Factionless PM a slave to popularity contest

ONE of the frustrations for many Labor Party diehards is Kevin Rudd's apparent unwillingness to use his record popularity to make significant public policy reform; change that Wayne Swan, Lindsay Tanner and Craig Emerson each wrote books about before Labor was elected into government.

One of the proudest set of achievements by a Labor government was the micro-economic reforms the Hawke and Keating governments secured in the 1980s and 90s. Floating the dollar, industrial relations changes, tariff reductions and compulsory superannuation were reforms championed by Labor.

They weren't always popular, especially with Labor's base. But Bob Hawke and Paul Keating knew Australia needed to change if it was going to stay internationally competitive, so they brought their party with them at some cost to their respective popularity.

Labor even dramatically reduced company taxes in the late 1980s as part of dividend imputation reforms.

So far Rudd has eschewed complex reform initiatives in favour of a spend-a-thon which has been popular (and in fairness may have contributed to Australia staving off recession last year). But it didn't re-shape the Australian social landscape the way Gough Whitlam's spend-a-thon after he won office in 1972 did.

The reason conservatives hate Whitlam so much is because he achieved social fabric changes with his spending: free university education and universal health care among the initiatives. Rudd hasn't done the 21st century equivalent. Say what you like about the fiscal negligence of the Whitlam government, at least it came hand in hand with shaping a new Australia, one the conservatives have been forced to largely maintain in Whitlam's aftermath.

Some of Rudd's internal critics aren't surprised he hasn't embraced major social change or unpopular, if necessary, economic reforms. They point to his bureaucratic past to support an argument that he is nothing more than an administrator, Australia's first federal premier. George Megalogenis identified this looming reality some time ago.

Such a scathing assessment of Rudd may be right, but there is more to the story than his limited framework. He doesn't have a support base inside his own parliamentary ranks.

Unlike previous Labor leaders he isn't factional and didn't win the leadership with a team of supporters in tow. It forces him to chase popularity in the polls to ensure his dominant position inside the party is maintained. That means he won't take risks.

It needs to be remembered that Rudd won the Labor leadership with up to only about 20 per cent personal support from the caucus; his majority came from leftwingers supporting Julia Gillard as deputy on their joint ticket, and a small collection of swinging MPs who just didn't think Kim Beazley could win an election against John Howard (many of them were shown internal party polling).

Gillard had to do the deal to be Rudd's deputy because whatever concerns sections of Labor's caucus had about Beazley's performance, they weren't going to back a left-winger to roll him.

Gillard's pragmatism gave Rudd the leadership. It has also given her the deputy prime ministership and with it the chance to prove to colleagues that she can one day be trusted with the leadership.

Rudd's lack of a base inside Labor's caucus means that to stay leader he has to stay popular. He doesn't have a backing that will see him through the tough times. This circular situation means Rudd is popular but won't use his popularity to make major reforms lest it renders him unpopular and therefore vulnerable to a challenge.

The way Rudd and his office have run the government since being elected more than two years ago has only reinforced this situation.

The media unit, the policy wonks inside the Prime Minister's office and the overarching, controlling nature of the leader have all meant that many inside Labor's parliamentary team are grateful for one thing only: at least they are in power sharing the spoils of victory. If that is put in jeopardy they won't continue to accept Rudd's approach, and discipline would quickly fade.

Making it even less likely that Rudd will actually start to embrace significant policies such as tax reform (not mere meddling), a commonwealth takeover of public hospitals (as promised), nuclear power as a means to reducing emissions (something he isn't even prepared to initiate a debate on) or higher education sector reform, is the pressure his chief spear carrier is under at the moment.

While Rudd has never had a base inside the Labor Party, the NSW Right formed a praetorian guard around him shortly after he became Prime Minister under the factional leadership of Mark Arbib, who saw being close to Rudd as a one-way ticket to promotion, power and influence.

The former state secretary has a history of supporting factional opponents into positions of power if he can see electoral benefits in doing so. It is a very different method to the NSW Right's traditional winner-takes-all approach to the upper echelons of power.

But while Arbib has been building his policy skills in Canberra, as well as his now-close relationship with Rudd, he has lost some of his control over the NSW Right. This was on show when Nathan Rees was rolled as premier for a right-wing candidate, Kristina Keneally, shortly after Rudd had endorsed the job Rees was doing. Apparently the Prime Minister was furious at the snub.

One of Arbib's right-wing colleagues commented: "[Arbib] is like a Roman emperor who is off abroad winning battles in new found territory. But when he returns to Rome, his power base is gone."

The imagery is dramatic, but even just the perception of a loss of factional power for Arbib makes it even less likely Rudd will use his popularity to embrace tough reforms.

Most governments do the heavy lifting on reform in their first term in office; certainly in the first half of their time in power. Howard balanced the budget, reformed gun laws and prepared the GST policy which he then took to his second election. Rudd has had a busy first term but not a productive one when it comes to major changes.

With the exception of the Fair Work bill which fulfilled (and built on) Labor's election commitment to replace Work Choices, the sorts of policies Rudd has delivered are ones that you would expect a bureaucracy to convince compliant ministers are necessary.

We are yet to see the sort of heavy lifting which pits ministers against his or her departments because one side is thinking like a bureaucrat while the other is thinking like an ideologue.

With Rudd's dependence on popularity to keep his job the situation isn't likely to change in an election year.