Fast response for role in any Gulf conflict

Iraq’s decision to refuse inspectors access to sites suspected weapons of mass destruction sites triggered the flare-up.

Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 1998. Picture: AP

Cabinet moved quickly to ensure Australia could play an important role in the international response to Iraq’s refusal to co-operate with weapons inspectors in 1998, five years before the invasion that led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

In February 1998, the National Security Committee sketched out the operational rules of engagement for Australian special forces sent to the Gulf after the US and Britain threatened Iraq with military action.

The flare-up in tensions was triggered by Iraq’s decision to refuse inspectors access to sites suspected of being used for the development of weapons of mass destruction.

The stand-off prompt­ed a US-led military build-up in the region, with John Howard briefing ­cabinet in February on his dis­cussions with US president Bill Clinton and with the leaders of Canada and New Zealand. As revealed in cabinet records, cabinet agreed on February 17 to the deployment of special forces to the region for three months along with Boeing 707s; three days later, the NSC authorised combat search and ­rescue operations into Iraq if ­required.

Australian special forces were also authorised to conduct surveillance activities on the border with Kuwait and respond to any incursions by Iraqi forces if they were committed to combat.

The minutes of the February 20 NSC meeting show how seriously the government took Australia’s role in any international effort to curtail Iraq’s regional ambitions and development of WMDs.

ADF personnel were given two sets of rules of engagement, including one for peacetime and the other for operational use during conflict, which would be activated in the absence of a diplomatic solution and following the initiation of military operations by the US.

The failure to discover any weapons was noted by the NSC on March 17, 1998.