Victoria’s Covid-19 response structure a monster with three heads

Melbourne’s central business district is nearly deserted as Victorians lock down to fight another coronavirus outbreak. Picture: Getty Images

The latest Victorian COVID-19 lockdown was caused by two catastrophic errors. First, a complete breakdown in the communication, decision-making and administrative systems of the Victorian bureaucracy and ministry. And second, the failure of WorkSafe and the crown prosecutors to investigate properly and prosecute the blatant abuse of Victoria’s occupational health and safety rules that led to 801 deaths last year.

Had WorkSafe done its job it would have ensured that proper systems were put in place.

The current mismanagement is so bad that it puts the health, safety and lives of Victorians and Australians at risk. Victoria may have to stop hotel quarantine even though it has a crisis plan gathering dust in a drawer that is the basis of how other states successfully manage quarantine.

We can understand the extent of the problem because of the good work done by our media and the fact that many of the contractors in the quarantine hotels are anxious that the community understands what is happening so have communicated with the chief executive of Self-Employed Australia, Ken Phillips.

Last year I described how the Victorian government abandoned conventional management structures and began to organise its COVID-19 response in terms of so-called “missions”.

The “missions” system was a failure and contributed to the death of 801 people. The Victorian government responded by showing a number of ministers and public servants the door. But often their replacements were inexperienced. It became clear to the entire public service that Premier Daniel Andrews was going to personally run the operation. In a process run by the Premier, public servants need to check ministerial messages in making decisions. The hazards of such a system were compounded by the repercussions of a massive 2021 public service reorganisation in health.

The old department of health and human services was disbanded and replaced with three arms: a new health bureaucracy, the Department of Health; hotel quarantine transferred to the Department of Justice under the Corrections Division; and a new body, COVID-19 Quarantine Victoria, under the leadership of a commissioner.

There was no way a three-headed complex structure like that could work in a pandemic.

Most functions of the hotel quarantine program were contracted out to various bodies, including catering, supplies, cleaning facilities and some medical staff. However the contracted organisations do not exercise control over most of the quarantine activities, including daily control of the numbers, type and qualifications of staff required at each quarantine hotel, operational control of protective equipment use, and movement of persons through the hotels. Accordingly decisions on a whole range of matters required instructions from the new three-headed bureaucratic monster.

Public servants are afraid of making decisions where they are responsible so most decision-making is by “committee”.

Contractors say the old department of health and human services effectively ceased functioning on February 1, 2021, to be replaced by the three-headed monster. Suddenly new people came in who had no quarantine experience or working knowledge of the program and its current status. There was no manual, which quickly led to defective or critically slow decision-making.

In the first week of the system it became apparent to most contractors that it was not working.

Several incidents underlined the extent of the mess. On one day in the first week, public servants were told of workers being in close contact to positive travellers. They asked if such workers should go to work at the hotel. But that meant a quick public service decision where someone would be responsible. The public servants explained that it would need to go to a meeting of bureaucrats in the three-headed monster. The bureaucrats had their meeting, making sure that it was a group decision where nobody could be responsible. The contractors were told the workers should not be retained in work.

However the directions were too late and the workers had already attended and been at work for some hours.

Also in that first week, a family of three arrived at the hotel. One member had asthma and wanted to use a nebuliser. This was a highly predictable event and should have been covered in any training. The traveller was able to use the nebuliser, with devastating consequences. Later assorted ministers and bureaucrats declared they were not responsible but of course they were responsible because they had not put in place the proper procedures.

As in the 801 deaths disaster, the government and bureaucracy were too slow to respond to known infections. Close contacts were not notified for three days or more and not given instructions as to what to do. Consequently, people who were unknowingly COVID-19 positive went about their activities in the community, spreading the virus.

Before the first week of the new structure had passed most people involved in the process knew it was inevitable that Victoria would face another lockdown, at enormous cost. A week later the government made sure that it was authorised for a two-week lockdown ending on February 26. They may be very lucky and get away with a four-day lockdown. And when this lockdown is completed all Victorians have to realise that until widespread vaccination there may be more lockdowns because the government is simply unable to manage the situation and won’t be forced into change until WorkSafe does its job.