Australia’s strategic risks are changing and so must our defence thinking

Australia’s strategic outlook is deteriorating. For the first time since World War II, we face an increased prospect of threat from high-level military capabilities being introduced into our region.

This means we need to make a major change to the management of strategic risk. Strategic risk is a grey area in which governments need to make critical assessments of capability and intent. Since the 1976 defence white paper, judgments in this area have relied heavily on the conclusion that the capabilities required for a serious assault on Australia simply did not exist in our region.

In contrast, in the years ahead, the level of capability able to be brought to bear against Australia will increase. So, judgments relating to warning time will need to rely less on evidence of capability and more on assessments of motive and intent. Such judgments are inherently ambiguous and uncertain.

The potential warning time is shorter because regional military capability levels are higher and will increase yet further in the years ahead. Several countries are developing the capability for longer range strike, particularly China. How should Australia respond? Contingencies that are credible in the shorter term could be characterised by higher levels of intensity and technological sophistication.

This means that the Australian Defence Force’s readiness and sustainability must be increased: we need higher training levels, a demonstrable and sustainable surge capacity, greatly increased stocks of missiles and munitions, more maintenance spares, a robust fuel supply system, and modernised and protected operational bases in the north of Australia.

For the longer term, the key issue is whether there is a sound basis for the timely expansion of the ADF. Critical policy considerations include: the development of an Australian equivalent of an anti-access and area denial capability (especially for our vulnerable northern and western approaches), an improved capacity for anti-submarine warfare, and seriously revisiting our capacity for sustained strike operations.

The prospect of shortened warning times needs to be a major factor in our defence planning.

Much more thought must be given to planning for the expansion of the ADF and its capacity to engage in high-intensity conflict in our own defence in a way that we haven’t previously had to consider. We have to comprehend the “remote but plausible potential of confrontation with a major power adversary”, as the 2016 defence white paper observed.

We must refocus on our own region of primary strategic interest, which includes the eastern Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea, and the South Pacific.

The conduct of operations farther afield, including in the Middle East and Afghanistan, must not be allowed to distract from the effort and funding that need to go into this planning.

This will demand a major change in Australia’s approach to the management of strategic risk. It will be compounded by the likely absence of an obvious warning threshold. To help manage this ambiguity and uncertainty, it will be vital for Australia to increase the priority given to high levels of independent intelligence collection and analysis.

Recent developments in our region reflect a reduction in Australia’s strategic space as some countries develop military bases there, including in the South China Sea within reach of northern Australia. This is shortening the time that Australia has to understand, prepare and — if necessary — to respond to adverse military developments.

The issue confronting policy is whether we have built a sound basis from which to expand the ADF, especially our strike, air combat and maritime capabilities.

Having such an expanded force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any potential adversary and increase the size and military capabilities of the force it would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or to coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us.

Attacks on Australia of an intensity and duration sufficient to be a serious threat to our national way of life would be possible only by an adversary’s forces with access to bases and facilities in our immediate neighbourhood.

This needs to be taken into account when considering the development of Australia’s strike forces so that they have sufficient weight to deny any future adversary such military bases.

This involves reconsidering the range, endurance and weapon load of our strike forces and the numbers needed for repeated operations in the archipelago to our north and northeast.

Any serious review of Australia’s evolving strategic circumstances must come to the conclusion that the management of strategic risk is becoming significantly more demanding. It is imperative that planning for the defence of Australia, and for operations in our region of primary strategic concern, resumes the highest priority.

Re-establishing our foreign policy and defence presence in this part of the world should also be a key priority.

This approach does not mean to say that we identify any country as a threat.

Rather, we are responding to the significant improvement in hi-tech military capabilities across the board in our region. We would be adopting an area denial force posture in our own defence, like that of some other countries in our region.

Paul Dibb is emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University. He is a former deputy secretary of defence.