Defence Strategic Review: Strategy is sound but far from complete

Anthony Albanese and Chief of Defence Force Angus Campbell in Canberra on Monday. Picture: AAP

The key aim of the nation’s new defence policy is very simple: to change the calculus of China’s thinking so the risk of war ­outweighs the benefits.

It foreshadows a futuristic world where Australian warships, nuclear submarines, planes and army vehicles bristle with enough long-range missiles to give pause to any aggressive intent in Beijing.

It aims to deceive and confuse an enemy with mobile missile batteries on land and heavily armed submarines roaming in the deep, giving the once-predictable Australian Defence Force more unpredictable fangs.

And it tries to ensure that any conflict will take place not on the Australian mainland but far to the north in the island chains of Southeast Asia.

In doing so, the Defence Strategic Review upends the nation’s decades-long defence policy of focusing largely on the direct defence of Australia. The new policy recognises many of Australia’s national interests lie far offshore.

As the review points out, “the threat or the use of military force or coercion against Australia does not require invasion”.

Instead, it could include attacks on trade and supply routes, cyber attacks and other threats which originate overseas.

The review seeks to bring Australia into what it calls “the missile age”, arming it with the same long-range strike weapons that countries like China have amassed and which, according to the report, have “radically reduced Australia’s geographic benefits (and) the comfort of distance”.

What’s more, the warning time for any conflict has dramatically shrunk, adding urgency to the planned overhaul of defence.

In arguing that Australia faces the worst strategic outlook in generations, the review portrays the intense China-US competition as “the defining feature of our region and our time”. It is refreshingly blunt about the shadow China is casting over the region, saying China’s military build-up is the “largest and most ambitious of any country since the Second World War” and yet this has occurred without ”transparency or reassurance” about China’s intent.

It then goes on to criticise Beijing for its illegal behaviour in the South China Sea and its “strategic competition” in the Pacific.

At its heart, the review is an admission of failure about the inability of defence planners to react more quickly to these changing circumstances which have been obvious for years.

It goes so far as to admit that the Australian Defence Force is not “fit for purpose” for the tasks required of it.

It recognises that the ADF is caught in a quagmire of delayed defence projects and is suffering from a paucity of firepower, while relying on yesterday’s tactics and archaic force structure. Meanwhile the world around it, and especially the Indo-Pacific has fundamentally changed. Yet the review puzzlingly tells us about some of the overhauls that it plans for defence, but not some of the most crucial and expensive ones.

As such, the document is not nearly as sweeping in scope as the government claims. It still lacks crucial detail about what Australia’s future defence force will look like and how we will pay for it.

For example, a surprising and disappointing gap in this document is that it defers a decision on the size and composition of the navy’s surface fleet. The review didn’t tell us anything about multibillion-dollar decisions such as the future of the $45b Hunter-class frigate program.

Will the government build all nine of them as planned, or cut the program to six, or even scrap it altogether?

And what about the rumours of building a fleet of heavily armed corvettes or more air warfare destroyers?

Defence Minister Richard Marles hinted that there might be fewer large surface ships and more smaller ships in the future fleet, but nothing concrete.

Future conflict is likely to be fought in the air and sea gap to Australia’s north.

Instead, the government says it will have a yet another review – albeit a “quick” one – to report later this year which will determine what sort of navy the country needs. Why the review did not make decisions on the size and shape of the navy is unclear, but these are such large decisions that the review is incomplete without them.

The good news, at least for local industry, is that the government says it is committed to a “continuous shipbuilding capability” in both Adelaide and Perth. If implemented correctly, this would be a boon for local jobs, skills and industry as well as a more cost-efficient way to produce warships. But Australia has never done this properly before, so this policy remains an aspiration rather than a given.

The review diminishes the role of the army, recognising that any future modern conflict is likely to be fought in the air and sea gap to Australia’s north.

Army traditionalists will be furious, pointing out that it was the army that carried the heaviest load in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam.

The review slashes the number of the army’s planned future armoured vehicles, saving many billions of dollars which will be used to buy new capabilities like long-range missiles and underwater drones.

Instead, the army has been given smaller roles, including using its vehicles to fire land-based missiles and expanding its landing craft for amphibious operations in Australia’s north.

The air force gets a few longer-range missiles for its fighters but the rumoured extra squadron of F-35 fighters did not eventuate.

The best part of this review is that it finally calls for a missile defence heavy force – to be fired from vehicles, ships, planes and submarines – which can attack enemies up to 500km away.

This helps to rectify an embarrassing lack of firepower in the current ADF and creates a formidable deterrent for would-be aggressors.

The review also calls for a welcome change in defence procurement priorities, saying defence should abandon its pursuit of “perfect solutions” and focus instead on what works and can be afforded. This is a nod to the endless list of defence projects that are delayed and over-budget because defence has tried to build a Ferrari rather than a Toyota.

These are good words, but can the government implement them? After all, the pursuit of “perfect” has been driven relentlessly for decades by defence chiefs – backed by compliant defence ministers – with disastrous results and little regard for the cost to taxpayers. It takes more than words to change a culture.

A surprising and disappointing gap in the review is that it defers a decision on the size and composition of the navy’s surface fleet.

A key weakness in the review is the lack of clarity about what it will all cost. The government says the extra spending, on the new items in this review and the AUKUS nuclear submarines, will not be felt in the four year-forward estimates of the budget.

It concedes defence spending will have to rise after that but gives no indication of how far it will rise. In other words, this review gives the government all the glory of sweeping pronouncements without having to start to pay more for it. At some stage, the government will need to have an honest public debate about what this enhanced defence force will cost and what sacrifices might be needed in other portfolios to pay for it. This has conveniently been kicked down the road until after the next election.

In summary, this review contains both good and bad. The new strategy of a more regionally potent, forward-looking and more lethal defence force is sound and welcome.

But it has failed to tell us about some of the most important future capabilities – such as warships – and how much its new shopping list will cost. Only when these questions are answered will we learn how far-reaching and realistic this new defence blueprint is.