Pentagon’s AUKUS review should spark strategic reckoning in Canberra

“This moment demands more than rhetoric. It demands increased defence spending – well beyond current projections,” writes Ian Langford.

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The Pentagon’s overnight announcement that it will formally review the 2021 AUKUS agreement – specifically the planned transfer of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia – has thrown the trilateral pact into fresh uncertainty.

While the review is officially framed as part of routine oversight, its timing and tone suggest something more significant: a reassessment of US strategic priorities and, potentially, a reprioritisation away from long-term alliance promises.

Elbridge Colby, whose influence within Republican defence circles has grown significantly, is fuelling speculation on the future of the pact. Known for his scepticism about alliance-industrial initiatives, Colby has reportedly declined recent engagements with Australian and British AUKUS officials. He is said to view the submarine transfer not as a deterrence multiplier but as a misallocation of US resources, particularly as Washington shifts towards confronting more immediate threats in the Indo-Pacific.

In his view, transferring submarines in the early 2030s does little to address a crisis that may arrive in the second half of this decade.

There is growing belief in Canberra that the review may also be a tactical move – an attempt to pressure the Albanese government into announcing a sharper increase in defence spending during next week’s G7 summit, where Anthony Albanese is expected to meet Donald Trump. The signal is clear: if Australia wants to benefit from the US’s most sensitive military technologies, it must contribute more – faster, and more visibly.

Setting aside the motive, the consequences are severe.

If the US delays or cancels the promised transfer of nuclear-powered submarines, Australia is left dangerously exposed. The current diesel-electric fleet is ageing. Until any of the locally built nuclear vessels are delivered – if they proceed at all – the capability gap could stretch into the 2040s.

That’s much too late to deter or respond to any near-term conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

The government must reconsider its force posture and move decisively to prepare for the risk of conflict within the next two to five years. That scenario is no longer implausible. The intensifying pace of Chinese military coercion, over Taiwan and throughout Southeast Asia’s maritime zones, has prompted many analysts to warn that a regional conflict could erupt well before Australia’s planned future force is realised.

Vice-President JD Vance (left) and Elbridge Colby. Picture: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

To prepare for such a contingency, Australia must rapidly invest in what military planners call “fight tonight” capabilities – those that can be operationalised within 12 to 18 months and generate real deterrent effect.

Australia must expand its inventory of long-range precision strike systems that can be launched from sea, land or air platforms. These systems are essential for targeting hostile naval forces, especially in contested waters. They provide standoff reach, reduce risk to RAN and RAAF platforms, and enhance Australia’s contribution to allied maritime operations in the northern approaches and beyond.

Counter-air systems must be strengthened to defend Australian territory, forward bases and deployed forces. This includes additional mobile and fixed-site sensors and interceptor systems capable of responding to high-speed aircraft and missile threats. A credible and resilient air defence shield is essential to protect critical nodes in northern Australia and support joint operations in forward areas.

Australia should invest in multi-layered missile defence capabilities that can detect, track and neutralise incoming threats, ranging from ballistic projectiles to cruise missiles and loitering munitions. These systems must be deployable, survivable and integrated with broader allied command and control networks. The current shortfalls in this area would be ruthlessly exposed in the opening hours of any high-end conflict.

The AUKUS review should trigger a broader strategic reckoning in Canberra.

While the partnership was initially framed as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to deepen defence co-operation with the US and the UK, the current situation underscores a stark reality: Australia remains a junior partner in an arrangement that can shift dramatically based on domestic political winds in Washington.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. Picture: Jim Watson/AFP

That should prompt urgent questions. What if the submarine deal falls over? Can Australia accelerate its conventional deterrent posture without waiting for imported nuclear platforms? Is Australia doing enough to develop sovereign production capacity for critical systems such as guided weapons, sensors and autonomous platforms?

And, most importantly, doesAustralia have the political will – and public mandate – to step up?

This moment demands more than rhetoric. It demands increased defence spending – well beyond current projections. It demands faster acquisition cycles, greater industry integration, and a ruthless focus on capability that can be delivered, deployed and sustained in the near term. It also demands that Australia thinks clearly about its role in shaping the balance of power – not merely as a consumer of allied largesse, but as a credible contributor to regional stability.

If AUKUS falters, the worst outcome would not be the loss of submarines. It would instead result in strategic paralysis in Canberra, where, in the absence of an AUKUS plan B, policymakers would have no choice but to await further decisions from Washington, while the region drifts towards crisis.

Instead, Australia must think fast and decisively.

The review may yet resolve in favour of Australia. But whether it does or not, the underlying lesson is clear: alliances are not guarantees. They are instruments, shaped by politics and underpinned by power.

Australia must now generate military power of its own. That means investing not just in platforms for the 2040s, but in the capabilities needed to deter, fight and win in the 2020s.

That is the essence of sovereign statecraft – and the real test of whether Australia can step up.

Professor Ian Langford is a UNSW academic and the executive director of Security & Defence PLuS