Improve ties with Phnom Penh or risk Chinese spy outpost; warns Lowy

A new Lowy Institute report urges Australia and the US to understand Cambodia’s embrace of Chinese military assistance as a reaction to its “acute sense of vulnerability towards Thailand and Vietnam”, and not just through the prism of US–China competition.

Cambodia's Defence Minister Tea Banh (L) and China's Ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wentian (R) take part in a groundbreaking ceremony at the Ream naval base in Preah Sihanouk province on June 8, 2022. (Photo by Pann Bony / AFP)

Australia and the US should increase military engagement with Cambodia to help counter the risk of the country’s Ream naval base becoming a military spy post for China, a new Lowy Institute report advises.

Both Canberra and Washington have repeatedly raised concerns that Ream, a base on the Gulf of Thailand, could become a permanent military outpost for Beijing as China-funded work on the base nears completion and a Chinese PLA navy warship has remained docked there for the past year.

PLAN Ships at Ream Naval Base Jan 22 2024 - Satellite imagery showing two Chinese warships have been docked at Cambodia’s Ream naval base since early December has raised concerns Beijing has now claimed the World War II-era base as a strategic staging post to the South China Sea. , , Commercially available images analysed by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, a South China Sea-monitoring projectunder the auspices of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, confirmed the People’s Liberation Army Navy shipshave been the only vessels docked at a Chinese-built deep-sea pier at the base for almost five months. Pictures - Supplied

Lowy research fellow and study author Rahman Yaacob says those fears are overblown given Ream’s geographic and strategic limitations, located close to Vietnam’s southern Phu Quoc island and in The Gulf of Thailand’s shallow waters.

Beijing’s militarisation of disputed islands and shoals in the South China Sea _ now equipped with deep water ports and air strips_ have far greater military value as permanent regional outposts.

But, Dr Yaacob cautions, the WWII-era base _ now equipped with radar facilities, a longer pier and service dockyards _ could still serve as a useful watch post for China to spy on Cambodia’s neighbours.

“Chinese military aid to modernise Ream Naval Base is largely driven by Beijing’s broader strategic objective to grow its influence in the kingdom and Southeast Asia,” according to the report, based on interviews with key Cambodian defence and government officials as well as officials from Thailand and Vietnam.

From 2018 to 2023, China accounted for more than 93 per cent of Cambodian military equipment imports.

“However, geographical limitations, a lack of strategic value, and domestic political constraints in Cambodia will present obstacles to any Chinese efforts to turn Ream into a military base fully under PLA control.

“US, Australia and other like-minded partners need to help the next generation of Cambodian leaders recalibrate their growing reliance on China by offering closer security ties.”

Continued US punitive actions against Phnom Penh will only drive it closer to Beijing, it warns.

Instead, the US, Australia and other like-minded partners should offer closer security ties to Cambodia, including more combined exercises and defence education opportunities.

Australia could expand its Australian Command and Staff Course and ASEAN-Australian Defence Postgraduate scholarship program, targeting young Cambodian military leaders with a long-term aim of building defence relations, it suggests.

Dr Yaacob says external partners should view Cambodia’s embrace of Chinese military assistance through its “acute sense of vulnerability towards Thailand and Vietnam”, with which it has ongoing land and sea border disputes, rather than exclusively through the prism of US–China competition.

Ream also overlooks a 27,000 square-kilometre, oil and gas-rich area claimed by both Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

China on the other hand has no overlapping claims and offers impoverished and outgunned Phnom Penh security against neighbouring Hanoi and Bangkok, the report notes.

Beijing’s interest in gaining influence in Cambodia has coincided with Phnom Penh’s drive to modernise its military to ensure it is capable of patrolling its own maritime borders.

Its China-funded upgrades to the Ream base, including construction of a dockyard and repair facilities, mean Cambodia will no longer have to send its ageing ship fleet for servicing in Vietnam or Malaysia.

Beijing maintains its influence in Cambodia through ex-Prime Minister Hun Sen who continues to control Cambodia’s foreign and defence affairs as President of the Senate, despite having appointed his West Point-educated son, Hun Manet, as successor.

But, the report notes, many Cambodians disagree with Hun Sen’s pivot to China, especially given the US and Europe are far more important export markets for Cambodian goods.

PLA officials have also “privately raised concerns that younger Cambodian political leaders led by Hun Manet may shift Cambodia’s foreign policy away from China in the long run”, with recent regional surveys revealing rising Cambodian concern over Chinese influence and a clear preference for the US over Beijing.

“Domestic public opinion would likely be unsupportive of a permanent or declared Chinese presence in Cambodia, which is also prohibited by the Cambodian constitution,” it concludes.