Republic model will not deliver

As a mature democracy and independent nation, Australia must make the transition to become a republic – but the latest model put forward by the Australian Republic Movement will neither deliver the best candidate nor secure the public support necessary to make the change. A process through which multiple candidates are offered from states, territories and the commonwealth to compete in a popular election using a system of preferential voting is a recipe for political division and celebrity rule. As Paul Kelly and Troy Bramston have argued, the change to a republic can succeed only by appealing to a wide range of Australians, and without bipartisanship it will be permanently denied. The result of the 1998 constitutional convention made clear that Australians want to elect a future president rather than have one appointed by parliament. But this carries difficulties that could be amplified by the method put forward by the ARM. Public support for a popular election is understandable but it could compound, rather than resolve, the constitutional issues raised by the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam government.

The Australian proudly supports replacing the Queen of England with an Australian citizen to be our head of state. This is not to show disrespect to the British monarchy, whoever may be on the throne, but to affirm the dignity and self-determination of all our citizens. The question is not whether or not Australia should become a republic but the way in which the transition should be handled and the method through which Australia should choose its head of state. The public also expects that any constitutional changes should be minimal to preserve the solid foundations that exist and continue to serve the nation well. Under the ARM’s Australian Choice Model, federal, state and territory parliaments would each nominate candidates to be put to a national election. The powers of an elected head of state would be mostly ceremonial, avoiding “kinglike” executive powers or a governing presidency like the United States. The Australian Choice Model confirms that on most matters the head of state will act on the advice of the government of the day. A limited exception would be when appointing the prime minister they believe is most likely to form a government, who commands the confidence (has majority support) of the House of Representatives.

Once appointed, if a prime minister no longer commands the confidence of the House of Representatives, they are expected to resign. If they do not, the head of state can terminate their appointment and appoint a person who has majority support. The model enshrines the current practice and prohibits a head of state terminating the appointment of a prime minister who retains the confidence of the house.

The ARM proposal will inevitably work to the disadvantage of smaller states. Another difficulty is that holding a popular contest will encourage a perception of competing mandates on the part of an elected president and the government of the day. Political choices and a system of preferential voting would make the process unnecessarily partisan.

Becoming a republic is an issue the nation must confront, but there is no rush. If a public vote is to be embraced, we must guard against the establishment of a celebrity-style contest that would cheapen the authority of the office. The guiding lesson from earlier attempts is that without deep public and bipartisan support, the republican push is destined to fail.