Boeing sustains max pain from a basic lapse

Boeing sold its jet as easy to fly and left out key pilot information.

Workers remove debris from the Ethiopian Airlines crash site south of Addis Ababa on Monday. Picture: AP

Until this week, all that was ­required for pilots to make the conversion to fly a new Boeing 737 MAX 8 was a 56-minute training video.

There was no simulator training and no flights with a supervising captain. It was just a matter of watch the video, get into the cockpit and fly.

According to pilots and other aviation industry insiders, the transitional ease of the 737 MAX 8, was one of the main marketing tools used by Boeing to sell the ­aircraft.

“They have sold this aircraft on the basis that if you can fly a 737-800, you can fly this,” says aviation consultant Neil Hansford. “It’s engineering arrogance.”

The marketing strategy certainly worked, with 5000 of the MAX family aircraft now on order with Boeing, worth an estimated $500 billion. Virgin Australia has 30 of the jets on order, worth $5bn, with the first due to be delivered before the end of 2019.

On paper the Boeing 737 MAX 8 must have sounded like the perfect aircraft for cash-conscious airlines with expansion on their mind.

As a variant of the very reliable industry workhorse, the 737, the MAX offered airlines more capacity, more range and better fuel efficiency, as well as the low-cost training proposition.

But after the second deadly crash of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 last Sunday, and the subsequent global grounding of the aircraft, questions are being asked about the approach to pilot training.

Certainly, US regulator the Federal Aviation Administration has demanded Boeing update crew training and operation manuals in the 737 MAX, with information about a new feature the manufacturer failed to explain to pilots.

The manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system, known as MCAS, was apparently added by Boeing to issue nose-down orders to the aircraft to compensate for a change in the centre of lift, as a result of larger engines placed slightly forward pushing the wings further back.

The anti-stalling mechanism kicks in when the aeroplane is being flown manually, which is thought to have confused the Lion Air pilots at the controls of Flight 610 on October 28 last year.

Thinking something else was going on, the pilot fought with the aircraft until it crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 people on board.

Last Sunday’s Ethiopian Airlines crash that left 157 dead also occurred minutes after takeoff as the pilot experienced difficulty controlling the plane, in a scenario similar to the Indonesian disaster.

inquirer graph - boeing 737 crashes

As far as Hansford is concerned, the whole tragic scenario is an example of what can happen when commercial interests take precedence over safety.

“One of the selling features of the aircraft was that it’s easy to fly for the least experienced pilots in developing economies,” Hansford says.

“That’s what it is all about and Boeing actually promoted, with the MAX 8 and 9, that the conversion from a 737-800 was quick, simple and effectively didn’t even require a simulator ride.”

He says the normal process of transitioning to a brand new aircraft is time-consuming and very considered.

There is a conversion course and thorough familiarisation with all the manuals.

“Then you’d fly up to four legs with a supervising captain,” he adds.

Perhaps because of the prospect of an easy transition to the new 737 variant, airlines in developing countries have been quick to place orders for the MAX.

Among the early customers were India’s Jet Airways and ­SpiceJet with 125 and 136 orders respectively, Indonesia’s Lion Air (201 orders) and AeroMexico (60).

“Boeing have taken a marketing position for financial reasons to make aircraft for places where pilot training and experience takes a back seat to other considerations,” Hansford says.

“You only need to look at the experience of the pilots operating Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. The captain had 8000 hours but we don’t know how many of those were on a jet, and the first officer had 200 hours. You wouldn’t get out of the Australian Wings Academy at Coolangatta with 200 hours.”

The brevity of the training package for the 737 MAX also concerns Australian Federation of Air Pilots technical and safety manager Marcus Diamond.

He says the size of the order book is no doubt a reflection of the fact the aircraft could be adopted by airlines without having to shell out for new simulators.

“A big-ticket item is the training for a new fleet and it’s definitely one of the swings in the economics of choosing a new fleet for all the major airlines,” Diamond says.

“Virgin Australia until now had a short power point presentation on differences training for their crew which did not include ­anything about the MCAS (manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system).”

This week Virgin cast some doubt over its MAX 8 order, suggesting it would need to be completely satisfied about the aircraft’s safety before taking delivery of any planes.

It has time in its favour, with the first aeroplane not due to arrive until November.

The airline has also committed to ensuring pilots have access to a dedicated MAX simulator so they are familiar with features such as the MCAS.

Hansford says the system, which is designed to push the nose of the plane down in part to compensate for a shift in the centre of lift, is an example of “dumbing down” aircraft to suit less experienced pilots.

Boeing’s decision not to inform pilots about the system in flight crew manuals and training appears to be further evidence of that — in a seemingly classic case of “what you don’t know can’t hurt you”.

But as the Lion Air crash appeared to demonstrate, MCAS and the pilot’s lack of knowledge about its behaviour proved extremely damaging, possibly even causing the crash.

Diamond says the “anti-stall” system is a departure from the ­traditional Boeing way of producing planes that are “built for pilots to fly”.

“There’s always been a very big philosophical difference between them and Airbus, whose planes are much more computerised and automated,” he says.

inquirer graph - boeing 737 crashes

“It seems Boeing was starting to head down that track with the MAX but my point is you can’t get computers to make decisions that pilots do.”

Diamond says fix applied to the MAX should involve the disabling of the MACS, which is a view shared by Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association national secretary Steve Purvinas.

He says a feature that allows an aircraft to fly itself into the ground (or sea) was always going to be a disaster waiting to happen. “The aircraft definitely has some dramatic points of difference (to the 737-800) that should require the crew to have some simulator training,” Purvinas says.

Boeing has indicated its support for the grounding of the MAX fleet and has “paused” deliveries of the aircraft, although it continues to build the planes.

It is possible the MAX grounding could last as long as six months, based on the large number of aircraft involved — 376 — and the checks that would need to be completed before they could be returned to duty.

With the cost to airlines expected to run into the millions, some carriers, such as Norwegian Air, have already raised the possibility of seeking compensation from Boeing.

The company has been reluctant to discuss further details, and notably shut down a public relations event scheduled for the week much faster than it agreed to the grounding.

The tragedy has also concerned Boeing’s investors. Within days its share price fell by more than 10 per cent, wiping nearly $US30bn ($42bn) off its market value.