Devising complex security responses to simple terror

The terror attack on Istanbul’s Ataturk airport is a tragedy, ­destroying tens of lives and physically and mentally scarring hundreds more forever. But none of that will alter the broader pattern of air travel or the functioning of airports around the world, few of which have security systems better than Ataturk International.

The first attacker detonated his bomb before reaching the security scanners. This allowed the second attacker to move past security checkpoints into the departure terminal, where he detonated his device. The third attacker waited outside the departure terminal, ­clearly with the ­intent of killing more people as they fled from the earlier bombs.

This wasn’t a random attack of mentally unbalanced lone wolves. The bombers’ strategy was well-co-ordinated and shows an ability to learn from the experience of past attacks, including the one on Brussels airport in March.

The attackers must have had organisational back-up providing them with a plan of attack, tactical training to keep them going through the shock of the detonations and the right weapons.

The attack was simple in concept but executing simple plans isn’t necessarily easy, particularly when it had to be done avoiding detection. It’s not surprising that Turkish authorities suspect ­Islamic State’s involvement.

The terror group hasn’t followed up yet with fresh propaganda, as it did after attacks in Paris and elsewhere, but that will probably happen in coming days.

There are many lessons we should draw from the airport ­attack. Regrettably, most of them point to the need for strengthened security against a persistent, ­indeed growing, threat.

Airport security will come under a harsh spotlight. At most Australian airports security screening happens only after people have checked in baggage, well inside departure terminals.

Older airports can be even less protected. Berlin’s Tegel airport, for example, processes people through security only at their flight departure gate, with thousands of unchecked individuals milling through a shopping concourse just metres away.

Airport security involves a trade-off between convenience and risk. It’s physically possible to push security perimeters out to control, say, the flow of vehicles into airport precincts. That used to happen at Tokyo’s Narita airport, where vehicles were halted and passports checked several kilo­metres from the terminal. Last year Narita replaced this manual check with a camera-based surveillance system using face-­recognition technology.

Greater security around airports will come only at a cost that ultimately will be paid by travellers in higher airfares and longer ­delays. While travellers may be prepared individually to run the small risk of being caught in a terror incident, airport authorities and governments will struggle to claim that present security systems are adequate to the threat posed by suicide bombers.

And beyond airports the constant drumbeat of terror attacks, magnified in significance by global media coverage, will force businesses to reconsider the security of shopping malls, dance clubs, stadiums, cinemas — any place that people gather.

One outcome from the attack is that countries with the capacity to heighten security precautions will do so, driven by popular expectation and government and ­business caution.

It’s true that no complete security guarantee can ever be offered. If airports are made more secure, terrorists may turn to attacking bus stations instead. But no government can use that dismal ­reality as an excuse not to bother.

The future of airport security will look more like Israel’s Ben ­Gurion International, which ­requires a vehicle security check before entering the airport compound. Armed guards view personal identification and question all visitors to the airport.

Armed security personnel stationed at Ben Gurion’s terminal entrances watch those who enter the buildings. Plainclothes and uniformed security personnel ­patrol inside the terminal, backed up with surveillance cameras and biometric face-recognition technology. Departing passengers are questioned by security agents before check-in. There is detailed physical examination of luggage and travellers, including devices to pressure-test checked bags that can trigger explosives.

These measures make it highly likely that an Ataturk airport-style attack would have been quashed at Ben Gurion International.

More broadly, the security ­levels in modern-day Jerusalem could well become a more widely adopted measure in central business districts. Travel and conducting business will take more time, there will be a heavier security presence and a more pervasive sense of being on the alert.

It has been 11 years since security at Australian airports was ­reviewed by John Wheeler. A new review is needed. It could ­advise on how far airports should go in adopting new security regimes.

A second dispiriting conclusion from the attack at Ataturk International is that the heavy battlefield reverses given to the Islamic State group in Iraq is not weakening the attraction of its ideology to potential Islamist extremists.

Islamic State may have been pushed out of the town of Fallujah but, even while suffering some battlefield reverses, it continues to promote its successful brand of social media and Islamist extremist ideology. The Fallujah defeat can be used by Islamic State as a recruitment incentive, focusing on allegations of torture and other mistreatment handed out by the Iranian-backed Shia Popular Mobilisation Units to local Sunni males suspected of being Islamic State sympathisers.

After two years of heavy fighting against Islamic State, it’s clear that the number of individuals susceptible to radicalisation and willing to go to their own death supporting Islamist extremism is not diminishing rapidly, even after 13,400 airstrikes have killed more than 10,000 Islamic State fighters.

Foreign fighters are finding it harder to reach Syria and Iraq but locals continue to be recruited and Islamic State seems to be expanding its influence in Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Turkish authorities claim the bombers were citizens of Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which demonstrates the widespread attrac­tion of the extremist jihadist ideology. It may be these individuals had been unable to cross from Turkey into Syria.

Violent radicalisation is not limited to the Middle East but is global. Thus far Southeast Asia has escaped relatively lightly but we should worry that the potential for a flare-up of Islamist extremism in our region is quickly growing.

No country has yet developed effective counter-radicalisation strategies. Police and security agencies in Australia try to span tasks ranging from hard-knock ­arrests of terrorist plotters to providing pastoral care of “at risk” youth. Politicians in many countries struggle to find the right phrases even to talk about radicalisation. Barack Obama resists using the term “Islamist extremism” out of a sensible wish not to needlessly ­offend, but such an ideology is overwhelmingly the core of the problem.

After the Paris attacks of ­November last year, I wrote in ­Inquirer that police and security forces would have no option other than to use more pre-emptive raids and arrests to shut down ­potential terrorist plots.

Along with that comes the need for broader legal powers of search and arrest and the capacity to ­detain individuals for longer on suspicion of terrorist involvement. The rapid detention by Turkish police of 13 suspects including three foreign nationals shows the authorities were tracking extremists.

The challenge for police is in knowing when to detain individuals who may, or may not, be planning attacks.

In responding to actual ­terrorist events, police and security forces have little choice other than to kill attackers rather than hope to stop attacks with minimum force. This is exactly what has happened. For the most part our communities have accepted that personal freedoms may have to be compromised to achieve ­greater security.

The Ataturk airport attack will accelerate this trend even as governments scratch their heads looking for softer solutions to counter radicalisation.

Peter Jennings is the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.