AUKUS drives strategic vision

The authors of the DSR have bravely undertaken the task of creating within 18 months not just a new strategy but a new framework for creating strategic policy.

The horrific scenes at Kabul airport on August 16, 2021, made it unmistakably clear that two decades of the ‘global war on terror’ had ended ingloriously. Picture: NBC News

When Australians in 2045 look back on 100 years of Australian strategic decisions since WWII, they may see 35 days in 2021 as a major turning point, not because of what happened but because of what did not happen.

By mid-2021 it was clear the war in Afghanistan was going badly. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was already widely condemned as a major strategic error. The horrific scenes at Kabul airport on August 15 made it unmistakably clear that two decades of the “global war on terror” had ended ingloriously, despite the noble intentions and courageous actions of many involved.

It looked as if the Australian community would once again do what it had done after a long period of military activity, whether rejoicing in victory or lamenting defeat. After WWII, after the Vietnam War, and after the Cold War, the nation embarked on a period of discussion and debate, seeking to learn the lessons of the immediate past and to shape national policies for the foreseeable future. As Australians sought a vision for our place in the world, they asked themselves some profound questions.

Peter Edwards.

At the most general level, how do we see our place in the world and how would we want other nations to see us? What interests and values do we wish to defend and promote? How do we see our strengths and weaknesses, our opportunities and threats, in the foreseeable future? Can we formulate a strategic concept (“grand strategy” is too grandiose for Australian tastes) to frame not only our foreign and defence policies but also our other international policies, including trade, finance, immigration, and now health, education, and climate?

In all these fields how much attention should we focus on Australia and its immediate approaches, how much on our region, and how much on the global balance? How do we strike the right balance between our history and our geography, simultaneously maintaining alliances with powerful but distant countries such as the US and Britain while developing close relationships with countries in our region? Where can we be self-reliant and where must we form and maintain alliances and partnerships?

The goal is to formulate a whole-of-nation strategy which proceeds from these broad assessments to give strategic guidance to all the agencies involved in its implementation. The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) capabilities – its weapons platforms and weapons systems – are obviously important but are just one part of the means to achieve the strategic ends to which the nation has committed itself.

In August 2021 it looked as if Australia was about to enter such a period of reflection and strategic reassessment. Prompted by two looming anniversaries, the 70th of ANZUS and the 20th of 9/11, think tanks had prepared reports on the future of the US alliance.

For some years commentators had debated the implications for Australian strategy of the rise of China, political turbulence in the US, the decline in our diplomatic resources, and other factors such as climate change. The fall of Kabul, it seemed, would prompt a whole-of-nation review of our national strategy and the policymaking process. In a challenging international environment, the process would need to be conducted with speed but not haste and with full opportunity for public discussion. Sufficient time would be needed to debate all the relevant issues and to reach conclusions that the whole nation could understand and support.

More than 600 Afghans cram inside a US Air Force C-17 Globemaster III, which flew from Kabul to Qatar on August 15, 2021, to escape the hard line Islamist rule expected under the Taliban. Picture: AFP

Then, on August 18, Australia woke to the announcement of the AUKUS agreement. Australia was committed to the extraordinarily complex task of acquiring and maintaining nuclear-powered submarines (SSN), an extremely powerful capability but one that posed huge technical, political and economic challenges.

The decision had been taken by a very small group of politicians and officials, including our senior diplomats in London and Washington but not the then foreign minister and her department. This was the very opposite of a whole-of-government, let alone a whole-of-nation, process. Nevertheless the SSN program is apparently to dominate the nation’s approach to the world, drawing resources not only from other parts of Defence but also other agencies.

Some reports suggest that much of the long overdue boost to DFAT’s resources will be directed to diplomatic support for the SSN program, and the Workplace Relations and Education departments will be similarly affected.

Strategic debate in Australia since September 2021 has been vigorous, wide-ranging and often profound. Much of it, however, has been focused on, and pre-empted by, a decision taken secretively by the Morrison government and confirmed enthusiastically by the Albanese government. Many of the serious issues raised should have been thoroughly discussed before, not after, the country committed itself to one specific and extremely challenging capability.

The authors of the DSR have bravely undertaken the task of creating within 18 months not just a new strategy but a new framework for creating strategic policy.

As the DSR records, the Defence of Australia strategy set out in the 1987 Defence White Paper followed discussion initiated by the 1976 White Paper and shaped by the 1986 Dibb Review of capabilities.

The DSR gives the impression, however, that it aims to substitute Defence of Australia with the new doctrine of National Defence, simultaneously replacing all three of those comprehensively argued and detailed documents by one extremely brief review and not recognising that the detailed recommendations on capabilities came a decade after the foundational ideas had first been raised.

The authors of the DSR have bravely undertaken the task of creating within 18 months not just a new strategy but a new framework for creating strategic policy. Such a task has previously demanded years of work by large teams and extensive public discussion. Inevitably the DSR lacks the comprehensively detailed argument which might create a national consensus behind major changes in policy and governance.

The public version of the DSR, leaving aside the photographs and other ancillary material, contains just 58 pages of text, comprising brief paragraphs that state what Australia “must” do.

It states, for example, that “National Defence must be part of a broader national strategy of whole-of-government co-ordinated and focused statecraft and diplomacy in our region.” The ADF must replace a “balanced force” with a “focused force”. These ambitions sound worthy but lack explication. On precisely what, for example, should the statecraft and the force be focused?

Moreover, we cannot escape the sense that the capability cart has been put before the strategic horse. Nowhere in this document, nor in any other policy statement since September 2021, is there a clear and detailed explanation of precisely why the acquisition of SSNs is a better use of Australia’s resources than other potential capabilities, especially those that build on existing strengths.

Perhaps Australians in 2045 will commend the Morrison government for making, and the Albanese government for confirming, a courageous and far-reaching decision to reshape national strategy around one powerful but extremely demanding capability.

There are, unfortunately, many reasons to fear that they will regret that a wide-ranging strategic debate was not initiated in the 35 days between August 15 and September 18, 2021.

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Peter Edwards has written extensively on the history of Australia’s defence and foreign policies and policymaking.