May firmly places UK in the laughing stocks

Illustration: Eric Lobbecke

Britain’s House of Commons was right to reject the disastrous deal that Theresa May brought home from Brussels for Britain leaving the EU. While the insider detail is fascinating for political tragics — like Don Bradman’s first-class batting averages over different seasons for a cricket obsessive — the bigger picture is sobering, if not shocking.

The whole Brexit mess is a catastrophic failure by the British political class. It is a failure espec­ially by May, but everyone shares the group blame for not leading their country effectively. It is the worst single failure of UK politics since the infamous ­appeasement era, in which British leaders ­refused to face up to the ­reality of Nazi Germany. It represents the gravest political crisis since the early days of World War II, when the decision to install Winston Churchill as leader was achieved by the narrowest margin.

I am not equating anyone in this situation with either Chur­chill or the Nazis, but Britain is ­facing fundamental issues. The Brit­ish political class has also pro­duced an environment of passionate community hostilities, one of such ferment that there is more potential for unpredictable realignment of politics and society than at any time since the first ­decades of the past century, when the Labour Party replaced the ­Liberal Party, women’s suffrage was established and trade unions ­became a powerful force, politic­ally and socially.

It is no fun to beat up on May. Her stoic determination to keep on keeping on is in some sense ­admirable, especially as her body seems to keep breaking down at key crisis points. Listening to her speech and answers to questions in parliament in the early hours of Wednesday morning (Australian time) was excruciating. Her voice started croaky and got steadily worse. The benches behind her were half empty; her colleagues did not turn out for her.

May’s lack of effective leadership in all this is epic. She triggered the two-year mechanism for withdrawal without any coherent idea of what kind of Brexit she wanted. She laid down bold red lines that she has subsequently crept away from. She did not develop her own negotiating position until the last minute. She sacrificed a poll lead of 23 points at the start of the previous election campaign and fell into minority government, but then ­refused to stand down from the prime ministership as she obviously should have done. At every point her rhetoric has ­tended to deny reality.

Most of all, she has never overcome, nor even addressed, the fundamental structural contradiction of Brexit: in the biggest vote in British history, 52 per cent decided to leave the EU, while 48 per cent voted Remain. But as Jacob Rees-Mogg points out, probably 500 of the 650 MPs in the House of Commons, ­including May herself, supported Remain, as did almost all senior civil servants. And the British media, I would guess, having watched it closely, is probably 80 per cent Remain.

The three pillars of the British establishment are pro-Remain, yet have had key roles in implementing Brexit. At first they were cowed by the authority of the democratic referendum. But once May lost her parliamentary ­majority, the establishment reasserted itself and began, like orthodox communists of old, to describe a kind of “false consciousness” under which voters had laboured. The establishment worked to water down or reverse Brexit

Given this, May should never have allowed the civil service to lead the negotiations. They should have been ­under­taken by politicians committed to Brexit. May did appoint Brexiteers to her cabinet, such as Boris Johnson and David Davis, even to the key Brexit ministries, but then gave them no authority, a typical May dodge, painting the picture of one thing while ­pursuing the substance of something different.

May’s deal is so unbelievably bad because it effectively allows the EU to keep Britain inside all the EU rules forever, a point May’s attorney-general reiterated had not changed even with the cosmetic explanatory bits and pieces she brought back from the EU this week. The deal provides for a transition period until the end of 2020 in which nothing much changes. If at the end of that transition the EU and Britain have not reached agreement on a future trade and political relationship, the “backstop” comes into force. This ­involves Britain remaining inside the EU customs union, which means it cannot set its own tariffs and still must abide by European Court rulings and the rulings of other EU institutions, until the EU agrees that it can leave.

Under May’s deal Britain is much worse off than it is as a member of the EU. As a member, Britain has some influence on the rules it must follow. More important, as a member it can decide to leave the EU. In May’s bizarre twilight zone agreement, it has no ­influence on the rules it must follow and no ability to leave the backstop unless Brussels agrees. Why would Brussels ever agree? Britain following all the rules and having no influence — that is ­exactly where the EU would like to see Britain forever.

It is unbelievable May ever ­accepted this deal. In a devastating speech after May, Tory backbencher Sir William Cash pointed out that under May’s deal, Britain would be “at the mercy of its competitors” who would have no incentive to give it any benefit at all. The EU could shape its own trade deals, and its own regulations, to disadvantage British industry vis-a-vis French or German industry, and Britain would have to meekly follow every such decision.

Don’t think British courts, themselves used to decades of jurisprudential domination from ­Europe, would not thwart any uppity British government that tried to leave the backstop anyway.

Almost any outcome is now possible. Here are six. One, a disorderly no-deal Brexit. That means Britain leaves the EU on March 29 with no deal and trades with the EU under World Trade Organisation rules. Two, an orderly no-deal Brexit. That means a transition period but within a clear time, say six months, Britain goes to WTO rules. These are the two best options as only they can bring the debilitating uncertainty and endless dispute to an end.

Other possibilities are, three, Britain could reverse Brexit and stay in the EU; four, it could hold a second referendum, though God knows what it would do if the people voted to leave again; five, Britain could accept permanently a soft Brexit involving accepting all the EU rules but not having any say in them; or six, it could secure a delay with nothing decided.

What a mess.