Defence study is a wake-up call

Anthony Albanese’s insistence that his government “will invest in the (defence) capability that Australia needs” should be viewed in light of the compelling case for strengthening northern Australia as an Indo-Pacific allied stronghold.

That need is set out convincingly in a new study for Washington’s Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment by former US deputy assistant secretary of defence Thomas Mahnken, who served under president George. W. Bush from 2006 to 2009 and as an officer in the US Navy Reserve including tours of Iraq and Kosovo. The study, reported by Cameron Stewart, is a serious wake-up call. Lifting defence spending is not about placating Donald Trump. It is about serving the nation’s interests.

By implication the study raises questions about leadership, political will and the need for the government to make sure the public is well aware of the importance of the issue. Addressing the concerns raised would require a significant realignment of budget priorities, underlining the importance of productivity fuelling growth and the likely need to divert resources from other parts of the economy, such as subsidising high-risk green projects. That vital conversation needs to happen sooner rather than later.

The study canvasses defence infrastructure in northern Australia, going beyond the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, which was right in recommending major upgrades of the northern network of bases, ports and barracks, including RAAF bases Learmonth, Curtin, Darwin, Tindal, Scherger and Townsville. Dr Mahnken also covers the importance of a long-range strike capability and an integrated air, drone and missile defence system to protect key facilities and improve “survivability”.

Geography, which has been central to Australia’s defence strategy for the better part of a century, still works in the nation’s favour. But the possibility that Australia will be attacked can no longer be ignored, the study finds. Existing defence efforts would probably be inadequate in the event of a major conflict, which is why the Australian Defence Force needs to act with greater urgency, including investing in basic logistic support, such as additional fuel and munitions storage and the expansion of maintenance facilities.

The report also emphasises the importance of close intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the region to warn of threats to Australia and its neighbours. That capability is becoming more important given the increasing level of Chinese activity near Australia’s periphery.

In contrast to the government’s relatively muted response to the PLA navy’s live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea in February, Dr Mahnken notes that during a Senate estimates hearing in February Andrew Shearer, the head of Australia’s Office of National Intelligence, confirmed Chinese naval ships had never been spotted that far south before. “He suggested this troubling incident created a new paradigm because it is setting the stage for Beijing to regularise these activities near Australia,’’ the report says.

Beijing has steadily increased its ability to project naval power into Australia’s neighbourhood. In May 2022, for example, a Chinese spy ship operated off the coast of Australia for nearly a week, spending days near the Harold E. Holt Communications Station in Exmouth, Western Australia, which provides very-low-frequency communication transmission services to Australian and US submarines.

As Australia and Britain strengthen their AUKUS ties, co-signing a new 50-year treaty, Dr Mahnken’s study notes that the Virginia-class submarines to be acquired under AUKUS have the speed, range and endurance suited to the Pacific region. By 2035, however, the ADF will have at most two Virginia-class subs in its inventory, constraining operations in the meantime.

On Thursday, Defence Minister Richard Marles told the ABC that the current era of strategic contest was being shaped by the biggest increase in conventional defence spending seen since the end of the Second World War – from China: “without strategic reassurance, in a sense that there’s not a clear articulation of why that defence spending is occurring”. Australia needed “to be making sure that we are facing the complex strategic circumstances”. The process, Mr Marles said, included updating the National Defence Strategy every two years. It was due in the first or second quarter of next year.

Judging by the issues raised by the CSBA report, the next NDS will demand hard decisions because the time available to create an expanded, resilient defence infrastructure suited to 21st-century warfare is limited. The report’s insights and the opportunities our alliances afford must not be wasted. Business as usual, with defence on the backburner, no longer is good enough.