Cabinet Papers: Our capital cities not ready for 9/11-style terror attack

Almost three years after the 9/11 attacks, Australia was still unprepared for a suicide plane attack in its major cities and officials warned of a possible 30-second-only warning in Sydney.

John Howard with workers at the World Trade Centre site in New York during a tour of the scene on January 30, 2002. Picture: Ray Strange

Almost three years after the ­September 11, 2001 attacks, ­Australia remained unprepared for a suicide plane hitting one of its major cities, and officials warned there was a possibility no anomalies would show up on monitoring systems until just 30 seconds ­before impact in ­Sydney.

Freshly unsealed cabinet documents from 2004 detail Australia’s security and counter-terrorism efforts, years into the war on terror. That year saw a new white paper on counter-terrorism and progression of significant defence investments.

As part of the Howard government’s attempts to prevent terrorism, the cabinet discussed decision-making procedures during major aircraft incidents such as suicide attacks of the kind seen on 9/11.

Patchy radar coverage and the prohibitive cost for constant Air Force vigilance would prevent Australia from being able to intercept a hijacked plane quickly, the briefing warned.

The control tower at Sydney Airport seen in 2019. Picture: AAP

“Due to the lack of comprehensive radar coverage in ­Australia, it may not become apparent that an aircraft has been hijacked until it is within radar coverage of an airport, which equates to 50 nautical miles from an air traffic control tower,” one briefing read.

“Civil aircraft can travel 50 nautical miles in seven minutes. Furthermore, it is conceivable that a hijacked aircraft flying near Sydney, for example, may be on its legitimate flight path until the last 30 seconds of its flight.

“In such cases, air traffic controllers would not be able to confirm that an incident is taking place in time to initiate any response action.”

Even in the case that a hijacking could be detected, “the (Australian Defence Force) currently holds no elements at sufficient readiness to respond to a short-notice airborne aviation security incident”, the document reads.

The cost of operating such capacity would be “extremely high”, at $1.2bn, officials estimated.

The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation’s threat assessment for Australian aviation remained classified, but it said at the time that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates “remain the greatest source of terrorist threat to Australian aviation”.

In short, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet deemed it “highly unlikely that an appropriate response capability could be activated in time to intervene in the event of a major aviation security incident” but, nonetheless, the cabinet put into place procedures and rules in the case of a hijacking event.

There are also a few sparse details in the documents of cabinet discussions about the then upcoming counter-terrorism white paper, which would go on to form the cornerstone of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy in the following years.

“The (National Security Committee) agreed that … subsequent drafting … makes clear that terrorism is a tool not only of Islamic extremism such as secessionist groups,” one note read.

Another minutes document read that the white paper writers would “consult with agencies to determine whether there are a limited number of issues in the white paper, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, which might be expanded on”.