Defence Strategic Review: Bold changes send clear message to potential enemies
Shrewdly timed to coincide with Anzac Day commemorations, the Albanese government has taken a major step forward in delivering on its promise to make the ADF a more “impactful” force, with the much-anticipated release of its response to the Defence Strategic Review. This sends an unambiguous signal to potential adversaries that while Australia is committed to preserving the peace, we won’t be a pushover if it comes to a fight.
The ADF is now set on a path of transformation – from a boutique force with niche capabilities but little punch to a harder, more lethal, self-reliant military that is also more interoperable with allies and friends. Higher levels of interoperability will be crucial to offset the advantages that autocracies have in their ability to mobilise resources and prosecute the untrammelled ambitions of their rulers.
Independent leads Stephen Smith and Angus Houston assert their review “is the most substantial and ambitious approach to defence reform” since World War II and it will “reshape the force structure, posture and capability of Defence for coming decades.”
This is a justifiable claim, given the sweep of the review and the government’s acceptance of all 62 recommendations contained in the 110-page public version. The more detailed, classified version is said to be one third longer with additional recommendations.
The accompanying national statement summarises the government’s response and supports the review’s strategic direction and key findings. It foreshadows a more comprehensive, granular review of national defence strategy to be held biennially from next year which will align capability and investment priorities with the Defence Strategic Review’s recommendations. There will also be an independent analysis of the navy’s surface combatant fleet and a Defence Industry Development Strategy later this year.
This is a hugely ambitious agenda which will consume much of the government’s policy bandwidth for the duration of its term.
Tyson Sara, a former defence official and CEO of advisory group CMAX, says “the review raises as many questions as it answers (and) the Defence Department has a huge task to turn a number of general recommendations into specific, meaningful and lasting reforms.” Sara adds: “The spawning of another review into the navy’s surface fleet means that clear answers about the size, capability and cost of the future ADF are still a way off.”
That’s right. Revamping a defence force and supporting acquisition system no longer fit for purpose in the judgment of Smith and Houston is going to take a long time. But this is a god start.
The authors have charted a clear pathway to a better-structured and postured ADF which is conceptually labelled “national defence”. This requires a more holistic, whole of government and nation approach; “changes to mindsets and technologies to deliver competitive advantage”; an ability to strike adversaries at long distance; moving from a balanced to a focused force; and acquiring crucial future-focused joint capabilities such as information warfare, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, and guided weapons and explosive ordnance.”
The need for these changes was succinctly captured by Penny Wong in her foreign policy address to the National Press Club last week. In what is effectively an explanatory preamble of the strategic rationale for the new national defence plan, Wong says: “In an age of military modernisation, as other militaries can operate from increased range, with faster speed, and greater precision and lethality, taking responsibility for our security means being able to hold potential adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance.”
In the steady drip of rumours, leaks and announcements about missiles, armed drones, new ships and aircraft, it’s easy to miss the thread that binds these capabilities into an efficacious strategy. But the striking aspect of the review’s approach, and the government’s response, is the marrying of foreign, defence, energy and climate policies into a coherent whole.
The principal aim is to ensure a regional balance of power that protects Australian interests and values by working with like-minded countries to preserve the status quo which, as Wong says, “is comprehensively superior to any alternative”.
The review makes it clear that a military with real clout to underpin a strategy of denial is the best way of avoiding conflict. But if deterrence fails, then the ADF must be capable of credibly defending Australia by imposing high costs on a potential aggressor.
Defence Minister Richard Marles has been measured in his assessment of the threats to Australia’s security and careful not to single out individual countries for criticism. But there is no doubt that China’s unprecedented military build-up, regional assertiveness and coercive practices have driven the government’s response to the review.
Anthony Albanese and Marles clearly intend to build a defence force designed to counter China’s overwhelming superiority in missiles and naval power by putting the ships and aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army in danger should they attempt to penetrate the protective archipelago to our north with hostile intent.
Together with the previously announced commitment to nuclear-powered submarines, the new capabilities will boost defence spending from an already respectable 2 per cent of GDP to as much as 3 per cent beyond 2027.
If realised, this would be the highest level of defence spending in half a century, strengthening Labor’s alliance and national security credentials tarnished during the Gillard era when defence spending fell to historic lows.
We are now indisputably pulling our alliance weight by any objective measure.
But doubts remain about whether this level of spending will be sustained over the five to six electoral cycles required to deliver on the review. Bipartisanship is essential but may not be enough as fiscal realities bite. There will be plenty of opportunities for backsliding. Governments of both political persuasions have a long history of overpromising on defence. Enticing big super and venture capital to invest in defence infrastructure is the key to reducing the burden on the taxpayer and funding the ADF’s needs.
Time is not on our side. Marles knows full well that the likely trigger for a serious conflict in our region is Xi Jinping’s determination to incorporate Taiwan into China. The window for Chinese military action will be wide open from 2025. Any conflict over Taiwan could make us a target for Chinese missiles. Hence the imperative to get new capabilities in place as quickly as possible.
That’s why the review has identified three distinct time periods for defence planning: “The three-year period 2023-2025 (for those matters which must be prioritised and addressed urgently); the five-year period 2026-2030; and the period 2031 and beyond.”
Unfortunately, the existing acquisition system can’t deliver quickly or efficiently. The review concedes that “Defence’s current approach to capability acquisition is not fit for purpose – the system needs to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering timely and relevant capability”.
Part of the problem is that we are overly reliant on overseas suppliers. Since the start of the Ukraine conflict, everyone else wants the same missiles, drones and smart munitions as us. We need a domestic defence sector that can produce more of the capabilities required so that we can control what we use from cradle to grave. That’s the real definition of a sovereign capability. Not waiting in a queue for non-Australian suppliers to dictate the delivery schedule and charge high prices.
The next challenge for the government is ensuring that the Defence Industry Development Strategy slashes red tape, promotes innovation and reduces our heavy dependence on imports by establishing the foundations of a robust and world-class Australian defence industry.
Alan Dupont is The Australian’s contributing national security editor.