off from allies like the US.”
But while three nations continue to back Taipei, and not Beijing, it cannot get the consensus it needs.
If there is a bright side to the latest PIF debacle for Pacific island nations, it is that the post-war era of benign global neglect of the Pacific region is well and truly behind it.
Like neighbouring Southeast Asia, the collection of 18 diverse small island states understands there is leverage in being at the centre of great power rivalry – demonstrated by the billions of dollars pouring in from Australia, New Zealand, China and the US for security, development, budget support and infrastructure programs.
Is there another compelling reason why Australia would strike a $500 million security agreement with Vanuatu, for instance?
Yet Pacific Island nations hardly need reminding that such a position can be both a gift and a curse, and that constructive gains can easily be lost if that competition steamrollers regional priorities, or spills over into something more destructive.
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