Residual US force could have saved Iraq from a civil war spiral

THE portentous resurgence by al-Qa'ida-linked militants in Iraq is a strategic disaster for the US.

THE portentous resurgence by al-Qa'ida-linked militants in Iraq is a strategic disaster for the US that owes much to President Obama's determination to bring a hasty end to a highly unpopular war without first securing a planned agreement with Baghdad to maintain a residual US and coalition force in the country.

Military strategists always believed that the presence of such a residual force in the post-withdrawal period was imperative if the grim developments now being seen in Anbar Province were to be avoided. With Iraq now looking into the abyss of a return to full-scale civil war, their worst fears are being realised, and it is inevitable that Obama will have to shoulder much of the blame.

When he became president in 2009, Obama was determined to have done with a conflict that was identified with his predecessor, George W. Bush. The new President had popular opinion overwhelmingly on his side. There was no appetite in the US or elsewhere to carry on fighting, even though Iraq was manifestly far from stable.

A residual force of US and coalition forces was, however, with Baghdad's agreement, supposed to remain, enabling Washington to assert direct influence over political and security developments in Iraq.

Protracted negotiations with Baghdad over an agreement failed. Obama seemed almost relieved when they did. He had shown few signs of enthusiasm for even a residual force remaining in the country and he failed to exert the pressure that many believed he was in a position to wield on Baghdad to force it to agree. Instead, he went off to proclaim ending the war in Iraq as one of the big successes of his first term.

Such claims now look extremely dubious as Washington rushes in Hellfire missiles and other weaponry to shore up the forces of Iraq Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as they seek to drive back the Islamist advances in Fallujah, Ramadi and elsewhere.

Al-Maliki, too, has much to answer for over the stunning advance by the al-Qa'ida-linked insurgents. A Shia partisan and strident Iraqi nationalist who has close ties to Iran's Shia rulers, he is the antithesis of what Iraq needed in a prime minister as US and coalition forces withdrew and the importance of achieving reconciliation among the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish communities was paramount.

With Shi'ites in control, what was imperative was to bring the Sunnis (now the backbone of the Islamist insurgency) and the Kurds back into the political mainstream. Instead, al-Maliki's administration has been based on crass sectarianism that has allowed al-Qa'ida's proxies to ruthlessly exploit Sunni grievances, their disaffection fuelled by similar jihadist militancy from across the border with Syria.

Gradually, the jihadists have moved back into the Sunni heartland, relaunching their sectarian violence and giving Iraq its worst year since 2008, with the UN estimating that nearly 8000 civilians and more than 1000 security personnel have been killed in suicide bombings in the past 12 months.

It is a scenario that could hardly be more forbidding from Obama's point of view, especially as it is linked to the way al-Qa'ida proxies are now dominating the uprising against Bashar al-Assad in Syria and an upsurge in jihadist militancy across much of the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.

Could things have turned out differently if Obama had shown more determination in forcing Baghdad to accept an agreement that kept a residual US and coalition force in the country?

Potentially, yes. Perhaps it would have given Washington and its allies more direct input into political and security decisions that are at the heart of the strategic disaster that is now being seen.

A residual force might have made al-Maliki think more deeply about the effects of his blatantly sectarian policies that have promoted Shias and left Sunnis so disenchanted.

Obama now, however, has few options beyond rushing in military supplies to shore up al-Maliki's forces as they try to launch counter-offensives to drive the jihadists out of their newly established gains. There is no appetite for a return of US forces to Iraq, and extremely unlikely to be in the future.

For Obama, the return in strength of Sunni jihadist forces linked to al-Qa'ida to key battle grounds like Fallujah and Ramadi, where so many US soldiers lost their lives, is a sobering reminder that for Washington the war in Iraq is not yet over.