Staking a claim among giants

FACING dynamic changes in east Asia, the new Australian government, led by John Howard or Kevin Rudd, will confront pivotal strategic decisions about Australia's future.

These concern how Australia sees the balance of power in Asia and defines the national interest in regional arrangements being canvassed among the US, China, Japan and India.

There should be five guiding stars for Australia in this process.

First, Australia should embrace the new Trilateral Strategic Dialogue involving the US and Japan. This means dismissing the pessimistic doomsayers who warn Australia off such a natural association on the basis that it might upset China. Such views are astounding.

If Australia cannot enter a dialogue in 2007 with its close allies lest China be upset then our foreign policy flexibility is so utterly circumscribed that our only future is Finlandisation before the Middle Kingdom. This is not the response of a realist nation or confident society. It is not the outlook of a nation that can succeed in Asia.

Remember, the TSD was the idea of Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and former US deputy secretary of state Rich Armitage. It is a way of better integrating Japan's military emergence and sensitive ties with China into a regional framework. Critics who fear it conscripts Australia into Japan's tensions with China overlook the obvious reverse point: it gives Australia more influence over Japan.

Second, Australia needs firmly and unequivocally to convey to the US that it sees no strategic role for alliances of democracies in Asia. The pro-democratic streak in US foreign policy is long documented. While it has some limited Australian backers, usually based on convenience, the idea neither suits Australia's interests nor will it appeal in the region.

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum leaders summit, US President George W. Bush floated a proposal for a new Asia-Pacific democratic partnership, a meeting of Asian democracies.

Downer has told US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that such a concept must be limited strictly to capacity-building, that is, offering practical help.

It should not have any strategic role and this must become an unshakable Australian position.

Any US notion of dividing Asia along democratic lines - the democracies (including Taiwan) against China - would be ludicrous. The ultimate alarm for China is an Asian NATO. Australia has the ability to exercise influence over the US on this concept - witness Downer's role - and it needs to be vigilant to ensure the US does not prioritise this idea on the wrong basis.

Third, Australia should signal to US leaders and Japan's new leaders (if necessary) that Australia opposes any four-way strategic group comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia. This may be unnecessary since India is smart enough not to get involved.

But the notion was advocated by retired Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and has been embraced by US Vice-President Dick Cheney, who pushed it in talks with Howard earlier this year. It seems Howard was interested. Downer, by contrast, is unenthusiastic. The Canberra bureaucracy seems confused.

Australia should work cautiously but ceaselessly to ensure such a flawed concept with serious potential for regional damage does not get into US strategic consciousness. There is only one conclusion from such a strategic body: that it is a China containment strategy. Beijing does not much like the TSD. But it sees the logic of such a grouping of US allies. And such logic becomes, in effect, an instrument of reassurance. India, however, is not a US alliance partner and any US-Japan-India-Australia strategic grouping has no inherent logic whatsoever.

When the Chinese talk to Australia about this idea they ask: "What is the organising principle?" Good question. The answer is obvious: to limit and contain China. What else could it be? Beijing would see any such body as ideological. The basis of Australian foreign policy has been to deal with China on the national interest, not on ideology. It is vital this approach not be compromised.

Most regional experts feel the quadrilateral idea is a dead end. Let's hope so. So far, despite all the talk, there has been only one officials meeting at quadrilateral level, a breakfast in Manila at the time of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The suggestion is that India is not too interested.

But there are grounds for worry. At the Sydney APEC meeting Rice hinted to the media she wanted the group to begin talking about security issues. Howard hosted a breakfast meeting for Bush and Abe at which much of the discussion was about how to involve India. This is a vital moment for Australia. It needs to think with clarity and draw lines between what it wants and what it doesn't want.

A Rudd government would have fixed ideas on these subjects. Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Robert McClelland says: "Labor supports the (TSD) that the Howard Government has entered. We believe it is important for law enforcement, counter-terrorism and has potential to assist on climate change. We also favour Australia entering into a security dialogue with India. But Labor does not support any four-way security pact that involves India and that could require Australia to engage in hostilities should India or Japan be attacked." Precisely.

Fourth, the lesson from the Sydney APEC meeting is that Australia must continue to advance APEC, keep its relevance and drive its agenda. This will not be easy given multiple regional bodies and pressures for rationalisation. But APEC is a piece of valuable regional architecture for Australia and an instrument the US should value more than it does.

It must progress to discuss security issues, and Australia should facilitate this. The profile of APEC is greater in Australia than in any other member economy, a point that is valid despite the deliberate decision by much of the Sydney media to de-legitimise the forum by turning it into a circus about traffic and protesters.

Finally, there will be no substitute for bilateralism in the evolving Asia. Regionalism cannot substitute for effective state-to-state ties. One of the insights of the Howard era was to grasp this from the start. Australia is deepening its bilateral ties with Indonesia, Japan, China and India. It is the strength of such bilateral links covering trade, finance and security that entrenches shared national interests.

The message for Australia given the rising giants of Asia is that our foreign policy task will become far more complex. As a nation we need to get sharper intellectually and tougher politically. The task, as ever, is to help shape the region, not just endure its consequences.