Cabinet papers 1996-97: emissions agreement conundrum remains unsolved 20 years on

John Howard has warned that a “conundrum remains” in Aus­tralia’s approach to climate change.

John Howard has warned that a “conundrum remains” in Aus­tralia’s approach to climate change more than 20 years after he first tackled the challenges posed by ­legally binding and internationally uniform emissions ­reduction ­targets.

Cabinet documents from 1996 and 1997 — released today by the National Archives — show the Howard government was ­internationally isolated after ­voicing concerns during the negotiating period ahead of the adoption in December 1997 of the Kyoto Protocol. In June 1997, Mr Howard’s cabinet received a submission weighing up the benefits of either abandoning climate negotiations ahead of a UN General Assembly session or being seen to be ­“excluded from an agreement by the international community”.

“We should be seen to be ‘pushed off the cliff’ rather than ‘walking away’,” the submission said. ­

“Australia could only sign up to a Kyoto agreement if we are ­successful in securing our own bottom-line ­target.”

Speaking ahead of the release of the cabinet documents, Mr Howard — who never ratified the Kyoto Protocol — said the key ­dilemma posed by international climate agreements had not been resolved.

“We are a major exporter of ­energy and this conundrum ­remains,” Mr Howard said. “I mean Australia has these huge ­reserves of coal and we have an enormous amount of natural gas.

“The problem I had with fully endorsing the Kyoto Protocol, which was a big issue in the 2007 election campaign … was that fully embracing it would have imposed restrictions on Australia but not imposed (them) on our potential competitors. An aluminium smelter could go to Indonesia or Malaysia or China or somewhere without having to be burdened by restrictions. But it couldn’t be built in Australia because those restrictions would apply. And that fundamentally is one of the reasons why I just kept ­resisting even though the popular culture said: ‘Sign Kyoto and save the planet.’ ”

Then environment minister Robert Hill speaks at the UN conference on climate change at Kyoto International Conference Hall in Japan in 1997

In June 1996, the Howard cabinet first determined it would pursue an international agreement that “does not contain targets that are legally binding” and to safeguard “national trade and economic interests”. The cabinet received advice that uniform targets would impose “significantly higher costs on Australia than on other OECD economies” because of “our relatively high per unit cost of reducing emissions”. Such an approach would “erode our comparative advantage in energy-­intensive industries and encourage them to move offshore”.

Reporting to cabinet in September 1996 on a July climate change meeting in Geneva, Robert Hill said there was strong international support for legally binding targets and timetables due to the emergence of an apparent “US/EU alliance”. He concluded it was a “difficult and complex meeting for Australia” in which the nation was “singled out for criticism”.

“Overall, there was a general perception of Australia being isolated,” Senator Hill said.

By July 1997 — one month after cabinet had weighed up being “pushed off the cliff” and isolated from the international community for its stance in negotiations — the advocacy of the Australian government on binding and uniform targets had begun to cut through amid rifts between the US and EU.

A memorandum to cabinet by Alexander Downer, Senator Hill and Warwick Parer noted that “Australia’s case on climate change, arguing for realism and equity through differentiated targets has had considerable impact”.