Trump retreat emboldens Putin and Xi. Australia must rethink its whole US relationship

It has been a fascinating and disconcerting week for observers of the war in Ukraine. Comments by Donald Trump apparently left open the way for Russia to absorb Ukraine or, at a minimum, accepting a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. His phone call to Vladimir Putin conceded all of the Russian president’s key demands before negotiations start in Saudi Arabia. It appears Trump may repeat his disastrous Afghanistan agreement by leaving Ukraine and Europe out of key negotiations.

Not long afterwards, Trump’s defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, issued stern statements about the US no longer being a guarantee for European security and that, even though Europe may be left out of negotiations, it would need to deploy troops as peacekeepers to Ukraine. Vice President J. D. Vance – while lecturing Europe on Friday that its greatest threat was from within rather than from Russia or China – has left open the possibility of more aid to Ukraine, including US troops, if Russia does not offer concessions.

Australia slouches among the big guns: Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.Credit: Graphic: Marija Ercegovac, AP, Getty

Trump floated the idea of cutting a deal with China and Russia under which they and the US would all slice their defence budgets in half.

Add to all of this the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned it was time to create an “armed forces of Europe” because the US may no longer be counted on to support the continent.

There have been many interpretations of the behaviour of the new US administration in Europe and America. Perhaps the best description might be offered by Vladimir Lenin, who is reputed to have stated: “There are decades where nothing happens and then there are weeks when decades happen.”

This shift has been described by the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal as peace through weakness. In an era in which aggressive, technologically advanced and industrialised authoritarians believe the time has come to reorder the international system, Trump’s retreat from the world will only provoke and embolden dictators like Putin and Xi Jinping.

In accepting Ukraine might eventually return to Russia, Trump is implicitly accepting China’s claims on Taiwan.

The political shock-and-awe campaign launched by Trump on his inauguration day has extended to European security. It will almost certainly drift to the Indo-Pacific, too. The sentiments that underlie the new American view of its role in the world will have major ramifications for the future security of Australia.

The security environment in the Pacific region, described in the government’s National Defence Strategy as the most complex and challenging since World War II, is even more perilous because of the events of the past week. In accepting Ukraine might eventually return to Russia, Trump is implicitly accepting China’s claims on Taiwan.

In delivering mixed messages on Ukraine negotiations, he is building the environment for misunderstanding and gross strategic miscalculations by China and others in our region. The decreasing trust that US allies have in America means Putin and Xi have more gaps between America and its friends to exploit.

For Australia, the last massive transformation in our security outlook occurred after the fall of Singapore. It was the final nail in the coffin for the imperial defence strategy. We may be on the verge of another once-in-a-century security realignment. Our longstanding American ally, under Trump, threatens to reward the shared sacrifice of our soldiers throughout the 20th and 21st centuries with punitive tariffs on Australian exports. America might be too preoccupied elsewhere or too focused on competing strategic interests to help Australia in a future conflict. What does this mean?

First, it means we need to stick close to America but understand every aspect of our relationship is up for renegotiation. The best way to respond is to stand fast and not be pushed around. If the tariffs on our tiny exports to America stand, Australia could impose similar tariffs on the US. Or we might demand a 25 per cent discount on our multibillion-dollar commitment to AUKUS.

Second, the Australian government must assess the implications of Trump seeking a grand bargain with Xi in the same way he has with Putin. While America might engage in a trade war with China, Trump shows no stomach for an actual war with China to defend Western Pacific nations. Trump’s statement that “Ukraine may be Russian again someday” will be read in Beijing as an America more open to an accommodation on Taiwan. Chinese occupation of Taiwan, and acceptance of China’s illegal construction of islands in the South China Sea, would establish a precedent for further aggression. It would result in a more confident China that may seek to continue pushing other territorial claims, further destabilising our region.

Finally, whoever wins the Australian election must urgently plan to use the recent National Defence Strategy as the foundation for the development of a strategic plan B for Australia. We are the world’s 13th largest economy and have the advantages of geography, advanced technological and education sectors. But the Australian Defence Force is too small and getting smaller because of the growing submarine budget.

By 2030, we won’t have nuclear submarines and may not have a ready or lethal ADF either. An urgent expansion of the ADF – especially combat forces, drone and missile defence and indigenous defence production – is needed to enhance our strategic deterrent. Plans to further mobilise people and industry, as well as the civil defence functions of cybersecurity and stockpiling medical and fuel supplies, must be developed to deter and resist Chinese coercion against Australia and its friends.

Such a plan would have two major outcomes: it would see Australia possess a more confident, sovereign defence posture; and, ironically, it would achieve what the US administration wants its closest allies to do.

In 2011, the then US secretary of defence, Robert Gates, said “the blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence”.

We were warned that this day, and this new strategic posture from America, was coming. We, like the Europeans, have ignored the approaching storm front, kept our defence budgets at a measly 2 per cent of GDP in the face of growing authoritarian aggression, and hoped this day would not arrive.

The reckoning for all of us is here. Only political courage, clear communication with the Australian people about the costs of not acting, increased investment in defence and a reinvigorated sense of confidence about what our country can do for itself will see us through.

Mick Ryan is a retired major-general who served in the ADF for more than 35 years. He is the senior fellow for military studies at the Lowy Institute and the author of The War for Ukraine.

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