Funds and action crucial for ADF lethality

The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) asserts that the force structure of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) no longer meets our needs and requires fundamental change. It has to become more lethal. This has major implications for the Navy.

HMAS Hobart, Brisbane and Sydney sail in formation for the first time off the coast of NSW. Picture: Department of Defence

The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) asserts that the force structure of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) no longer meets our needs and requires fundamental change. We no longer have the luxury of warning time to prepare for conflict, our remoteness no longer ensures our security, and our current force structure is not fit for purpose.

DSR notes that our primary area of military interest incorporates much of the Indo-Pacific. Adopting a strategy of deterrence by denial and increasing the ADF’s presence in the north, the DSR also places a focus on denying access to our northern maritime approaches by improving our capacity to undertake long range strikes. The ADF has to become more lethal. This has major implications for the Navy.

Fundamental drivers of ADF capability and cost are the tasks to be performed, as well as their concurrency, geographic location, duration, and against what threat.

Except for location, DSR is silent on these aspects but says we should be at the high-end of combat. The DSR recommends that the ADF needs to increase its preparedness for operations, but this will come at a cost.

Australia’s geography is crucial in the security context. Navy’s ships and submarines must have long endurance at reasonable speed, and sufficient volume to carry all consumable items, including ammunition. Naval operations are usually lengthy and support ships are essential. The endurance of nuclear submarines is dependent on resupply of parts, food and ammunition.

Navy’s platforms must incorporate advanced sensors, communications and other systems necessary to participate in sophisticated networked warfare and deliver lethal weapons on the right target. In the near future they can also act as control nodes for unmanned vessels, submersibles and drones, potentially adding significant value to the RAN’s force mix. All Navy’s platforms, systems and crews are highly valuable; making sure they can be defended is essential to winning.

We can’t afford aircraft carriers, but in a hostile environment the Navy needs continuous airborne early warning support, and in-situ or immediately on-call combat air support. This is problematic because our small force of F-35 JSF and F/A18 Growler aircraft are limited to land-based operations. RAAF’s fleets of E7 Airborne Early Warning and P8 surveillance aircraft are too small to provide required rates of effort in multiple locations on a continuous basis, even in our northern maritime approaches.

In contrast, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force is converting its helicopter carrying destroyers to become F-35B (VSTOL) capable. Australia took out features to operate F-35Bs when our Canberra-class landing ships were constructed.

Significant improvements in the accuracy and lethality of long-range precision weapons means that larger surface combatants and submarines can now play a wider role in ADF operations. Destroyers bring considerable firepower to air defence and land campaigns over much greater distances than was the case a few decades earlier.

Nuclear submarines with extensive range, endurance and high speed are a self-evident solution for Australia, but their costs of ownership will be very high. We need enough to make an operational difference, but we shouldn’t have to give up other important ADF capabilities to pay for them.

Having fewer classes of flexible and adaptable ships and submarines with sufficient growth margins achieves the most cost effective result in construction and life-cycle costs. Standardisation helps with preparing and sustaining logistics and crews.

Building them in batches, retrofitting upgrades where relevant and sensible, and de-risking future classes by their systematic evolution is best practice.

The US approach to its Virginia-class submarines and Burke-class destroyers has resulted in their continuous upgrading over many decades with new orders still being placed.

Acquiring the RAN’s Hobart-class destroyers moved Australia towards the ships we need in the future, but three ships clearly do not provide a viable force. The Hunter does not meet the DSR’s call for greater lethality, and involves significant technical, cost, and schedule risk. It should be cancelled.

We need enough to make an operational difference, but we shouldn’t have to give up other important ADF capabilities to pay for them.

Construction instead should commence on several updated Hobart-class destroyers while we develop a more suitable plan, which should include collaboration with the US Navy for construction of its future large destroyer (DDG-X) under license in Australia using our own industry to the maximum extent possible.

The 1987 Defence of Australia policy was based on the Navy’s assessment that 16 to 17 major surface combatants were needed to provide a concurrent presence in five broad geographic areas across Australia’s northern maritime approaches. That number did not emerge, and the RAN has since lost firepower. This same general tasking is now envisaged in the DSR.

In peacetime, Navy maintains its ships and aircraft so they have sufficient surge capability to meet operational needs in time of conflict. In peacetime we might see 30-50 per cent availability, whereas in time of conflict this would increase to 70-80 per cent availability. A viable peacetime naval task group would consist of three or four major surface combatants, a dedicated support ship, one large ship of the Canberra class with embarked helicopters, UAVs, and a nuclear submarine. Operating this force in our region would also create what we need for intensive denial operations.

Geography hasn’t changed, hence, we would still need in the order of 18 major surface combatants and four support ships to do much the same task as identified in 1987. The number of nuclear submarines required is likely to be 10 to 12 to simultaneously support a task group and conduct independent operations. This is obviously expensive, but plausible strategic deterrence by denial doesn’t come cheaply.

If our major surface combatant force remains at its planned 12 ships, or up to 18 but including six smaller and less extensively armed corvette types, it imposes serious constraints on the RAN’s operational effectiveness. Its ability to protect our northern Defence infrastructure or conduct the required long-range precision strikes in all areas of our maritime approaches will be inadequate.

Protection of amphibious deployments into the region or defending strategically important shipping needed for our economy, will be compromised. Patrol craft such as the evolved Cape class are cost effective small ships that provide law enforcement and sovereignty tasks. The new Offshore Patrol Vessels have capabilities well in excess of the tasks required. They will be more expensive to operate, crew and maintain and we should cease construction of these ships now in favour of more appropriate smaller ships.

The DSR pursues capability goals well beyond the current capacity of all three armed services, especially Navy. So far, there is no sign of the increase in Defence funding announced by the government on its way to winning the last election. Without funding and action to match the strategy, there is no viable strategy.

-

Dr David Shackleton is a retired vice admiral and former Chief of the RAN.
John Mortimer worked for Department of Defence in various senior roles. From 1988 to 2001 he managed the RAN’s international relations with other navies and strategic policy formulation in Navy Headquarters.
These are the authors’ personal views.