Developing air power in the age of uncertainty
We must face a future in which the US nay no longer be our reliable friend.
We are in an age of upheaval. President Donald Trump’s actions are accelerating many of the strategic drivers that were already at work. These changes are not beneficial to Australia.
While the mantra of ADF leaders has been “we’ll never fight alone”, even before Trump’s return it was clear – and stated in the government’s own strategic policy documents – that while the US may be willing to help us, in the face of other demands it may not have the means.
Trump’s upending of the global order, best illustrated by his shameful abandonment of Ukraine as it seeks to defend itself against an unprovoked invasion, shows that our situation has declined even further.
In these “black is white” days, traditional US allies are not only realising they cannot rely on the US but are even considering it may be a direct threat, as the Canadian government has stated.
It is prudent to assume that not only is US capacity flagging, its will is too. In either case, we must accept we may need to fight alone, or with severely curtailed US support.
Moreover, the facts on the ground are moving rapidly. Like nature, military power abhors a vacuum, so a taskforce of modern People’s Liberation Army-Navy vessels has already shown up, one missile-shot off our major cities.
Public attention has rightly turned to the state of Australia’s defences. And they have been found wanting. The PLAN’s unannounced visit put the Royal Australian Navy’s decline in stark relief with its two tankers out of service and unable to support its frigates, which were themselves hopelessly outgunned by the Chinese vessels.
But the ADF has other capabilities. Air power is crucial in our region, as the course of World War II demonstrated, and it is undeniable that the Royal Australian Air Force is in a far better state than the RAN. But it nonetheless requires urgent attention and additional investment.
The RAAF has transformed itself into a very capable small air force, built around advanced platforms and weapons. These include its three combat squadrons of fifth-generation F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, which are supported by a squadron of F/A-18F Super Hornets. The RAAF is also developing strong electronic warfare capabilities including its squadron of Growler electronic attack aircraft.
Four MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare aircraft will also bring a massive capability boost with their ability to vacuum up signals intelligence.
For maritime operations, 14 P-8A patrol aircraft are intended to detect surface and subsurface threats. They’ll be assisted (eventually) by four MQ-4A Triton high-altitude, long-endurance and uncrewed aerial vehicles conducting maritime surveillance.
Those systems are ably supported by a small fleet of seven KC-30A Multi-role Tanker Transport aircraft that can extend the range and endurance of the rest of the fleet.
Tying the components of this picture together is another small fleet of six E-7A Wedgetail aircraft that manage the battlespace.
These platforms will be able to deliver sophisticated guided weapons. They include modest numbers of long-range missiles with a range in the order of 1000km, such as the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and the extended range JASSM land-strike missile, as well as shorter-range weapons being acquired in larger numbers, including the Small Diameter Bomb.
In summary, compared to the RAN’s disastrous shipbuilding plan, the RAAF’s transformation has been remarkably successful, and it is now focusing on bedding down these new capabilities.
If an adversary appeared off Australia with ill intent, Australians can be assured that the RAAF could respond. Nevertheless, we should have real concerns about its ability to successfully defend the country against a major power that is committed to causing us harm. That’s for several reasons.
First, that small, exquisitely formed air force is the product of the long age that preceded the new one that has burst upon us. It’s designed to generate small contributions that support US-led coalitions. The RAAF’s participation in the coalition that defeated Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is a good illustration. Our contribution performed well against an adversary with no air defences, but it was a rotation of one fighter squadron supplemented by a single Wedgetail and tanker. That’s not the scale of effort needed to deter or defeat a major adversary.
Second, the Australian government is not building on the RAAF’s success. Faced with the choice of backing a strong performer or bailing out a failing one, it has chosen the latter. The balance of investment in Defence’s acquisition plan has now shifted decisively towards maritime capabilities.
In Defence’s 2020 acquisition plan, the air domain was to receive 24 per cent of investment while maritime was assigned 28 per cent.
That has fundamentally changed. With the advent of AUKUS, maritime investment has grown massively to 38 per cent of the total, while air has fallen to 14 per cent. Almost unbelievably the RAAF won’t acquire a single new aircraft over the coming decade beyond what was already on order.
While today’s RAAF is a good foundation to build on, it’s not the force we need for the future.
Third, there are major gaps in our air power. If we are concerned about the threat posed by adversaries with long-range systems, we need greater strike range. It’s arguable whether the long-range strike gap created by the retirement of the F-111 bomber has been filled by fighter aircraft supported by tankers. Fighters simply cannot match the organic range and ordnance load of dedicated bombers.
We shouldn’t simply assume that nuclear-powered submarines, if they are delivered, will fill the long range strike gap. They carry only limited numbers of missiles. Moreover, for the 75 per cent of their lives that they are in harbour or dry dock they are extremely vulnerable to an adversary’s own long-range strike systems and will be at the top of an adversary’s targeting plan. Ukraine has already shown that air drones launched from maritime drones can strike targets near the coast. China will be able to do this at a massive scale. We can’t put all our eggs in one strike basket.
Our lack of ground-based air defence is another major gap. Certainly, conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown that modern fighter aircraft can shoot down cruise missiles and drones, but our lack of ground-based air defence is a shortfall any adversary will exploit.
Unfortunately, that too has been deleted from Defence’s acquisition plan.
Next, the RAAF’s ability to sustain air combat operations is limited. Modern conflict consumes massive numbers of guided weapons. We are going to need deep arsenals. Moreover, it’s not just munitions that will be in short supply. Analysis of sustained air combat from our northern bases shows we also quickly run out of fuel, pilots, and aircraft.
And finally, we have relied on the US both to meet the gaps in our own inventory as well as to provide the support needed to get the maximum benefit of what we do have. For example, without access to intelligence coming from US satellites, it will be very difficult for the ADF to detect and respond to threats operating in our near region.
So while today’s RAAF is a good foundation to build on, it’s not the force we need for the future. Nor do Defence’s current acquisition plans and defence industry strategy deliver what we need.
There’s no easy fix. The Coalition has recently proposed buying an additional squadron of F-35 aircraft, to mixed responses. But we should not get bogged down in arguments over whether we should get a particular capability; the bottom line is we need more of everything, and we need it soon. That will require immediate growth in our defence spending, not the delayed growth that characterises the current defence budget.
Even without the Trump administration’s exhortations for more defence spending, it’s clear we need to grow rapidly from the current 2.0 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent of GDP in the next few years and then to 3 per cent. In current day terms, that’s an increase of around $27bn a year.
But with the Defence Department’s lamentable neglect of Australia’s defence industry, it will be hard to spend that, despite the strategic urgency. The case of the F-35 illustrates the dire straits we are in with our excessive dependence on overseas suppliers. While there’s a hot production line delivering around 150 aircraft per year, we can’t expect to get more aircraft soon.
The original JSF consortium had nine members; the list of customers has now reached 20 wanting around 2000 further aircraft. Deliveries of the long-range missiles discussed earlier have also been achingly slow as the US meets its own needs from a struggling industrial base.
Moreover, any intent of acquiring further US weapons has to consider whether we want to double-down on an erratic and increasingly unpredictable partner. Some NATO countries are reconsidering their F-35 acquistion plans. Hedging our risks is crucial, but acquiring capability from Europeans will also be challenging as they seek to rapidly rebuild their militaries.
Effective hedging requires backing Australian industry, which has impressive capabilities in drones, guided weapons, sensors and autonomy. The lessons from countries such as Ukraine and Turkey and indeed even the Houthis show that it is possible to rapidly transform the local defence industrial base. Unfortunately, we have wasted valuable time avoiding making the necessary investments at home. Defence needs to overcome its infamous reluctance to back Australian industry. If it won’t, the government must take charge.
But while Australian industry can produce many of the consumables of war, it can’t produce fighter planes and bombers in the immediate term. We’ll need to think differently about what good looks like. It’s likely to be a mix of the traditional platforms we have already supplemented by large numbers of the small, the smart and the many designed and built here. It’s not going to be Defence’s traditional goal of seeking carefully crafted perfection that’s delivered over such long timeframes it’s no longer relevant.
There are no easy answers – which is why governments and Defence leaders have simply avoided thinking about them for decades and doubled down on the US alliance as the panacea for all our security challenges.
Whether we are talking about Australia’s air power or any other aspect of defence and security policy, that single-minded avoidance of the hard issues can no longer continue.
Dr Marcus Hellyer is Head of Research at Strategic Analysis Australia.
