On firmer moral ground for action against Islamic State in Iraq

OZ oped art. 03/09/2014 Hercules airplane dropping American and Australian parachutes. Artwork by Sturt Krygsman.

HUMANITARIAN goals are the moral basis for intervention against the so-called Islamic State, but the obvious parallel mission is the military goal of diminishing this entity, its fighters and its infrastructure.

Australia is taking sides in this battle. How far the Abbott government’s military commitment goes depends on US policy. Tony Abbott has said the Islamic State must be defeated — but that is a big call.

Because taking sides against Islamic State jihadists to deplete their military strength is a justified moral and strategic objective the argument, sooner or later, must be advanced and carried on this basis. But that means avoiding the fatal trap — being seen to back a Shi’ite retaliation against the Sunnis, thereby deepening the civil war within Iraq and Syria.

Alert to this risk, the model for President Barack Obama’s action is far closer to that of George HW Bush in his highly successful 1991 war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq than with George W. Bush’s ill-conceived 2003 invasion of Iraq to achieve regime change.

In his New York Times op-ed, US Secretary of State John Kerry said of the Islamic State: “In this battle there is a role for almost every country.”

He endorsed the 1991 multi­lateral method of Bush Sr and his secretary of state, James A. Baker III, because “they methodically assembled a coalition of countries whose concerted action brought a quick victory”. In short, Obama’s model is Bush 41, not Bush 43.

Obama has identified his trigger points — he wants an inclusive government in Baghdad, inter­national support and a regional strategy, critically with Sunni partners inside and outside Iraq. Obama wants Middle East nations backing intervention or ending support for the Islamic State.

These are daunting tests. The intervention will be compromised if the US-led campaign becomes a project on behalf of the Shia rather than an inclusive Iraq. Yet shaping such outcomes is beyond Obama’s control.

The limited justifications advanced by the Prime Minister are persuasive, so far. First, that leaving “millions of people exposed to death, forced conversion and ethnic cleansing” is a humanitarian-moral platform for intervention. And, second, that the strategic consequences of inaction is the worst option, since with these Islamic jihadists the “conflict is reaching out to us”.

Australia is involved because our citizens are involved, fighting and killing for the Islamic State and supporting its efforts. The fact demonstrators in our streets march under its flag testifies to the greatest challenge facing Australian multiculturalism.

The more momentum the Islamic State achieves, the more its appeal to Western-based jihadists will intensify.

The West has a high strategic interest in preventing the Islamic State from becoming entrenched as a permanent state with a system of governance, resources and de facto boundaries, the consequence of which will extend violence in the region and the world.

Abbott leaves nobody in doubt about his views. Yet he operates step-by-step and his decisions are cautious. Our humanitarian support has now extended into another dimension: flying munitions and supplies to the Kurdish regional government in Erbil.

Australia has acted in response to a US request with the support of the Iraqi government and as part of a coalition. Abbott expects the US will seek more Australian support. This could involve Super Hornet fighters and perhaps the SAS in a further role.

Abbott sends two messages to the Australian people: prepare for a greater military role but realise this is not 2003 and our involvement will be limited. The key to any greater Australia role will be mission definition, a point Abbott repeatedly emphasises.

The Prime Minister correctly dismisses the push for parliament to approve or disapprove cabinet’s decision. Abbott and Labor are in fierce agreement on this. But this push from the Greens, part of their long-established policy, should be welcomed because its flaws are ­exposed.

Modern war and interventions, humanitarian and strategic, often involve quick decisions based on intelligence and gradations of involvement. The idea that parliament should have the power to vote on and potentially veto supplying munitions in the current context, a low-level mission, is ­ludicrous.

It is also dangerous. The contingencies that would demand a quick military response are almost limitless. The reality, of course, is that any parliamentary approval mechanism would need to cover such exceptions and this, in effect, reveals its inadequate and flawed nature.

The entire idea arises from the 2003 Iraq war and the strategic motive is obvious: to impose a new test making external military commitments by Australia far more difficult to realise. This strikes at our strategic tradition and flexibility, and it seeks to achieve a change in strategic ­culture.

Beyond this, it is the principle that matters and the principle is wrong. The embedded, long practised and unwritten law of the Australian Constitution is that the war decision rests with the executive government. Parliament is consulted at some time but maximum discretion lies with the Prime Minister.

The executive has no more important power. There is no greater legitimate task than protecting the national interest and lives of citizens. The executive is responsible to the parliament for its decision and to the people. This is our democratic accountability.

Attempting to invest either house of parliament with a veto power on military deployment is a violation of our constitutional arrangements since Federation and a radical change in executive-legislative powers.

If either house can veto a military commitment then the idea is outrageous. It would give the Senate veto power over a war decision by government when the founding fathers refused to give the Senate this same veto power over any item of legislation since Senate rejection of bills can be reversed at a joint sitting.

On another note: can you imagine what the public would think of the current bunch of Senate crossbenchers now being given the power over war and peace? Yes, it is farcical.

Any such change, of course, would lead to more politics, deeper schisms, legal threats and greater community division over war decisions. It would make war decisions more, not less, contentious. The lesson is you can’t easily change a nation’s institutional culture.

It is a flawed idea that would weaken the quality of our decision-making and our democracy. It will never happen while Liberal and Labor see themselves as governing parties with responsibility for national security.