Orlandon shooting: ASIO has 400 extremists under survelliance

ASIO has more than 400 “high priority” counter-terrorism investigations on its books.

ASIO's new Headquarters perched near the shores of Lake Burley Griffin in Canberra.

There is no such thing as a terrorist watch list, at least not in Australia. Instead, ASIO operates what it calls a “grid” — a framework for ­determining the level of surveillance and investigation it applies to any of the hundreds of Islamic radicals who at any one time are of security interest to the agency.

ASIO does not say how many suspected extremists are on the grid. However, the domestic intelligence agency told The Australian yesterday it had more than 400 “high-priority” counter-terrorism investigations on its books.

That’s more than double the number of serious investigations ASIO was conducting in 2014, ­before Islamic State declared its caliphate in Syria and Iraq, an event sources say supercharged extremist sentiment in Australia.

ASIO has also said there are about 190 Australians actively supporting Islamic State in some way, although they would almost certainly form part of the 400-odd people being “watched” on the agency’s grid.

The grid is organised into ­concentric circles, with subjects moving from the centre, where scrutiny is at its most intense, ­towards the periphery, where the level of surveillance is gradually scaled down.

At any one time only a relatively small number of extremists are concentrated at the centre.

These radicals will be the ­subject of intense technical ­surveillance, meaning ASIO will be intercepting their phones — if they still have them — reading their emails, monitoring their ­internet usage and probably ­bugging their homes and vehicles. They might also be subject to physical surveillance.

This sort of work is usually done in conjunction with state and federal police, who are armed and have powers of arrest, something ASIO officers don’t have.

It is also done sparingly. Physical surveillance is labour intensive, requiring teams of officers and multiple vehicles working in shifts. Technical surveillance is also ­laborious. Gathering the information is relatively easy, although the ubiquity of encrypted messaging apps has added another layer of difficulty. But transcribing it, analysing it and translating it is ­incredibly time consuming.

Much of this work needs to be done in real time. If ASIO suspects a team of Lebanese-speaking ­jihadists is planning an attack it needs Lebanese-speaking translators in the room monitoring the intercepted conversations as they arrive.

If Orlando shooter Omar ­Mateen had been in Australia he likely would have been on the outer rim of ASIO’s grid. Others, like the targets of Operation ­Appleby, the investigation into ­Afghan radicals ­suspected of planning terror ­attacks in Sydney, would have been at the centre.

Sources said that this time last year there were real concerns that ASIO would not be able to maintain the tempo of serious investigations. Like all national security agencies, ASIO has received hundreds of millions of dollars in ­additional funding to deal with the ISIS threat. But the sensitive, specialised nature of ASIO’s work means the money can take years to reach the areas it is needed.

Recruiting, vetting and training an ASIO intelligence officer might take years. There are only so many Pashto speakers in Australia. And, as counter-terrorism officials are fond of saying, the good guys have to be lucky every time. The bad guys only once.