Tampa standoff gives rise to Pacific solution

A ‘more aggressive approach’ to boat arrivals was being canvassed long before the MV Tampa rescued 433 Middle Eastern asylum-seekers.

Refugees crowd the deck of the Norwegian container ship MS Tampa off Christmas Island in September 2001.

Long before Norwegian freighter MV Tampa rescued 433 Middle Eastern asylum-seekers on August 26, 2001, who subsequently were denied landfall in Australia, the Howard government was grappling with how to respond to a sharp increase in unauthorised boat arrivals.

A cabinet memo, finalised days before the Tampa rescued the stranded boat, canvassed “a more aggressive approach” to asylum-seekers that included intercepting and returning boats to their country of origin but advised this required legislation to authorise such actions and the agreement of the country of embarka­tion and flag registration.

The Attorney-General’s Department advised that “once a vessel carrying claimants to refugee status has entered Australia (ie internal waters of the mainland and of any island territory such as Ashmore Island or Christmas Island) then claimants cannot be returned to Indonesia or elsewhere until their refugee status has been determined.”

When Tampa captain Arne Rinnan entered Australian waters on August 29, having previously been denied approval to land at Christmas Island, John Howard authorised 45 Special Air Service troops to board the vessel to stop it making landfall. Most of the asylum-seekers were later transferred, by agreement, to Nauru and then to New Zealand.

That same day, cabinet met to “validate action undertaken in relation to potential unauthorised arrivals on the MV Tampa” and authorise the Border Protection Bill 2001. This bill would provide the power to remove any foreign vessel from Australian waters and give retrospective legal authority to the boarding of the Tampa.

Labor, led by Kim Beazley, supported the response to the Tampa but then opposed the bill given the wider scope of powers sought by the government. This bill was rejected by the Senate on August 30. The Tampa actions were later validated by the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001.

Cabinet noted on July 9 that 6500 asylum-seekers were awaiting passage to Australia. Up to 1600 were expected within weeks, which would “exhaust present detention capacity”. There had been 4141 people arriving on 54 boats in 2000-01 and 4175 on 74 boats in 1999-2000.

The August 24 memo reveals “immediate contingency plans” included expanding existing defence bases, building a “purpose-built detention facility” in Darwin that could house 2000 asylum-seekers and another on Christmas Island with 500 to 700 places.

The Finance Department opposed a permanent centre on Christmas Island. The Defence Department argued it was “not core Defence business”, opposed using bases as overflow facilities and queried the cost of providing intercept and escort efforts.

In August-September the government developed the policy of offshore detention of asylum-seekers that became known as the Pacific solution, which involved excising territories such as Christmas Island from the migration zone. Asylum-seekers were processed offshore and denied the right to apply for refugee status.

John Howard believed the hardline policy not only worked to reduce unauthorised boat arrivals significantly but also was necessary to maintain public support for the wider immigration program.

“I knew that our action in stopping the Tampa was what the public expected because they thought the government had lost control of the borders and support for the overall immigration program plummeted,” Mr Howard told The Weekend Australian.