Most Australians want Harris to beat Trump. But what does she want for Australia?

A new Lowy Institute poll finds that 73 per cent of Australians say they would prefer Kamala Harris to become president. Only 22 per cent say they would prefer Donald Trump.

It seems highly unlikely that Kamala Harris, as president, would walk away from AUKUS. Keir Starmer and Anthony Albanese will be keen that she doesn’t.Credit:

But what kind of foreign policy would Harris pursue if she were elected president in November? Harris has not been a major foreign policy player in the Biden administration, so it is way too early to identify a “Harris doctrine”. However, drawing on her public statements, her record, and the people on whom she may depend, we can begin to discern a “Harris disposition”.

First, Harris identifies with the mainstream US tradition of American leadership abroad. At the Munich Security Conference in February, she said: “I believe it is in the fundamental interest of the American people for the United States to fulfil our longstanding role of global leadership.”

By contrast, Trump defines America’s interests much more narrowly. As he once said: “Hey, I’m the president of the United States – I’m not the president of the globe.”

Second, while Trump is sceptical of America’s alliances, Harris is an alliance believer. She thinks that standing with allies “makes America strong, and it keeps Americans safe”. Her belief in US leadership does not necessarily translate to a predilection for foreign interventions, however. Harris supported President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw completely from Afghanistan in 2021. She is not a hawk.

Third, Harris is more pro-trade than Trump – which isn’t saying that much. She has criticised Trump’s plan for tariffs of 10 per cent or even 20 per cent on all imports, calling it a “Trump tax”. But she has also criticised or voted against free-trade agreements and her campaign has pledged to “employ targeted and strategic tariffs”.

“There are, perhaps, some similarities between California liberals and members of the NSW Labor Left”. Harris with Albanese in Washington in October 2023.Credit: Alex Ellinghausen

Fourth, Harris has strong Europe policy foundations, laid by Biden, on which to build. Biden’s response to Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a successful exercise in statecraft and alliance management that not only frustrated Putin’s aims and assisted Ukraine, but strengthened and expanded NATO.

Fifth, there would likely be a contrast between the Harris and Biden administrations when it comes to the Middle East. Harris called for an “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza in March, before other senior administration officials did so. However, her language on the conflict has been cautious, emphasising Israel’s right to defend itself. At the debate, she noted: “I have, my entire career and life, supported Israel and the Israeli people.”

Sixth, what about the Indo-Pacific? The Biden administration has been unusually focused on Asia. Typically, Democratic administrations have been more seized of transatlantic relations than transpacific ones. Unlike former president Barack Obama, who initially wanted to pursue a grand bargain with China, Biden has taken an “allies-first” approach to Asia. The administration has brought Japan and South Korea closer together, quickened America’s connections with India and Vietnam, launched AUKUS and convened the Quad. At the same time, the administration has worked effectively to manage its strategic competition with China.

It is hard to say how much continuity we would see in Harris’ Asia policy. In addition to her own disposition, the interests and inclination of the people around her would be important. Biden’s National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, and Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, have been critical to the success of his Asia strategy.

Harris’ adviser, Philip Gordon, has her confidence and seems to be a lock for the role of national security adviser, should she become president. Gordon was a colleague of mine at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. — he is a smart operator and a decent person, a listener who is open to persuasion.

CIA director Bill Burns is a possible secretary of state. Burns is a highly impressive player, a career foreign service officer who has been responsible for the administration’s shadow diplomacy in recent years. Alternatively, Harris could choose a former senator, governor or cabinet officer – the current Commerce Secretary, Gina Raimondo, for example, or Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg.

Harris may choose to appoint America’s first female secretary of defence. There are several strong candidates, including former undersecretary of defence Michèle Flournoy, current Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and Deputy Secretary of Defence Kathleen Hicks.

Harris’ running-mate, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, would bring to the administration an unusual association with China for a top-tier American politician, having visited the country 30 times since he taught English in Guangdong province after university.

Finally, what would a Harris presidency mean for Australia? Her mainstream outlook on foreign policy means she would be more in tune with Australians’ instincts than Trump would be. Given that AUKUS is one of the Biden-Harris administration’s notable foreign policy achievements, it seems highly unlikely that Harris, as president, would walk away from it. Trump has no personal stake in AUKUS and in the past he has been happy to renege on deals made by his predecessors.

If Harris is elected, she would gel with Anthony Albanese. The two have met several times and have a warm relationship. There are, perhaps, some similarities between California liberals and members of the NSW Labor left.

Harris would have much less in common on domestic issues with Peter Dutton, but his muscular approach to defence, and his instinctive pro-American position, would appeal to any US president.

We cannot really know what foreign policies Harris would advance as president. Speeches delivered at think-tank conferences and party conventions rarely translate into decisions taken in office. If she is elected, developments abroad would be crucial. Given that foreign policy is not her chief interest, the instincts of her key advisers would be unusually important.

However, we can say that the Harris disposition fits within the mainstream of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The Trump disposition does not.

Surely, this helps to explain why almost three-quarters of Australians hope that Harris beats Trump in November.

Michael Fullilove is the executive director of the Lowy Institute.