PM needs to preserve security legacy

Morrison as PM – following the initiatives of Turnbull – has taken Australia into a permanently new era in its foreign and security future. Picture: NCA NewsWire / Martin Ollman

With Russia threatening Ukraine by military invasion or internal destabilisation, China intensifying its military pressure on Taiwan and US-China strategic rivalry rapidly deepening, warnings by Scott Morrison two years ago about a dangerous world look only more salient.

Drawing parallels with the 1930s and ’40s, the Prime Minister said the global order from which Australia had prospered over many decades was facing “increasing and I would suggest almost irreversible strain”.

The evidence for this continues to mount. Morrison as PM – following the initiatives of Malcolm Turnbull – has taken Australia into a permanently new era in its foreign and security future. His decisions as a foreign policy activist will have consequences lasting for years, probably decades. For the record they are conviction decisions, not marketing decisions.

Morrison’s pushback against Beijing has won public support in Australia, bipartisan backing from the Labor Party, and global attention and kudos. But a new chapter is opening, driven by domestic politics. Morrison is engaged in a high-risk play, seeking to make China policy into a partisan issue in the election.

Drawing a nexus between Ukraine and China, Morrison has criticised China for not publicly calling out Russia’s threats of violence against Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty – and he has linked this to the opposition, saying Labor wants “to appease when it comes to China”.

Morrison seeks to wedge Labor on China. He casts himself as a leader of national security strength against China – on shutting the border, demanding an inquiry into the pandemic’s origins and defying China. His remarks will provoke further criticism of Morrison from the Beijing government. And Morrison knows this.

He told John Laws in an interview yesterday on 2SM he was calling out China. “I know there will be blowback against me,” Morrison said, almost inviting public criticism from Beijing – blowback, he assumes, that will underline his strength in the election context.

There are two obvious points. These tactics will not necessarily work since they reveal a strand of desperation from the government. And they risk damaging the national interest by provoking China with comments that, while accurate, are unnecessary and designed to wedge Labor for domestic purposes. Morrison should safeguard his foreign policy legacy as Prime Minister. This tactic only risks compromising that legacy.

Morrison’s pushback of resilience against China over the past three years is outlined in my Lowy Institute/Penguin book launched this week, Morrison’s Mission: How a Beginner Reshaped Australian Foreign Policy. The book tells the story of how the organising principle of Morrison’s policy became his resistance to China’s effort to break Australia’s will via economic coercion. Morrison believed the challenge from China constituted a decisive historical moment for Australia.

Many will disagree. But understanding Morrison’s conclusions is the first stage in assessing his policy. “Resolve is so important” in combating China, Morrison said. “If I was to be jittery” that would be exploited and the country “would lose confidence”. He believed the ultimate issue was whether China could drive Australia on to a trajectory of client state submission.

For two years Australia’s pushback against China has assumed global significance. A senior official said: “Other countries are going to reach a conclusion – either Australia is offering a successful template for other nations in defying China’s coercion or we become an example of what not to do.”

So far the judgment is heavily in Morrison’s favour, but the challenge is just in its infancy. Morrison’s view is that if Australia does not stand firm against Beijing’s coercion now it will be forced to stand up from a far weaker position in future. As Turnbull has argued, China’s tactics have failed. “Allow them an elegant dismount,” he said. Yet this is unlikely to happen.

Many people felt Australia would have buckled by now under the loss of China’s markets. Former Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade secretary and former director-general of the Office of National Assessments Peter Varghese said: “I think China is probably surprised that we didn’t give in, given the sheer extent of the retaliation.”

While alert to the military dimensions of China’s rise, Morrison’s deeper focus is what he sees as the sovereignty threat from China. Morrison as PM has surprised Beijing; he internationalised the crisis in bilateral ties by advocating the Quad at leaders level, which US President Joe Biden brought to fruition, and he secured the nuclear-powered submarine fleet decision for Aus­tralia in the AUKUS agreement with Biden and Boris Johnson, a decision that has global significance. The progress of the Quad and the submarine agreement are hostage to immense and unpredictable forces. There are few certainties in this climate.

Morrison has operated on three assumptions: despite America’s internal traumas Australia’s interests are best served by deepening the US alliance; Australia must mobilise regional networks in the Indo-Pacific to balance China’s muscle flexing; and our self-reliance must be enhanced.

It is imperative for Australia that the coming election campaign deepen the public awareness of the challenges Australia faces so the incoming government – whether led by Morrison or Anthony Albanese – is mandated to build Australia’s resilience across the economic, diplomatic and military domains.

Every sign from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific points to a world of growing power rivalry, the possible resort to military force, an intensifying US-China contest for technological superiority and a decline in the rules-based order. In this environment Australia needs the resolve and the flexibility to revise both its internal and external policy frameworks.

There is wide agreement about the changes under way in the strategic order – but not necessarily about how Australia should respond. Former diplomat, adviser to Paul Keating and former head of ONA Allan Gyngell has said: “There is no doubt in my mind that the post-second world war order that suited Australia so much has come to an end. It’s not being challenged. It’s not changing. It’s over.”

Principal author of the 2017 foreign policy white paper and former head of the ONA Richard Maude has said: “Morrison inherited a foreign policy already beginning to adapt to a world in transformation. More change is coming.” Interviewed last year before the unveiling of the Australia-UK-US nuclear powered submarine agreement, Maude said: “Morrison now faces a steady stream of consequential policy decisions as the old world order unravels and US-China competition ramps up.”

Reflecting on her time as DFAT secretary, Frances Adamson said last year: “The West’s advantage in economic, military and technological power is ebbing. The international order is being remade and there are big agendas ahead for Australia.”

Pivotal to Australia’s success in its pushback against China has been support from the public and bipartisanship from Labor. This bipartisanship is a national asset. The election needs to leave Australia in a stronger position to deal with China, not diminished and more divided.