Moving towards control of our space domain

Space is not a serene sanctuary, it is an operational domain in its own right, which is contested as a result of the growing threat of Chinese and Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities

Satellite in space.

It is a common observation that the space domain is both contested and congested. Space is not a serene sanctuary, sitting untouched by the terrestrial major-power competition below. It is an operational domain in its own right, which is contested as a result of the growing threat of Chinese and Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. These are likely to be used, prior to or early in the next war, to attack US and allied critical space systems with the aim being to leave their military forces effectively deaf, dumb and blind.

Space is also increasingly congested as larger numbers of satellites, as well as pieces of space debris fill key orbital locations. The challenge posed by ASATs, and space debris, is that they threaten assured access to the space domain, including for Australia as it begins to invest in its own sovereign space capability.

Australia already has invested in space domain awareness capabilities, including hosting a US optical space surveillance telescope and a large “deep space advanced radar capability”, both of which are located at Exmouth in Western Australia. These and other commercially provided space domain awareness sensors – both on the ground and in space – provide Australia with the ability to ensure space situational awareness, and to share critical intelligence on space activities with Five Eyes partners under the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative.

But simply monitoring adversary space activities, which increasingly are becoming aggressive and provocative, is insufficient. Australia needs to take the vital step of contributing capabilities for space control – the ability to actively counter and defeat adversary ASAT threats through defensive or offensive measures.

The Albanese government’s 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) has followed the lead of the Morrison Coalition government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update in highlighting the importance of the space domain.

The latest IIP specifically mentions the requirement for the ADF to undertake a space control mission. It suggests planned spending of between $9bn-$12bn will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations”.

Yet, no further detail is forthcoming in the IIP on exactly what is planned, or how funding will be allocated over time. Of the $9bn-$12bn invested in space in the IIP, only $430m-$590m is dedicated to space control, but only $190m is approved. The earlier 2022 Defence Space Strategy also reinforces the importance of space control, as do current planning documents within Defence Space Command.

A 2021 Defence project for space electronic warfare (DEF 9358) was announced by the Morrison government, but it’s unclear where that now sits under the Albanese government, particularly as the IIP defers, cancels or reprioritises projects to support investment in both nuclear-powered submarines and the Navy’s fleet review.

There’s an urgent incentive for Australia to protect its critical space capabilities and support a broader requirement to build resilience and deterrence in space in partnership with allies.

Whichever party wins the next federal election, there is a requirement to provide greater clarity on the status of key Defence projects in coming years. Space control represents a real opportunity for Defence to identify a key mission and capability requirement, particularly in the lead-up to the 2026 National Defence Strategy and IIP. This is an urgent capability requirement, in the face of increasingly aggressive and provocative Chinese and Russian counterspace operations across a full range of Earth orbits, most worryingly now in geosynchronous orbit, at 36,500km. This is where most communications satellites are located and will be the orbital location for Australia’s planned satellite communications system – a current defence project known as JP-9102.

There’s an urgent incentive for Australia to protect its critical space capabilities and support a broader requirement to build resilience and deterrence in space in partnership with allies. Part of that must be through investing in space control capabilities in a manner consistent with Australia’s obligations under international legal and regulatory principles towards space sustainability. For this reason, it is sensible that Australia has signed a ban on destructive testing of direct-ascent ASATs. It’s unlikely any Australian government would seek to acquire a space control capability based on “kinetic kill” that physically destroys a target satellite and creates space debris.

Instead, a more practical and usable option is a “soft kill” system, which can generate scalable and reversible effects that simply disable an adversary ASAT threat in a defensive employment, rather than physically destroying a target.

The proposed space-electronic warfare capability under DEF 9358 would be a ground-based starting point but, ultimately, the ADF should also consider defensive soft kill space-based co-orbital systems too. In addition, the employment of ground-based laser systems for dazzling, with Australian companies such as Electro-Optic Systems demonstrating a practical capability, would also be a possibility, as would ground-based offensive cyber capabilities to complement space-based soft kill space control systems.

Such space control capabilities should be matched by investment in and support of sovereign launch capabilities to enable Australian and allied satellites to be launched in a rapid and responsive manner on Australian launch vehicles from Australian launch sites.

This would allow an ability for Australia to swiftly augment or urgently reconstitute critical space capabilities for the ADF, or for its allies in a crisis. That also contributes to Australian and allied space resilience and reinforces the credibility of deterrence by denial in orbit. As such, it’s important that government fully support a sovereign space launch capability in Australia, along with investment in small satellite design and manufacture.

These two policy goals – space control and assured space access through sovereign launch – should be clearly stated as priorities in the 2026 NDS and IIP. The time for vague statements and uncertain funding arrangements is over.

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Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst in defence strategy and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.