Iran’s talking tough after US attack. But the regime has run out of options

In the end, Israel’s leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, got what he wanted – America involved in his aerial campaign against Iran. And in a timeframe determined by Israeli rather than US calculations.

It is an extraordinary turn of events. Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency nor America’s own Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard supported Netanyahu’s claim about the “golden information” possessed by Israel indicating an imminent threat posed by any weaponised nuclear program. Yet, US President Donald Trump has variously told reporters not to listen to Gabbard, and later simply that “she’s wrong”. Once again, the White House has committed its forces to a conflict in the Middle East without making the case as to why it needed to.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (left) has limited options to respond to the American attacks ordered by Donald Trump (right). Credit:

The world now waits for Iran’s response to the attacks by the United States. Its options are limited. It is relatively weak militarily and Israel has air supremacy. Iran’s armed non-state supporting actors have either been degraded – as is the case with Lebanese Hezbollah – or internal political or broader national considerations have forced them to critically re-evaluate that support. A wariness about Trump’s unpredictability also makes support for Iran more challenging than was the case before October 7, 2023.

Iran’s own conventional capabilities have taken a hit through Israel’s military campaign and have been depleted as a result of Tehran’s week-long response to those attacks. Their remaining stockpiles and what, if any, ability they have to replenish them, will be one of the pieces of intelligence most keenly sought by its adversaries. One can have the greatest intent to retaliate but, if you possess limited capabilities, then your military options remain constrained.

The regime’s ultimate aim is, and always has been, survival. Their ambiguity regarding their nuclear program was a means to that end, not necessarily an end in itself. Suspicions about its nuclear capability or intent was seen as a way of securing the regime from direct attack, but the economic sanctions that secrecy over the program brought with it constrained its own economic development and put pressure on the regime. The nuclear program then became the means by which it could negotiate sanctions relief without entirely giving up its strategic ambiguity. The Iran Nuclear Deal (or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was the result of this approach.

Nuclear ambiguity worked as long as Iran’s policy of “forward defence” worked. Tehran’s reliance on its so-called “axis of resistance” – a network of armed non-state actors in the region – was ultimately a strategic miscalculation.

These groups destabilised the countries in which they operated. Iran’s use of these affiliates made Gulf states suspicious of Tehran’s motives in the region. When Israel degraded them as part of their post-October 7 response, few tears were shed in the region. Without them, and with a new and unpredictable president in the White House, Iran’s strategic nuclear ambiguity quickly became a millstone around Tehran’s neck.

The question now is, what Iran will do in response to the US attack? If regime survival remains the priority, it is quite possible that its best chance for achieving that comes from limiting and focusing – rather than broadening – their response. Tehran knows that Washington can deliver an overwhelming response to any Iranian retaliation, while any Iranian response against US interests is going to achieve limited results. A largely symbolic military response may be carried out, if only for appearance’s sake.

A more astute response would be to continue to target Israel and prolong the conflict with it for as long as Iran can maintain a rate of effort that has some effect on the Israeli economy, and raises the political costs to Netanyahu of continuing a war that he initiated. Tehran would know that Israel’s international reputation is at a low ebb, and that Israel having to conduct a war against a state imposes a significantly greater cost on it than fighting non-state actors.

Extending the conflict also increases the likelihood and number of civilian casualties in Iran, and forces Israel to select more and more targets unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program. Both these actions are likely to increase, rather than lessen national resolve in Iran and increase international pressure on Israel to stop. It will also increase domestic political pressure on Washington to limit its support for the conflict. The regime faces no real organised or viable political opposition because of its repressive nature, so a focus on external threats will continue to buy it time to ride out the current military action.

There are other, non-military responses, such as withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that have been on the table but could now be enacted. With many of its nuclear facilities badly damaged, and a belief that any future negotiations are pointless given what has passed, removal from international regulatory oversight would appear an obvious response. Other responses such as raising the economic price by mining the Straits of Hormuz or targeting energy facilities in the Gulf would have a short-term impact, couldn’t be sustained and would likely come at a greater cost than it could impose.

Iran is boxed in, and has limited options available. While its response could take an unexpected turn, if one proceeds from the assumption that its main strategic aim is to preserve the integrity of the Islamic Revolution, then that prioritises the survival of the regime. And this in turn dictates the choices it will make – from the nature of its retaliation to the future of its nuclear program. The world now awaits those choices.

Dr Rodger Shanahan is a Middle East analyst.

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