Whoever wins the election, stop the rot in Defence. We’re in peril as never before

Defence, while elevated by recent Chinese live-fire exercises near Australia, will take a back seat to the cost of groceries and power in this federal election campaign. That is a tragedy because Australia is confronting threats to its security unlike any it has faced. Ever.

Despite the best efforts of the superb people in our operating forces outside Canberra, our Defence department is like a footy team about to run onto the grand final with five unfit players, two who are missing boots, a coach who is yet to decide on game tactics, and a support staff who forgot energy drinks and the team physio. Because of underfunding and poor investment prioritisation, underperformance in recruitment and, most importantly, underthinking about lessons from modern war, the defence of our nation will soon tip into crisis.

Australia’s forces do a gallant job but what of the Defence “aristocrats” who call the tune?

Since the election of the Albanese government, the Chinese and Russians have grown more militarily powerful, aggressive and informed about modern warfare. China has formed a learning-and-adaptation bloc with Russia, Iran and North Korea to implement the lessons of modern war, strategy, industrial production, economic coercion and disinformation operations against democratic nations.

To complicate matters further, our great and powerful friend is in the process of breaking the partnerships – and the hearts – of its closest friends and allies through tariffs, a determined effort to denigrate its “pathetic” European partners, demands for access to territory and minerals, and a closer alignment with brutal dictator Putin. The Trump administration’s actions so far with Europe signal that there is trouble ahead, too, for the Pacific.

Defence capability and reform has stalled. According to the 2022 and 2025 portfolio budget statements, over the past three years the Australian Defence Force has declined from 62,063 people to 59,373, causing readiness shortfalls across the force. Defence has, however, managed to grow the number of public servants from 16,991 to 19,863, and the number of senior military officers and bureaucrats by 15 per cent. It employs these bureaucrats in a massive ecosystem of constant committee meetings, slowing decision-making and the removal of creativity from defence thinking.

It has failed to retain legacy military platforms while underfunding many of the innovative uncrewed systems that would give the ADF more military capability. Ukraine has enlightened military institutions around the world in the design, manufacture and deployment of uncrewed systems. Based on my visits to that country and discussions with the head of its new unmanned systems force, Australia is years behind in these endeavours. This puts our people, and our national security, at huge risk. Given these pressing challenges, what should an incoming government do?

First, it must produce a national security strategy. This must include a strategic reappraisal of alliances and security partnerships. It should also ensure that the defence of Australia is a whole-of-nation undertaking, not just a Defence endeavour. Most importantly, a national security strategy should serve as an honest conversation with the Australian people about the perils we face, what our nation needs to do and what resources are required including large increases in defence spending.

A second initiative is building a more resilient nation. This has many components, including communications networks, energy, transport, medicines and food, trusted government institutions, public education and effective state and federal co-ordination mechanisms. It includes an expansion in our ability to build our own military hardware and munitions. There are programs to build a missile industry in Australia, but – over a period greater than it took to win the Pacific War – not a single missile has been delivered. Investment in Australian-made drones, missiles and national security-related software must be priorities.

We must also invest in combating Chinese and Russian disinformation and cognitive warfare – the blending of propaganda, neurosciences and artificial intelligence – which are targeting our citizens every day.

A third priority is expanding the Australian Defence Force. Recent governments have funded an enlarged ADF yet have failed to deliver. The external labour market has an influence, but development inside Defence of a bloated HR oligarchy has taken recruitment away from military services and handed it to underperforming contractors. This has strangled recruitment and must be rectified urgently.

The ADF also needs expanded capacity through a different balance of crewed and uncrewed systems – as well as defences for drones and missiles – in the army, navy and air force. Multiple aerial, ground and naval solutions, which could be built in Australia, are evident from the war in Ukraine.

Fourth, Australia urgently needs a mobilisation plan; that is, to appropriate all national assets – people, resources, science and technology for an expanded defence capacity in a conflict. This is not advocacy to mobilise now, but for its foundational planning. This has become urgent because a mobilisation plan is part of our strategic deterrent and the projection of our national will. Planning for mobilisation also means we must have a serious debate about national service, something that is uncontroversial in many other democracies. In Sweden, for instance, 18-year-olds spend 11 months in national service, and all residents aged 16 to 70 have a “total defence duty” (regardless of citizenship) to be called upon to serve in various ways in the event of a heightened state of alert or war.

We cannot defend Australia – especially if we can’t rely on a great and powerful friend – without the mobilisation of people and other resources.

The People’s Liberation Army-Navy Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang in the Torres Strait last month.Credit: ADF/AP

Finally, Australia needs new defence leadership. The senior bureaucrats who populate the committee rooms of Russell Offices in Canberra – a bloated, intellectually stunted and zero-risk class of defence aristocrats – have been incapable of creative, timely decision-making. Among the insights from my Ukraine visits, one issue stands out above all others: learning and the speed of adaptation has intensified.

There is an ongoing adaptation war internationally, on the battlefield, in national security endeavours, and in our adversaries sharing their best-practice know-how – and at a pace incomprehensible to politicians and defence bureaucrats. A new defence leadership culture is needed to nurture risk-taking, make quick decisions and link military and industrial research – and to allow military leaders to be visible to the public in explaining both the challenges and solutions to our many defence challenges.

The peril for our nation is growing. A new government needs to address defence transformation as a priority.

Mick Ryan is a retired major-general who served in the ADF for more than 35 years. He is the senior fellow for military studies at the Lowy Institute. He is the author of the 2024 book The War for Ukraine.