‘Betrayal and moral collapse’: How we lost Afghanistan

'Betrayal and moral collapse': How we lost Afghanistan

Words: Madeleine Spence Producer: Bianca Farmakis

On August 30, 2021, the last American troops left Afghanistan and chaos consumed the capital, Kabul, after it fell to the Taliban. The world watched on in horror as desperate civil­ians fell to their deaths trying to cling to a plane leaving for safety. Comparisons with the US evacuation of Saigon after the Vietnam War were quickly drawn.

The question remained the same: decades since troops first arrived in Afghanistan, how could it possibly have ended like this?

A new book by David Kilcullen and Greg Mills, titled The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan , argues the cliches that came pouring out about Afghanistan — a graveyard of empires, hostile, unruly and impossible to fix — are "overly simplistic and a massive cop-out".

The pair, who both served in Afghanistan and spent years working with some of the most powerful policymakers and participants in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion, say the war was "eminently winnable".

"What happened in Afghanistan in 2021 was not a defeat, but something between a betrayal and a moral collapse."

David Kilcullen & Greg Mills The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan

They argue the mission was "screwed up from start to finish" while trillions of dollars and thousands of lives were lost in the process. How did these massive investments of money and blood come to such an ignominious end? Britain spent $US40 billion on the war in Afghanistan. The US spent between $US 1 - 2 trillion.

The original sin

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a shellshocked America launched its war on terror, vowing to pursue the Taliban. By October, George W. Bush's administration had invaded with the support of Britain and other NATO allies.

December 2001 : Peace talks aimed at rebuilding Afghanistan were under way. The Bush administration failed to understand the Taliban's role in the rebuilding of the state. The Taliban was less interested in exporting extremism than enacting vigilante-style justice. The US saw the group as radicals to be roundly defeated. The West's desire to see things in black and white left no room for shades of grey on the ground. Left out, the Taliban retreated and plotted its return.

The self-licking lollipop

Before long, the West was in a desert quagmire, fighting an insurgency against the Taliban. The war machine demanded more money, resources, lives and time while degrading the political will of international forces. It created a self-licking lollipop that justified its own existence.

Succession planning

America spent $US69bn building Afghan security forces, a 'Jenga' tower propped up by the West's logistics, intelligence and aviation support. When President Joe Biden pulled his troops out, the tower toppled.

Problem of impatience

The West won many battles against the Taliban, but the Taliban won the war. It was able to exploit the West's own impatience, and had calculated that it simply had to play a waiting game.

"[The situation] might have changed if the West had signalled that it was in Afghanistan for the long haul. Taliban leaders would have been more likely to commit to a political solution if faced with the prospect of a permanent military stalemate."

David Kilcullen & Greg Mills The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan

Will it happen again?

Mills argues it is inevitable the West will once again find itself sucked into some similar role elsewhere. So we must ask ourselves, he says, "Can the West, or anybody for that matter, play the nation-building role in a way that has a better outcome?"

Mills believes the answer is yes. But next time, he says, the West needs to commit to the role. The era of short-term interventionism needs to end; we should have a long-term strategy from the start.