Frigates sink us further into risk of expensive duds

An artist's impression of a BAE frigate.

Australia has done it again, buying an unproven defence design and creating innumerable further problems by modifying it to meet our own requirements.

The classified “Engineering Team Assessment” of the $45bn Hunter-class frigate program, revealed by The Australian, should be a wake-up call to the government – without urgent political intervention, the frigates risk becoming expensive duds.

The report should also be a warning of the high risks of selecting a British-designed nuclear submarine.

The British government and its privatised defence giant, BAE Systems, claimed its Type-26 frigate was the most advanced submarine-hunting ship on the market.

But unlike its Italian and Spanish competitors, the British option existed only as an immature design, not a completed ship.

Defence and federal cabinet ministers somehow swallowed the BAE line that the huge risks of buying a “first of class” vessel would be mitigated by the delivery of the first Type-26 for the Royal Navy ahead of the initial Hunter-class vessel.

But the British vessel is running well behind schedule, and Australia’s mandated design changes have caused flow-on problems throughout the vessel.

The additions of a US AEGIS combat system and Australian-designed CEAFAR radar have increased the frigates’ designed weight so much that the hull has had to be enlarged and redesigned.

The extra weight means the ships will be slower than envisaged, have a shorter range, and draw so much power that commanders will have to decide whether to prioritise the radar or propulsion system.

There are also stark warnings over the ship’s radar and noise signatures, and risks to crew members in the event of floods and fires.

Staggeringly, the report reveals Defence has left itself with little contractual leverage to force the company to shoulder these risks and fix the problems at its own expense.

Taxpayers now face a drawn-out design and construction process, with escalating costs and delays, and no guarantees that the ships will do what they’re supposed to.

Unfortunately, the new AUKUS partnership between Australia, Britain and the US makes it all but impossible for the Morrison government to cancel the contract as it did with the French Attack-class subs.

An Albanese government might feel freer to revisit the decision to go with the British design.

Either way, Peter Dutton or his Labor successor will have to personally take charge of efforts to get the frigate program back on track.