We’re oceans apart on nuclear-powered subs

Listening to the Australian government and the local media, one would be entitled to think that it’s now a simple question of when will we receive nuclear-powered submarines, not if.

The Virginia-class fast attack nuclear-powered submarine USS North Dakota. Picture: US Navy

Listening to the Australian government and the local media, one would be entitled to think that it’s now a simple question of when will we receive nuclear-powered submarines, not if.

However, this is not the perspective of various parties in the US, with even the basic enabling legislation stuck in the Senate since June.

Called drily the “May 2023 DOD Legislative Package Regarding Proposed Sale of Virginia-class Boats Under AUKUS Agreement”, its aim seems to have been widely misunderstood in Australia.

Assuming that it is passed at some stage, it does not guarantee that we will be sold anything – it puts in place various measures and milestones that define how the process needs to work. Ultimately, the sale will still depend on the attitude of a future secretary of the Navy, who must advise congress for final approval.

One of the first things the legislation will do is clear the way for our government to transfer $3.326bn to the Pentagon coffers, seemingly with no visibility on how the US will spend it. We know the precise amount because it appears in a small footnote in the Defence Department’s annual budget papers. A change in the law is necessary because this transfer is unprecedented in US history and there are no existing mechanisms that allow it to happen.

There is also no mechanism for the money to be returned if the sale of submarines does not happen, and everyone from Defence Minister Richard Marles downwards has been mute about why we are handing over such a huge amount of money – something apparently volunteered by Australian officials during early negotiations. The intent is supposedly to strengthen US industry so that it reaches a point where it is producing so many Virginia-class submarines that some will be available for export.

Even determining when that point will be reached is speculative – and the legislation is no help because amendments include statements such as Australia will receive two submarines within 15 years, or they will be available for export when the US is launching them at a rate of three per year. Commentators have spoken of the need to be building them at two, or 2½ a year. The current pattern is barely 1½.

Nuclear-powered submarines are one of the most complex things ever constructed by humans, with about five million discrete components in each one. An 8000-tonne Virginia-class boat – the weight of 20 A380 passenger jets – requires a massive supply chain. Trying to ramp up production is a huge undertaking, which might work – but it also might not.

According to US officials, an extra 100,000 skilled workers are going to be needed in the next decade to meet even the two-per-year target. This is because the highest priority for the US Navy is the new Columbia-class ballistic missile firing submarines under construction. In addition, the Virginia-class – the first of which was launched in 2003 – is proving to be more maintenance intensive than expected, with close to 40 per cent of the current fleet tied up because of worker and spare parts shortages.

Some of this is spelled out in a section rather ominously titled: Limitation on Transfer of Submarines to Australia pending certification on domestic production capacity.

The government has no idea what to do, only a hope that it will all work out at a point in the distant future, preferably in a galaxy far away

The legislation also requires reporting requirements that appear incompatible with how our secretive Defence Department does things, with the connivance of the government. It says that within 90 days of passage, the Secretary of Defense – currently Lloyd Austin – must report to Congress on the cost, schedule, milestones and funding requirements involved in the sale of a Virginia-class submarine. This needs to be done in a way that will not adversely affect the capabilities of the USN. Since the US has a level of transparency we can only dream of, there are numerous other reporting requirements. One of these states: “A description of progress by the Government of Australia in building a new submarine facility to support the basing and disposition of a nuclear-attack submarine on the east coast of Australia.”

As Richard Marles has ruled out making a decision on the location of the base until next decade – after all, no one wants to live adjacent to a nuclear target with a consequent fall in house prices – it seems we will be in early breach of one of the conditions.

Another is that we will need to show that plans for other Australian military acquisitions will not be distorted – in other words the US is expecting to see evidence of a major increase in Defence spending, not just a vague promise.

If not before, this is likely to come to a head when the US asks for detailed plans for how we dispose locally of the highly radioactive SG9 reactors containing bomb grade material – U235 has a half-life of 704 million years – on Australian soil. At the moment, the government has no idea what to do, only a hope that it will all work out at a point in the distant future, preferably in a galaxy far away. Why we agreed to this provision when the US already has a system in place for decommissioning their own submarines is unknown.

In related news, a team in the UK led by BAE Systems has been awarded a $7.5bn contract for early work on the future AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine, with construction starting in the late 2030s.

This does not seem to involve Australia, indicating that we will either have to take whatever the British decide to sell us, or our specific modifications – such as for US weapons – will have to be made at a later point, increasing cost and risk.