Heads need to roll after the Lindt siege inquest

BASED on their own evidence at the Lindt inquiry, both Andrew Scipione and Cath Burn should be relieved of their commands, says Catherine McGregor.

IN one devastating sentence Thomas Zinn summed up the performance of the NSW Police leadership in response to the Lindt Cafe siege of December 2014: “God help Australians if we ever face a terrorist with more than a sawn-off shotgun.”

The army of lawyers, experts and witnesses who have grappled with this issue could save themselves a lot of time and trouble by accepting that as the key finding of the inquest into the Sydney siege.

Colleagues Miranda Devine, Andrew Bolt and Tim Blair have already highlighted the abject failure of the senior leadership of the NSW Police in responding to this terrorist attack. That was partly because of their apparent reluctance to classify it as an obvious case of mass casualty Islamist violence from the outset.

Siege hostage Elly Chen runs from the Lindt cafe in Martin Place / AAP

Yet, perversely, their hand-­wringing preoccupation with imaginary community sensitivities indicated they did intuitively grasp that Man Monis was not just a deranged man with a weapon.

The hostages lost out both ways. The police leadership could frame the situation as directly involving Islam, when it came to fear of a backlash, but not when it came to the likely course of action of the terrorist nor the response to him.
From the moment Monis used a weapon to take hostages, and displayed an ­Islamic State flag, the Lindt Cafe siege warranted the immediate involvement of the Commonwealth of ­Australia and the invocation of ­relevant provisions of Aid to the Civil Power embodied in the Defence Act and under our Constitutional ­Conventions.

Last week’s evidence from both Commissioner Andrew Scipione, and his deputy, with direct responsibility for counter-terrorism, Catherine Burn, revealed the depth of the cultural malaise afflicting the NSW Police. In passing, maybe that decline commenced when it started to see itself as a service, not a force?

Based on their own evidence — which resembled evidence, the way their “leadership’’ resembled leadership — both should be relieved of their commands forthwith.

The evidence of systemic failure which has come to light through this inquest demands that heads roll.

If that seems harsh remember two innocent young lives were extinguished. One, if not both of them, may well have been spared if the police command had been up to the challenge it faced.

It gives me no joy whatsoever to write that. I have served in the military, including in operational theatres, and I err on the side of giving the benefit of the doubt to any man who has to blast down a door not knowing what is on the other side.

“God help Australians if we ever face a terrorist with more than a sawn-off shotgun.”

Nor do I wish to make the process of closure of the families of the victims harder by suggesting that there was an alternative ending to this drama in which their loved ones survived. But it is difficult not to conclude precisely that.

Both in conception and execution this operation was botched. Moreover the entire raising, training and sustaining function for the direct action capability has been exposed as inadequate. For that, Burn must bear heavy responsibility. But it is Scipione who has presided over the culture of box-ticking compliance which elevated her to her current rank and roles, at the expense of Nick Kaldas. Though only involved on the periphery of this siege, he is the only senior officer who emerged creditably.

Nor can there be any question about the courage and dedication to the safety of the public of the operators who finally conducted the assault. They did what they were asked, but they lacked the training, the equipment and the guidance that they were entitled to expect from their chain of command.

They made the best of a dire situation whose roots may be found in the system that failed to provide them with the best of night-vision equipment, the most appropriate ammunition, and effective communications and surveillance assets. We now know that the team was disorientated by its own stun grenades during the breach. Had they not rehearsed this with live ammunition routinely in recent months?

Lindt cafe gunman Man Haron Monis.

It is too late to draw comfort from the fact that our military maintains two highly capable Tactical Assault Groups, at a high state of readiness, in Sydney and Perth. These teams are highly trained, superbly equipped and conduct routine live-firing rehearsals for vastly more complex operations than this. Such is the pitch at which they operate that they are retained only on standby for strictly limited periods. During that time they fire large quantities of live ammunition to achieve the highest levels of proficiency in close quarter, instinctive shooting. I have observed live fire rehearsals at the “killing house’’ at Holsworthy conducted by TAG East.

Deputy Commissioner Catherine Burn and Commissioner Andrew Scipione / Picture: Ray Strange

It was both impressively precise and lethal. Based on the police evidence it seems valid to ask when was the last time the Lindt siege team had used live ammunition in rehearsals or conducted an operation of this nature in real life? Did the team routinely operate together or was it just cobbled together on the day? At the next COAG conference counter-terrorism capabilities need to be on the table. If the largest, most wealthy state in the Commonwealth cannot train and equip a force capable of such operations the Commonwealth needs to allocate responsibility to the ADF.

More complex domestic violence situations, drug and gang related crime warrant a special capability organic to the state police service. Likewise, better shooting skills, especially with long muzzle weapons, need to be inculcated right across the service. The likelihood of encountering well-armed offenders has risen alarmingly, as has the prospect of first responders encountering someone like Monis. But sustaining a standing capability, primed to the pitch that the special forces maintain, is clearly beyond even the most competent police service. And we clearly do not have that.

Catherine McGregor is a former senior military aide