Canberra must be clear-eyed on risks of EU security pact

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Ursula von der Leyen, president of European Commission in Rome. Picture: Instagram

Australia’s security environment is marked by a complex tapestry of alliances and strategic commitments. As Canberra contemplates an expanded security partnership with the European Union, policymakers must weigh potential gains against risks to our national interest. A pact with the EU could promise enhanced intelligence sharing, joint exercises and collaboration on emerging threats – from cyber attacks to maritime security – but it also risks collateral tensions with existing frameworks, notably the 2024 National Defence Strategy and the foundational AUKUS agreement.

History warns that, untethered from clear national objectives, well-intentioned coalitions can metastasise into open-ended obligations, blind to local realities and political accountability.

At the core of any security pact lies the principle of national interest. For Australia, this means safeguarding its immediate neighbourhood in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining deterrence against coercion and ensuring freedom of navigation.

An EU framework, by contrast, emanates from a Euro-Atlantic perspective, shaped by collective defence imperatives underpinned by NATO’s Article 5. Pursuing a formal security pact with Brussels could entangle Australia in obligations far removed from its strategic priorities, stretching diplomatic bandwidth and defence resources thin. Worse, it risks “mission creep”: commitments that begin as targeted collaborations on cyber- or counter-terrorism could morph into expectations of coalition support for EU operations in Africa or the Middle East.

Such collateral commitments may contradict the government’s own 2024 NDS, which emphasises a lean, agile force posture focused on high-end capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Embedding EU security obligations into our planning could dilute these priorities. Lacking a strict tether to Australia’s defined “strategy of denial”, a security pact with the EU risks diverting attention and scarce defence dollars from the ambitious force design envisaged in the NDS.

Moreover, AUKUS remains Canberra’s keystone security architecture. Through trilateral co-operation with the US and UK, Australia will invest in nuclear-powered submarines, advanced conventional strike capability, and joint research on emerging technologies. Layering an EU agreement atop AUKUS could introduce conflicting interoperability standards, strategic doctrines and threat perceptions. The EU, still forging a common defence identity, often struggles to harmonise national caveats and rules of engagement among its 27 member states. By contrast, AUKUS partners have codified high-end interoperability and a shared threat narrative focused on the rise of revisionist powers. Policymakers must guard against strategic dilution: as David Kilcullen warns, modern conflict demands “an unrelenting focus on the political landscape, not just the battle space”. Entangling Australia in a Eurocentric security framework could distract from the political-military nexus that undergirds the credible deterrence from AUKUS in our region.

Henry Kissinger famously stressed any sound strategy must reconcile “ends, ways and means” in harmony. A pact with the EU might offer attractive “ways” – joint exercises, intelligence fusion, common procurement projects – but if the “ends” are nebulous or the “means” inadequate, the exercise is hollow.

Australia must calibrate the strategic calculus: what precise outcomes does a Europe-anchored security pact deliver? How will these outcomes advance deterrence against coercion in the South China Sea, protect critical supply chains, or reinforce sovereign decision-making?

Without clear answers, a treaty becomes an administrative exercise rather than a bulwark for national security. Some advocates argue closer ties with Europe could diversify Australia’s strategic partnerships, hedging against over-reliance on any single ally. Yet diversification without depth offers little protection. A shallow network of security arrangements can dissipate focus and resources. Rather than a broad-brush pact, Australia might achieve greater value through targeted, task-specific collaborations – cyber-defence exercises with individual EU member states, shared research on quantum encryption, or co-ordination on sanctions enforcement.

It is worth noting Australia’s commitment to supporting Ukraine does not require the complexity of operating within a European security framework. Such modular partnerships preserve strategic agility and ensure each engagement aligns tightly with national objectives. Security agreements are instruments of statecraft, not diplomatic trophies. They demand rigorous political oversight, clear strategic purpose, and unwavering fidelity to national interest. Before embracing an Australia-EU security pact, policymakers must ensure it complements, not contradicts, the 2024 NDS and AUKUS, reinforces accountability and serves as a genuine instrument of defence rather than a symbolic gesture.

Only then can Australia navigate the treacherous shoals of Euro-Atlantic politics without sacrificing strategic autonomy or blindly plunging into another failed war of choice.

Ian Langford is executive director of Security and Defence PLuS.