Hanoi summit was a fiasco waiting to happen

In Vietnam, Donald Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy has been exposed as facile.

Kim Jong Un, Donald Trump and Mike Pompeo in Hanoi. Picture: AP

The unexpected breakdown of the second summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may be explained by two main factors. It illustrates the limitations of Trump’s top-down transactional approach to foreign policy, and that advanced preparations were inadequate and led to unrealistic expectations on the US side.

Ever since Trump embarked on high-level summitry with North Korea, he has touted his “very special relationship” with Kim. Both the first and second summits were choreographed to highlight the bonding between these two leaders, walks together on stately grounds and one-on-one meetings. But can we seriously believe that in the space of a few hours the two overcame linguistic and cultural barriers and really came to know and trust each other?

Ahead of the summit, analysts said North Korea preferred the top-down approach because it gave Kim an aura of respectability. The Singapore summit was the first time a US president had met with a North Korean leader. Reportedly, after that summit North Korea delayed receiving US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and held pro forma working meetings with US special representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun. Kim thought he could accomplish more in one-on-one discussions with Trump than through lower-level bilateral discussions.

The Hanoi summit was arranged to duplicate the format of the Singapore talks. The bilateral meetings between Trump and Kim were cordial and reportedly productive. Discussions at lower level were characterised by Pompeo as productive as well.

It was publicly announced the second summit would conclude with the signing of a joint statement. Two hours before the final session, it was clear than an impasse had been reached in the extended session and no joint statement was signed.

Trump and Pompeo gave a press conference right after the summit ended. Trump said the breakdown was basically about sanctions. He also said: “But at this time we had some options, and at this time we decided not to do any of the options.”

Pompeo said that although progress was made, it was not possible for the US to convince the North Koreans to “make a big step” towards denuclearisation. He concluded: “Unfortunately, we didn’t get all the way that ultimately made sense … I think Chairman Kim was hopeful that we would. We asked him to do more. He was unprepared to do that.”

The crux of the matter was the US viewed as insufficient Kim’s offer to close down the Yongbyon nuclear testing facility in exchange for lifting sanctions.

North Korea has since disputed that Kim demanded the lifting of all sanctions. Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho said it sought the lifting of five of 11 UN sanctions imposed in 2016-17 that affected the livelihood of its people in return for dismantling the Yong­byon reactor and a written pledge to permanently end ­nuclear and long-range missile tests. “The US was not ready to ­accept our proposal,”

South Korean sources reported that National Security Adviser John Bolton demanded disclosure of secret chemical and biological weapons, apparently taking the North Koreans by surprise. A sticking point of this magnitude should have been identified in pre-summit talks.

Trump defended his actions by saying no deal was better than a bad deal. This raises the question of why a better deal hadn’t been drawn up in the first place. According to Trump’s press secretary, the meetings were constructive and the two sides discussed “economic driven concepts” and various ways to de­nuclearise. This is an example of Trump’s facile trans­actional approach to dealing with North Korea: denuclearise completely in exchange for an opportunity to become an economic powerhouse.

Trump and his aides have jumped on the idea that Vietnam’s economic success could be a model for North Korea. But history tells us to be cautious. In January 1973, the US and North Vietnam signed a peace treaty, and the US agreed to heal the wounds of war. In February 1973, president Richard Nixon wrote to North Vietnam’s premier Pham Van Dong offering $US3.25 billion in aid over five years for reconstruction and an additional $US1bn to $US1.5bn in other forms of aid. The aim was to loosen Vietnam’s dependence on the Soviets.

But US financial assistance never eventuated. For one, it is congress that authorises funding, not the president. Besides, in the wake of Watergate, Nixon’s commitment fell by the wayside. In 1975, the US accused North Vietnam of violating the 1973 treaty and withdrew from its obligations. The US and Vietnam normalised relations in July 1995 and signed a bilateral trade agreement in 2000, but full economic normalisation is yet to occur. The US designates Vietnam as a “non-market economy” and maintains certain longstanding tariffs. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has imposed tariffs on Vietnamese aluminium and steel as well as inserting a “poison pill” into the US-Mexico-Canada agreement, permitting a signatory to withdraw if any of the others signs a free trade agreement with a non-market economy. This is aimed at China, but poses a risk to Vietnam as well.

Trump’s offer to North Korea also makes no mention of one major impediment: the latter’s appalling record on human rights. Now that Democrats control the house, this is surely an issue, with the Trump administration required to report on its reasons for lifting sanctions on North Korea.

The breakdown of the second summit is a setback but not a disaster. Kim promised Trump that he would not resume ballistic and nuclear testing. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations.

Perhaps it is time to give bottom-up diplomacy by the experts a chance. Trump’s summitry appears to have run its course for the time being. A third summit in 2020, a US election year, would appear more about show than substance.

In sum, Trump’s offer of a “bright shiny economic future” for North Korea is a grand transactional idea that needs to be defined and refined if it has any appeal for Kim. Given the track record of US-Vietnam economic relations, Kim would be wise to consider whether Trump can deliver. And US negotiators need to go back to the drawing board and work out step-by-step measures that would build trust along the protracted path to denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Big steps and grand bargains are all very well but the devil is in the details.

Carlyle A. Thayer is emeritus professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy at UNSW Canberra. He is the author of more than 500 publications including Need for Reform and Governance Capacities in Asia: Country Report Vietnam (2013).