What forward-thinking capabilities are built into the defence industry?
In 1942, Australia’s strategic position hung in the balance as Japanese forces pressed southward, threatening our beloved homeland. The advances of the Imperial Japanese Navy were finally repelled, or at least blocked, by the Americans in the Battle of the Coral Sea (as well as Midway and Guadalcanal). This was a momentous battle; it was fought at sea, across the horizon, using planes launched from aircraft carriers – a relatively new development. Prototypes of the world’s first aircraft carriers were developed late in World War I; by World War II, the technology had evolved to such an extent that the aircraft carrier was critical to military success in the Pacific.
After the war we acquired two (used) aircraft carriers, the Sydney and the Melbourne, but since then strategic thinking about the value of such assets has changed. A single aircraft carrier represents a lot of eggs in one basket. Plus, it’s a highly visible target. Far better to have a fleet of submarines, we thought.
We are a freedom-loving people, claiming the resources of an entire continent and its islands flanked by the Indian and Pacific Oceans. We should be world’s best practice in naval planning, infrastructure and technology. If current thinking is that we need nuclear-powered subs that could take a decade or two to deliver, then we also need the ability to better evaluate future security threats.
Was there really no one in Defence who foresaw, around the turn of the millennium, a threat requiring next-gen submarine capability taking decades to deliver? That’s the kind of paper that would have made mighty uncomfortable reading 20 years ago. I don’t want to be unfair to Defence; they probably war-game every conflict iteration imaginable. But even so we seem to have been caught flat-footed, scurrying about building alliances and shoring up defences. Our situation is something we did not countenance. And that is my point precisely.
Let’s assume, best case, that the current strategic situation subsides. What is the threat landscape in 2040 and what technologies and policies might deliver the best security outcome for the Australian people? These are reasonable questions for Australians to ask in the 21st century when the military supremacy of our key ally, the US, is likely to be challenged.
If aircraft carriers were superseded by nuclear-powered subs as the must-have piece of naval hardware, say, 30 years after World War II, what is the strategically useful lifespan of a nuclear-powered sub? And what are the chances of technological developments that could enable the detection of submarines within threat range of major cities or critical infrastructure, such as cheaply developed drones that could swarm a target? If these are in our future, what a pity to have all our eggs in one nuclear-powered submarine basket. In 2040, we could be scurrying about looking for technology, timelines and alliances to stay yet another threat we didn’t see coming.
I appreciate this kind of thinking probably occupies the minds of some, if not many, in the defence industry. However, our current situation suggests that whatever forward-thinking capabilities are built into the industry, they haven’t manifested in the timely delivery of the military hardware required to meet (and hopefully deflect) the threat posed in the 2020s. We need a team of future-thinking analysts, technology experts, logistics planners and others to scope defence requirements in the medium and long-term future. It’s the kind of thinking many corporations might also like to consider: broad planning for the perilous landscape that lies beyond.