AUKUS alliance: How to avoid making the same mistakes on subs

HMAS Rankin is seen during the AUSINDEX 21 maritime exercise in Darwin earlier this month. Picture: Getty Images

Having secured the pathway towards a nuclear-powered submarine fleet, Australia must now avoid the dreadful mistakes that have plagued its previous submarine and shipbuilding projects.

This will not be easy given the complexity of nuclear subs and Australia’s lack of experience with them. The timeline is so tight that there is little room for error in this massive enterprise. Yet it is frightening how often the same basic mistakes keep being made when it comes to Australia’s naval shipbuilding projects. After reporting on these troubled projects for more than 20 years, here are a few observations about ways to avoid a repeat of some of our previous shipbuilding disasters.

Urgency ahead of jobs: The greatest weakness of this AUKUS submarine deal is that the first nuclear-powered submarine will not be completed in Adelaide until the late 2030s. This is even later than the 2034 date under the now-scrapped French submarine project. It will require every last drop of life to be squeezed out of the ageing Collins-class fleet if we are to avoid a capability gap. In this circumstance, Australia should look to lease several nuclear-powered submarines from the US or Britain before this date.

Alternatively, it could have the first few of the eight submarines built overseas if that makes them available more quickly. This would give less work to Australian industry but it is more important to get these submarines in the water in the face of an increasingly belligerent China than it is to use the submarine program as a job creation scheme in South Australia’s marginal seats

Keep it simple: Australia says it will choose a submarine modelled on the US Virginia-class or the UK Astute-class or a possible hybrid. Do not choose a hybrid model, keep it simple by replicating as much as possible the Virginia-class boat. The fundamental problem of previous shipbuilding programs is when navy boffins demand extra bells and whistles to suit “Australian conditions”.

This creates an orphan-class of boat which inevitably leads to cost overruns, technical problems and schedule slippages. Choose either the Virginia or the Astute, not a complicated blend of the two. The Virginia makes more sense because it would help entwine US interests more closely to Australia’s, which is one of the main aims of the whole AUKUS pact.

Nuclear workforce: Australia will need to start now to plan for a new generation of nuclear trained specialists to help build, maintain and ultimately crew the new boats. Australia has almost no ­experts in this area now. Open up more university courses. Pay them heaps. But get them trained up quickly.

Extend the Collins: The long timelines for the new nuclear subs make the so-called Life of Type Extension of the six Collins-class boats absolutely critical to keep them in the water until the 2040s. Defence will need to balance ambition with pragmatism. There is no point making the refit of these submarines so complicated that they are out of the water for years. But the upgrades need to be good enough to keep the old boats ­lethal in any conflict. It will be a delicate balancing act.

Dutton: Keep Peter Dutton on as Defence Minister. It’s been a while since Defence had a minister who was willing to swim against the tide of popular opinion, including from within the powerful defence bureaucracy, to sort out major acquisition problems. Having played a key role in ending the troubled French submarine program in favour of the much superior nuclear-powered submarine option, one wonders what Dutton might now do to help fix up other troubled projects, especially the troubled $45 billion project to build nine navy frigates.