Kerr, the queen, her palace and a PM

NEITHER the Queen nor Whitlam knew the end was coming.

John Kerr

AS the New Year dawned in 1980, Sir John Kerr, the former governor-general who had dismissed the Whitlam government in November 1975 at the height of the constitutional crisis, decided to start a handwritten journal.

Sitting alone in his study, seeing the thick frost that lay on the ground outside but warmed by central heating and wearing a heavy navy woollen guernsey, Kerr started to write in his characteristically cramped scrawl.

Now living in England, his 153-page journal provides a stunning insight into the mind of Kerr, still obsessed by the dismissal five years on: the interplay of key characters, the sequence of events, the exercise of the reserve powers to dismiss the government and the consequences of that unprecedented action.

"It will be personal and reflective," Kerr writes. While it includes an account of Kerr's domestic life, the most striking aspect is a series of passages that deal with the role of the Queen and the staff of Buckingham Palace during the constitutional crisis.

The National Archives in Canberra holds two sealed boxes of correspondence between Kerr and the palace, which are not to be opened until 2027.

But what is accessible is Kerr's journal, alongside handwritten notes, typed memos and extracts from letters he sent to the palace -- many that have not been published until now -- which break protocol by revealing the confidences of the Queen, Prince Charles and other members of the royal household.

PICTURE GALLERY: Kerr and the dismissal

Kerr writes in the journal of his "regular and thorough reporting to the Queen" throughout the constitutional crisis. "Conversations with the Queen and with Sir Martin Charteris, her private secretary, as well as questions raised by me in the correspondence itself left me with the comfortable assurance that what I was writing, and the way I was going about the task, were welcomed in the Palace," Kerr writes. He was convinced that the Queen read every letter he sent to the palace.

The journal reveals that Kerr was obsessed about being recalled as governor-general -- removed from office -- by the Queen on the advice of prime minister Gough Whitlam as the constitutional crisis edged closer. While he continually downplayed this as a factor in his motivation, his journal, notes and letters make it clear that fear of removal was always at the top of Kerr's mind.

"I was not frightened of dismissal," Kerr writes. But he firmly believed that this was Whitlam's strategy: to force him from office and replace him with a more compliant governor-general if he did not act on Whitlam's instructions. "My analysis of the Whitlam character forced me to work out what my attitude to the prospect of recall would have to be," he writes. Whitlam's only strategy "to avoid an election", Kerr believed, was "my recall".

"Getting myself dismissed would create," Kerr argued, "a vice-regal vacuum because I would be replaced by someone who would do what the PM wanted the GG to do, which was nothing."

A meeting in September 1975 with a senior official in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Geoff Yeend, led Kerr to believe that his recall was a viable option for Whitlam. According to the journal, Yeend told Kerr that if he were forced to act to resolve the crisis, "Your own position could be in doubt. There could be a race to the Palace".

Later that month, Kerr was in Port Moresby and talked to Prince Charles. In the event of a supply crisis, Kerr told the Prince of Wales that "the reserve powers" might "need to be exercised", which could heighten "the risk of recall".

"But surely Sir John," Prince Charles told him, "the Queen would not have to accept advice that you should be recalled at the very time should this happen when you were considering having to dismiss the government." But this did not provide any comfort to Kerr. He knew that if the Queen were advised by Whitlam to recall him, she would act on this advice. Indeed, Kerr's journal says that after Prince Charles returned to London, he spoke to Charteris, who then wrote to Kerr on October 7: "Martin said he should tell me that if the kind of contingency in mind were to develop, although the Queen would try to delay things, in the end she would have to take the Prime Minister's advice."

But Kerr had already made up his mind. "I did not really need Martin's letter," he writes. A week before supply was blocked, to keep the option of exercising the reserve powers and to avoid being recalled, Kerr had decided to "play my cards close to my chest".

But Kerr also had another strategy: he would let the Queen and opposition leader Malcolm Fraser know that he feared recall. This was invaluable information to Fraser, whose strategy was that in any continuing deadlock, the governor-general would act to resolve the crisis.

On the day supply was blocked -- October 16 -- Kerr, along with Whitlam and Fraser, attended a Government House dinner with the prime minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak. Kerr told Fraser his worry about the possibility of recall. "It was inconceivable," Fraser said, according to a note in Kerr's papers, "the Queen would never permit it". Kerr replied that it may be "unlikely", but he had decided to tell Fraser because "he could be badly caught by ending up with a governor-general who would not even consider ever using the reserve power".

At the event, Whitlam joked that "it could be a question of whether I get to the Queen first for your recall or you get in first with my dismissal". Kerr writes in his journal that he was "shocked" to hear Whitlam say this and, in the context of the question of recall, "the Queen was entitled to know what Mr Whitlam had said".

He wrote to the palace the next day, October 17, letting the Queen know of Whitlam's inherent bullying. In other letters, Kerr provides frank commentary on Whitlam's political strategy and his state of mind. His aim was to leave her with the impression that Whitlam was an unreasonable and inflexible man who was intimidating the governor-general and would never recommend an election to break the impasse. In his journal, Kerr describes Whitlam as suffering from "euphoric megalomania". He says Whitlam had "the belief that nothing could stop him, that he was unassailable".

On November 6, Kerr writes to the palace that Whitlam "said that the only way in which an election for the House could occur would be if I dismissed him". Kerr is preparing the ground for dismissal. After the dismissal, on November 20, Kerr told the palace that Whitlam said, "there could only be one way in which an election could be obtained and that was by his dismissal".

Kerr even wrote to the palace on November 11, the day of the dismissal. He reported to the Queen that after Whitlam was dismissed, he said, "I shall have to get in touch with the Palace immediately".

Whitlam has denied this remark. But Kerr's motive is obvious -- it is to vindicate his dismissal by ambush by persuading the palace that Whitlam always planned to move against him.

Kerr not only deceived Whitlam. He gave the palace no warning. Nor did the palace give explicit or tacit approval in advance. Although handwritten notes in the Kerr papers refer to "Charteris's advice to me on dismissal", there is no such "advice" in the open files and the palace stated no such "advice" was given.

Indeed, a handwritten note from a palace adviser dated November 11 and later sent to Kerr instructs palace staff to tell the media that the Queen was "informed" of the dismissal "after" it occurred and there were no "consultations or seeking advice" on his decision to terminate the government.

When the Queen visited Australia in 1977, Kerr discussed the dismissal with her. In a 13-page handwritten note, Kerr wonders about "the legitimacy of everything done by me" and "the effect of dismissal of the Whitlam government upon the position of the monarchy in Australia".

He writes that he offered to resign as soon as Fraser's caretaker government was sworn in and again after the December 1975 election. "The prime minister and the Palace both advised against it," he writes.

Kerr's journal did not last very long. On January 1, 1980, he was unsure if he had "the disciplined habits of mind and life" necessary for keeping a daily journal. He didn't. The last entry is dated March 14, 1980.

Journals are, in part, a repository for secrets. Historian Jenny Hocking, who had access to the Kerr papers for her biography Gough Whitlam: His Time, argues that Kerr had secured "in advance the response of the Palace to" dismissal and that "understandings" were reached. However, this conclusion is not verified by the documents. Charteris counselled Kerr that "in the end," the Queen would accept Whitlam's advice to recall him, if such advice were tendered.

It was this counsel that reinforced Kerr's decision to act, as he wrote, "decisively", "secretively" and "by stealth" without informing the Queen or Whitlam of his decision to terminate the government on November 11, 1975.