From training to rehearsal: Why ‘brazen’ Chinese warships are off Sydney’s coast

Not since the Japanese attacks on Newcastle and inside Sydney Harbour over the period May 31 to June 8, 1942, has this nation faced the prospect of an aggressive threat against our shores and our shipping such as the one we have witnessed in the past 24 hours. The past day has seen a live fire exercise by a Chinese navy task group off Sydney. It is the most brazen deployment of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy into waters adjacent to Australia. Why have they done this, and why now?

The most obvious reason for the Chinese deployment and the live fire event is to point out that if Australia conducts freedom of navigation exercises off the Chinese coast, China can, and will reciprocate. But unlike China, Australia doesn’t have a nine-dot line beyond the 12-mile limit where it seeks to deny international maritime traffic. China does, and this is a very significant difference between these activities.

People’s Liberation Army-Navy Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang.Credit: ADF

Another reason the Chinese have done this is to normalise Chinese military activity in our region. Their security arrangement with Solomon Islands was calculated to improve access by Chinese military and commercial entities and extend Chinese influence. The Chinese will probably now normalise these kinds of naval deployments around Australia to constantly demonstrate how vulnerable we are to maritime interdiction of trade and the inflow of fuel and other critical supplies no longer made here. When will they start sailing aircraft carriers close to Australian waters?

The Chinese move will also be designed to make the Australian Defence Force reassess its force posture. The Chinese want to force Australia to keep its ships closer to home for political as well as military reasons. Given the tiny size of our navy, this also means that we may not be able to help out our allies further north if required. In essence, this is a Chinese rehearsal for the kind of “south seas” operations they might conduct to bottle up the Australian navy in home waters so it cannot help Taiwan, Japan or America in any north-west Asian security crisis.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of Indo-Pacific command in Hawaii, recently noted publicly that Chinese military aggression around Taiwan has shifted from a training mode to a rehearsal mode. This implies that Chinese action against Taiwan, or other targets, could be closer than we think. It is also what we are now seeing in Australian waters.

There is also no doubt that this Chinese deployment will be collecting intelligence on the Australian response to their deployment. Their ships have highly sophisticated intelligence collection sensors. They will use this to collect information on the sensors used on Australian military ships and aircraft, the military platforms we deploy, Australian warship readiness, and the tactics they employ. This, of course, cuts both ways, and there will be collection on the PLA-N vessels by Australia and New Zealand too.

China will be measuring the political response by the Australian government. So far, the response has been largely supine, like the “let’s keep our heads down” strategy they have employed for anti-Jewish protests since October 7, 2023 and the geopolitical earthquake in Europe last week. But the events of the past 24 hours are a significant shift in the regional security environment. Old playbooks no longer apply in these very different security circumstances.

More importantly, China will be assessing US responses. Will the US say something about this deliberately aggressive act against a treaty ally? This is perhaps the primary driver of the PLA aggression. Do the principles on display by the US administration in Europe last week – that alliances are now “fee for service” and that we all must spend much more on our defence – also apply in Asia?

As I wrote here early last week, the geopolitical earthquake in Europe will inevitably see aftershocks in Asia. Those aftershocks have arrived. Welcome, Australia, to an entirely new Pacific security environment. The situation has changed, so the thinking must change. Whether this will register in Canberra remains to be seen, however.

Of course, it is possible that China may have miscalculated here. They are the masters of childish overreaction after all. Might this wildly irresponsible and unnecessary aggression prompt a much needed, more robust debate on defence in Australia (and New Zealand), including the need to spend more, significantly expand the lethality, capacity and size of the ADF, and build much more defence material here?

This Chinese operation fundamentally changes Australia’s security outlook. We are dealing with an aggressive, irresponsible PLA that so far, Australia has shown little capacity or willingness to deter. Now, with them live firing off Australia’s coast, might this be the shock our politicians need to fund the ready, lethal and large ADF we need to counter 21st century authoritarianism?

Mick Ryan is a retired major general who served in the ADF for more than 35 years. He is the Senior Fellow for Military Studies at the Lowy Institute and the author of The War for Ukraine (2024).

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