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Michael Shoebridge

‘Extreme risk’ of AUKUS deal to US motivates Colby

Michael Shoebridge
US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Elbridge Colby, who is leading a Pentagon review of AUKUS. Picture: Bloomberg
US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Elbridge Colby, who is leading a Pentagon review of AUKUS. Picture: Bloomberg

AUKUS gives Australia some big levers over America.

There has been plenty of criticism and consternation about reports that Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon official running the Trump administration’s AUKUS review, had asked for some kind of commitment about Australian involvement if there were a conflict with China over Taiwan.

Colby is no fool. He probably has two very rational reasons for raising the issue. One is about the planning necessary to make collective deterrence real. And the other is about some big political and military risks for the US that are baked into the AUKUS nuclear submarine plan.

While the actual request isn’t clear, Colby is an experienced professional who knows that US policy towards Taiwan is one of strategic ambiguity, so he knows he won’t get an iron-clad position from the Australian government about a potential future conflict.

What’s going on? US officials may be sensibly frustrated about an Australian reluctance to do serious collective planning for a conflict over Taiwan because this may lock Australia in if something real happened. That anxiety waxes and wanes across time. It almost certainly doesn’t stop with senior civilian or military officials but is shared by our political leaders.

The problem with a fearful approach to sensitive collective planning is that Australia gets left not knowing what partners and allies may do in a time of crisis, and not knowing what assumptions are being made about Australian actions. That means we aren’t able to shape plans and expectations. Worse, when real-world events happen – such as Chinese leader Xi Jinping directing an invasion of Taiwan – Australian decision-makers will be knowledge-poor and badly prepared to make critical decisions right when the press of events means thinking and planning time isn’t available.

So, if our US allies in the Pentagon are making potential operational plans to deter China over Taiwan and to defeat the Chinese military if deterrence fails, it’s sensible for Australia to participate in that collective planning work. Then we avoid false assumptions being made and we put our decision-makers in a position of knowledge and strength should a crisis occur. Maybe Colby gets this and is bemused that his Australian partners don’t.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, UK Defence Secretary John Healey and Defence Minister Richard Marles. The UK and Australia announced a new 50-year AUKUS deal on Friday. Picture: Jeremy Piper/NewsWire/Pool
Foreign Minister Penny Wong, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, UK Defence Secretary John Healey and Defence Minister Richard Marles. The UK and Australia announced a new 50-year AUKUS deal on Friday. Picture: Jeremy Piper/NewsWire/Pool

The other reason Australian officials may be dealing with Colby’s awkward questions goes right to the heart of the AUKUS program’s design.

It’s not the question everyone is spending so much time on – whether Australia would or wouldn’t send the first few Australian-flagged Virginia-class submarines into a war sometime from the mid-2030s. Sure, that is an issue for the Pentagon, because those submarines will have come from the US Navy’s fleet at a time it doesn’t have enough to meet its own needs.

But the bigger, more immediate, risk to American freedom of action with submarines comes from the fact that, under the AUKUS Optimal Pathway plan agreed by the Biden administration, Australian personnel will be critical parts of the crews of the US Navy’s own submarines for the rest of this decade and into the mid-2030s.

Dan Packer, the US director of naval submarine forces for AUKUS, set this out very clearly back in May 2024, saying the US Navy will have 440 Australians on 25 attack submarines. Twelve per cent of the crew of each of 25 US subs will be Australian. And the US Navy is unlikely to have more than 25 deployable nuclear attack subs at any time because the rest will be in maintenance. Those Australian personnel won’t be in training billets.

As Packer put it, “This is something that has never happened before. We are completely, 100 per cent, integrating them into our crew, from a complete and utter perspective.”

For project planners, this makes absolute sense as the only way to solve the problem of getting about 3000 Australians trained up to operate nuclear-powered submarines between now and 2035. It also brings some advantages; as commander of US naval submarine forces Vice Admiral Robert Gaucher said, “We get the opportunity to leverage an ally who can help us with manning and operating.”

The USS Minnesota (SSN-783) Virginia-class fast attack submarine sails in the waters off the West Australian coast in March. Picture: Getty Images/Pool
The USS Minnesota (SSN-783) Virginia-class fast attack submarine sails in the waters off the West Australian coast in March. Picture: Getty Images/Pool

But it also brings a practical and big political and policy problem into play right now – a problem that will last until, and if, Australia manages to build a separate training program for submarine crews. Without these Australian crew members, the US Navy’s own fleet of Virginia-class submarines will be disabled. And if an Australian government decision on whether Australians can serve on US submarines in particular operations, crises or conflicts can be made only in the moment of crisis, then America’s security is at risk in a much bigger way than if two or three Australian-flagged submarines do or don’t join an operation.

Our American and British AUKUS partners know how Australia has handled decisions on Australians in line positions within each of their militaries. That won’t be reassuring anyone involved in the Pentagon’s AUKUS review. There’s an elaborate bureaucratic process for handling requests from our partners to have these Australians deploy with their US or British units when something real happens.

These third-country deployment decisions can go up to very senior decision-makers and potentially include ministers. No is a frequent answer.

To any informed American, such as Colby, this looks like a huge button labelled “Extreme Risk”. And as he absorbs the implications of the AUKUS training plan, he’s also reading our Prime Minister’s speeches about making our own decisions and saying no in previous conflicts.

Given this, if he wasn’t inquiring about what an Australian government and military might or might not do should a conflict with China over Taiwan begin, he wouldn’t be doing his job.

Maybe our political leaders here in Canberra and the senior defence civilian and military bureaucrats need to think through a better answer than “How very dare you!” to Colby’s question. AUKUS may depend on it.

Michael Shoebridge is founder and director of Strategic Analysis Australia.

Read related topics:AUKUSChina Ties

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Original URL: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/extreme-risk-of-aukus-deal-to-us-motivates-colby/news-story/1b73e1e4df4e223bfaf8b30ea9dd3d4d