Espionage charge denied amid questions over Labor leader's mental health

NEW claims suggest H.V. Evatt was betrayed and manipulated by members of his staff

Robert Menzies

A FORMER senior intelligence officer and a respected long-term ALP official have rejected claims that Labor leader Herbert "Doc" Evatt was an agent for the Soviet Union, as suggested by respected academic Des Ball.

But startling new claims made to Inquirer suggest Evatt was manipulated by his advisers, who knew he was unwell and that Evatt believed members of his staff were grossly disloyal.

"It is probably a stretch too far to label Evatt as a spy for the Russians," the former intelligence official tells Inquirer.

However, "he was used as an unwitting agent of influence by those around him", he says.

Cyril Wyndham, who served on Evatt's personal staff from 1957 to 1960 and was later ALP national secretary, says Evatt was "betrayed" by members of his staff who were "treacherous" towards him.

ASIO believed Evatt had become "unhinged and unbalanced" and was mentally unstable, the intelligence officer says.

Apparently, ASIO learned that Evatt had "suffered a complete mental breakdown" in the late 1940s, when returning from the UN, where he had been president of the general assembly. He may have been institutionalised in Australia for a time.

ASIO believed Evatt remained unwell while ALP leader from 1951 to 1960.

Evatt's private secretary, Allan Dalziel, wrote in his memoir, Evatt: The Enigma, that "there were those who felt he had burned himself out" during the 40s while working to establish the UN.

Dalziel and others have documented Evatt's wild mood swings, volcanic temper, rudeness and erratic behaviour. Since the 70s, biographers and historians have suggested Evatt may have suffered from a mental illness.

When asked why ASIO's view about Evatt's illness had not been revealed previously, the intelligence officer says Evatt was "admired" by many in ASIO for his service as minister for external affairs in the Curtin and Chifley governments, and for his role in establishing the UN.

"Many in ASIO regarded Evatt as a genius," the intelligence officer says.

Further, mental illness was not a subject widely discussed or understood in the 40s and 50s. Former soldiers who worked for ASIO were aware of World War II veterans who suffered from mental illnesses and trod carefully. Many Labor MPs simply saw Evatt's erratic nature as a side effect of his genius.

Evatt's illness may have been a contributing factor in his decision on October 5, 1954, to issue a statement denouncing the Victorian ALP state executive as "increasingly disloyal", an event now widely seen as forcing the party to split.

Two weeks later, on October 20, Evatt defeated an attempt to open up the party leadership to a ballot at an ALP caucus meeting in Canberra.

When some called for a formal vote to be taken on the "spill" motion, Evatt jumped up on to a table and demanded the names of the so-called disloyal MPs be recorded.

"Get their names," he said, "get their names."

Wyndham, who was ALP national secretary from 1963 to 1969, rejects the claim that Evatt was unwell.

"I saw no sign of a mental breakdown," he says.

Now 81, Wyndham tells Inquirer the suggestion Evatt was a Russian agent is "a load of bloody nonsense".

He does, however, believe Evatt was "betrayed" by his private secretary for 20 years, Dalziel.

Wyndham says Dalziel regularly supplied former NSW premier Jack Lang's Century newspaper with material detrimental to Evatt.

"Dalziel was a treacherous bastard," Wyndham says.

When Evatt resigned as ALP leader to be appointed chief justice of the NSW Supreme Court, he told Wyndham he had "long suspected that Dalziel was treacherous".

Wyndham is unsure if Dalziel passed secrets to the Russians, but says "he was a very secretive man". "When commonwealth car drivers drove him home," Wyndham says, "he was never dropped at his home, only close to his home."

Following the defection of Russian spies Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov in April 1954, the Menzies government established a royal commission into espionage in Australia.

Evatt believed the defection and the subsequent royal commission was an elaborate conspiracy between ASIO and the Menzies government designed to destroy him.

Labor was indeed defeated at the May 1954 election.

In material supplied by the Petrovs, the famed "Document J", written by communist Rupert Lockwood, named several members of Evatt's staff as having communist links: Dalziel, Albert Grundeman and Fergan O'Sullivan.

Evatt decided to appear before the royal commission to defend his staff.

Dalziel had several close relationships with prominent Russian spies living in Australia and had been under ASIO surveillance since the late 40s.

Nevertheless, he was exonerated by the royal commission.

O'Sullivan, Evatt's press secretary, had supplied the Russians with an overview of the Canberra press gallery, identifying journalists who might have been sympathetic to their interests. This was the famed "Document H" presented to the commission.

O'Sullivan was sacked by Evatt, who claimed he was part of a plot to discredit him.

On October 19, 1955, after the report of the royal commission was published, Evatt announced in parliament that he had written to the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, to ask if the Petrov documents were forgeries. In effect, Evatt had asked the Russians if they had spies in Australia.

Of course, they said there were no Russian spies in Australia.

In parliament, Labor MPs were stunned; Coalition MPs fell about laughing.

Appearing before the royal commission and writing to Molotov are widely seen as grave errors in judgment.

Wyndham says: "I admit that Evatt's actions regarding Molotov were naive."

It is a view backed up by the ASIO official, who says Evatt had a tendency to accept uncritically what he was told by people close to him and was taken advantage of.

The recent release of MI5 documents showed Australia's intelligence chief, Charles Spry, informed the British government that they should consider withholding intelligence from Australia if the ALP won government.

Prime minister Robert Menzies believed Evatt's judgment represented a security risk, arguing that "everything must be done in national as distinct from political party interest to prevent Evatt becoming prime minister". While Menzies and Spry were worried about Evatt's state of mind, it may have been those around him they were most worried about.

These new claims demand further research into Evatt's mental condition, the role of Evatt's staff and the underlying reasons as to why Menzies felt he had to warn the British about the threat of an Evatt government.

There is also no doubt that there were some abuses of power by ASIO and some Australians were wrongly targeted during the Cold War.

But the threat of communism was real.

There were widespread Communist Party links between scores of ALP figures in the party organisation and others elected to municipal councils and state and federal parliaments. Local ALP branches were plagued with communist supporters.

A secret Soviet spy ring operated in Australia that reached into the commonwealth public service.

Evatt may have been flawed and mentally unstable, but for many he was also a leader and a visionary for peace, civil liberties and social justice.

Troy Bramston is a former speechwriter to Kevin Rudd, an adviser to the Rudd government and a Labor historian.