Albanese, Dutton must set out clear China policy for public debate

When newly installed US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth used an address in Brussels on February 12 to recalibrate Washington’s policy on Ukraine, there was at least the semblance of a silver lining for Australia.

“We … face a peer competitor in the communist Chinese with the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific. The US is prioritising deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognising the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing trade-offs to ensure deterrence does not fail,” he declared.

A Chinese army-navy Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang was spotted 150 nautical miles off the coast of Sydney.Credit: ADF

US political and military leaders have been talking about the “pivot to Asia” more or less convincingly since the Obama administration’s first term. Hegseth’s blunt rendition of the theme might reassure some that the cavalry really is on its way, and this month’s close encounters with Chinese military power in the South China and Tasman seas have added a sense of urgency.

That Beijing’s increasingly expeditionary naval operations are thus far within the bounds of international law, and that they are likely to become more common over time, are not argued. But it is equally clear that warships firing live rounds within a few hundred kilometres of Sydney with only a few hours’ notice is a significant escalation in the posturing of Chinese forces in our region.

The release of flares by Chinese fighter pilots in the path of an Australian surveillance aircraft and the Chinese exercises in waters between Australia and New Zealand are part of a series of tests of strength taking place on the water, underneath it and above it.

On the same day as Hegseth’s speech in Europe, two US Navy vessels were sailing through the Taiwan Strait. In August last year, Australia joined the US, Canada and the Philippines in a “freedom of navigation operation” in South China Sea waters claimed by Beijing. The targeting of RAAF aircraft has been linked to the use of sonobuoys to detect Chinese submarine activity.

The Chinese Navy’s Tasman Sea exercises are clearly aimed at posing two strategically vital questions: What, if anything, does Australia intend to do? And how will the United States, long understood as the guarantor of Australian security, fit in?

Both these questions have been sharply underlined by the advent of the second Trump administration. With Canberra still fretting over Washington’s continued commitment to the AUKUS defence pact, the upending of America’s relationship with Europe has created an anxiety over the reliability of our chief security partner not seen since Richard Nixon’s 1969 speech in Guam sought to recalibrate US commitments in Asia.

For Taiwan, whose diplomatic position has long been ambiguous, watching as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was cut out of talks with the Kremlin in Riyadh must have made it wonder whether, as Lev Nachman of the National Taiwan University put it: “Donald Trump is willing to negotiate with Xi [Jinping] … in a scenario in which Taiwan has no agency and is not directly involved in its own future.”

Since we wish to be involved in our own future, the Albanese government must engage the Australian public in a discussion of our capabilities, our commitments and how the next such security situation will be handled. Do we want, as Taiwan and many of Washington’s European partners have done, to significantly raise our defence spending? Or do we want to pursue a diplomatic off-ramp with Beijing?

As Chris Uhlmann wrote for this masthead in 2021 regarding Taiwan: “We should be temperate in what we say, but we do need to talk about it.” As David Brophy, a China historian at the University of Sydney, pointed out at that time, unless questions of the conditions for war or peace are aired, “we may not get much say in how our government responds”. With a federal election looming, it is also incumbent on the opposition to set out a clear policy so that its merit can be assessed.

During the first Trump administration, Australia’s then-foreign minister Marise Payne declared that when it came to China, “we make our own decisions and we use our own language”.

That is all very well. But what do we do if our opponents – and even our erstwhile allies – aren’t listening? Beijing would like to know, and we have to find out.

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