Revealed: Gough Whitlam ignored warnings on dismissal and considered sacking John Kerr
Newly discovered documents show the public service repeatedly told Gough Whitlam that he faced possible dismissal by John Kerr but he undertook no contingency planning.
Gough Whitlam was repeatedly warned by public servants before and during the crisis over supply in October and November 1975 that he was at risk of being dismissed by vice-regal intervention but he chose to ignore them all.
In a “confidential” memo sent to the prime minister dated September 17, a month before supply was first delayed in the Senate by the Coalition, he was formally advised by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet that dismissal was a possible resolution to the deadlock.
“The governor-general could terminate the commission of the prime minister by issuing a new commission to a new prime minister,” Whitlam was warned.
“A precedent was the dismissal of JT Lang by Sir Philip Game for refusing to pay debts under the financial agreement between the states and the commonwealth.”
Two weeks before the budget was blocked in the Senate, Whitlam was further advised that governor-general Sir John Kerr could act to commission the opposition leader “to form a government” who could secure supply.
This is precisely what would happen on November 11, 1975.
“If the Senate were able to keep the bills in its possession without finally rejecting them until, say, the governor-general were to ask the leader of the opposition to form a government, the Senate would then be able to move to pass the bills,” Whitlam was advised.
These memos outlining the precise resolutions to the crisis 50 years ago were sent to Whitlam again and again, and formed part of his daily briefing folder on the crisis.
It can also be revealed that Whitlam sought advice on how to remove Kerr from office if he suspected his dismissal was being contemplated. Whitlam denied seriously considering this but he annotated a memo regarding “Refusal of Supply” asking his staff to “examine” recalling Kerr.
In recounting how NSW governor Sir Gerald Strickland was recalled by the British government after a dispute with NSW premier William Holman in May 1916, Whitlam wrote on the memo: “Could PM have GG recalled?”
After the dismissal, Whitlam wrote to British Labour prime minister Harold Wilson, saying it was a mistake to recommend “a judge” as the Queen’s “viceroy”. He would have sacked Kerr if he knew what was planned.
“He deceived me – realising, I’m sure, that I would have been in touch with the Queen if my suspicions had been aroused,” Whitlam wrote on December 31, 1975.
Don Emerton, first assistant secretary in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet said in an interview the annotated memo showed Whitlam was thinking he might have to “go to the palace” to recall Kerr during the crisis.
But Whitlam had little interest in contingency planning because he expected the Senate to buckle and pass supply. Mr Emerton recalled meeting Whitlam during the crisis. “He was talking about the probability that there was going to be a senator who would crack to vote for supply,” he recalled. “That was where his mind was.”
The secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, Clarrie Harders, disclosed in his unpublished memoir there were many “warnings by public servants” to Whitlam during the crisis but he showed little interest.
Harders was so concerned that Whitlam was at risk of being dismissed that he sent a note to the Prime Minister’s Office highlighting this danger. “I’ve written a note to the prime minister warning him that he could be dismissed by the governor-general,” he told Mr Emerton, who made sure it went to Whitlam.
There were many other warnings given to Whitlam not to trust Kerr and to be sure he would agree with the recommendation of a half-Senate election. They came from a diverse group of people such as adviser Elizabeth Reid, painter Clifton Pugh, party secretary David Combe and NSW MP Clive Evatt, along with ministers Bill Hayden, Fred Daly and Frank Crean.
An account of what took place on November 11, 1975, prepared by speaker Gordon Scholes – also fully revealed for the first time in a new biography of Whitlam – criticised Whitlam for not contemplating yet alone planning for a potential dismissal.
“Contingency plans for a complete departure from accepted parliamentary practice and the accepted role of the Australian governor-general had not been prepared,” Scholes wrote after being called to the Lodge at lunchtime to find Whitlam had been dismissed.
Troy Bramston is the author of Gough Whitlam: The Vista of the New (HarperCollins).
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