How we stepped out of Britain’s shadow

Illustration: Tom Jellett

About noon on July 26, 1950, the austere head of the department of external affairs, Alan Watt, grabbed a barrel-chested junior officer later to become famous, Arthur Tange, and they set out by car for Summerleas, the southern highlands property of Charles Lloyd Jones, on a trip that made history.

Australia’s foreign minister, Percy Spender, had an ulcer problem and was recuperating at Lloyd Jones’s property when he was delivered a far bigger global problem. That morning, Watt, in a condition of “considerable agitation”, had rung Spender with urgent news; the Attlee government had reversed policy and decided Britain would commit ground troops to support the US in the Korean War.

The British government would be announcing its decision to the world at 8pm Australian time. This was a shock to the Australian government. Prime minister Robert Menzies had been in London in the preceding days, had sat in the British cabinet and cabled home reporting there was no disposition to commit to Korea. Spender told Watt to immediately see him.

On the 70th anniversary of the Korean War — a brutal conflict that saw five million casualties and 340 Australian deaths — the story of how Australia went to war is revealing. On that day senior ministers were spread everywhere: Menzies on the Queen Mary sailing to America; acting PM and Country Party leader Arthur Fadden in Queensland; Spender near Moss Vale and appalled by the dilemma he confronted.

Spender knew any British announcement would trigger a follow-up war decision by Australia and New Zealand. This was exactly what Spender wanted to avoid: Australia as a subservient colonial trailing Britain to war yet again.

Already a veteran, having been elected to parliament in 1937 and a wartime minister, Spender had passionate views on defence and foreign policy.

Unlike Menzies, he was convinced of the need for a post-war Pacific pact that would tie Australia to the US in a new security arrangement.

Spender’s problem was that his vision of an Australian reorientation towards America was not shared by US political leaders and, as a consequence, was not viable.

Spender grasped immediately the significance of the Korean War for Australia. US president Harry Truman and the commander of UN forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, wanted commitments from Commonwealth countries, given the North Korean army had taken Seoul and smashed its way across much of South Korea.

For weeks Spender had been pressing Menzies, without success, for an Australian troop commitment. On July 17, he had cabled Menzies in London, warning the US position was probably “desperate” and saying: “From Australia’s long-term point of view any additional aid we can give to the US now, small though it may well be, will repay us in the future one hundred fold. My personal view is that we must scrape the bucket to see what we can give.”

That afternoon at Summerleas, Spender believed a moment of destiny had arrived. After speaking with the two-man delegation, Spender decided: Australia must commit ground forces to Korea, it must commit immediately, and it must announce ahead of the British.

It was impossible to convene a cabinet meeting. There was no point anyway. Spender knew the cabinet would not take a decision without knowing Menzies’s view. He told Watt that Australia must show the US it would take decisions in its own right, not just follow Britain.

Spender rang Fadden. His secretary said the acting PM was on his feet delivering a speech. Spender said his business would not wait; the speech must be interrupted.

Fadden was unimpressed. Spender explained the situation but Fadden said, more than once: “You know the views of the ‘Big Fellow’.” Fadden wouldn’t move without “Bob’s approval”. Spender refused to take no for an answer. He told Fadden he was the acting PM, a secure phone call to Menzies was not possible, it was Fadden’s responsibility to decide.

They reflected on their wartime decisions, notably, sending the AIF to Greece. “And we now have to decide whether we send Australian troops to Korea,” Spender said.

But Fadden still demurred. He wanted to wait until Menzies reached New York. Spender said that would take days; it wasn’t an option. Fadden asked why cabinet ministers couldn’t be consulted by phone. Spender said the time factor made that impossible: Fadden had to decide. Finally, Fadden said Spender could make the announcement. Spender said that wouldn’t do. The announcement must come from Fadden or in the Australian government’s name. Fadden acquiesced. “I will leave it to you,” was his final word.

Watt was at Spender’s side throughout the tortuous exchange. “He (Watt) was more than surprised,” Spender said.

The foreign minister drafted the short statement of principle. The vital sentence read: “In response to the appeal of the United Nations, the Australian government has decided to provide ground troops for use in Korea.”

Watt rang the ABC. The decision was announced on the 7pm news. Watt heard the report on his car radio returning to Canberra.

Now came the hardest part. Spender had to brief Menzies before he got off the boat. He made contact on the trans-ocean phone. “He was obviously put out,” Spender said. “He said little and in the circumstances I could not say much, but even over the distance of some 12,000 miles, I was aware of the sourness in his voice. I could not very well give him by telephone the reasons which activated the decision.”

Those reasons were remarkable. A few days earlier the British government had changed its mind after a report from its US ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, who said the Truman administration believed the campaign would be long and difficult, and saw Britain as its only dependable ally. In his official history of Australia in the Korean War, Bob O’Neill said Franks finished with a warning — a refusal by Britain would adversely change the core relationship with the US.

Clement Attlee now switched from what he had told Menzies: Britain was going to war but Menzies, on the high seas, didn’t know. Attlee sent a message to Menzies but it wasn’t received until the Queen Mary docked in New York. O’Neill recounts Spender now sent Menzies a cable with more detail attacking the British government, saying it had presented Australia with a fait accompli and had “placed Australia and yourself as prime minister in an unenviable and preposterous position”. He said had the British announcement come first it would imply Australia could not decide until Britain acted.

One of our smartest diplomats, KCO “Mick” Shann, based in New York, gathered all the cables and used a launch to get to the Queen Mary, enabling Menzies to digest the dramatic events. In typical fashion, as the liner berthed, Menzies commanded a press conference leaving the impression this was his own decision. He went to Washington, addressed congress and was hailed as a hero.

Many years later Tange told me: “Australia contributed forces to Korea for its own diplomatic reasons, not to protect the people of South Korea. I think that should be said candidly.” Two months later Spender met Truman in the Oval Office and raised the idea of a security treaty. It was the first Truman had heard of the idea. He was sympathetic. His immediate response was to express admiration for the performance of Australian troops in World War I.

For the first time Spender had won the support of a prominent American for his pact — President Truman. Not bad. Spender left the White House optimistic. O’Neill said this meeting was the “real turning point” leading to the ANZUS treaty.