Who’s really afraid of the Virginia-class?

We can be confident that our American Virginia-class submarines will be highly effective and difficult to counter.

There have been several commentators in Australia of late who have made rash pronouncements about the demise of US submarines, alleging that innovative technologies will make them vulnerable. Others have been arguing that US nuclear-powered submarines are now noisier than their Chinese counterparts and will be easily detectable by China.

The fact is that the US has been so far ahead in submarine technology and secure underwater operations during the past 50-plus years that its submarines are virtually undetectable by China or Russia. In the Cold War, US submarines tailed Soviet ballistic missile firing submarines (SSBNs) at close quarters without being detected. There is every reason to believe the same applies these days to China’s SSBNs.

It is our view that China’s ballistic missile firing submarines are so easily tracked by US SSNs that China’s allegedly survivable second-strike nuclear capability is at high risk (as was that of the Soviet Union in the Cold War). In brief, the quietness of American submarines and the sophistication of their operations are legendary.

People walk past an illustration of a Chinese nuclear submarine at the Military Museum in Beijing on March 3. Picture: AFP

The reason for this is that the US has persistently invested vast amounts of research and development for more than half a century in superior underwater warfare technology. Naturally, these capabilities are among America’s most highly guarded secrets and there is little available in the public domain. However, we recommend two books: Blind Man’s Bluff (1998), by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, and The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945 (2016) by Peter Hennessy and James Jinks.

The former is about highly classified US submarine operations involving the CIA tapping into the Soviet Union’s seabed communications in the Sea of Okhotsk for the Soviet Pacific submarine fleet in Kamchatka. US submarines made repeated visits and were not detected. The Silent Deep is about British close-quarter submarine operations against Soviet SSBNs and SSNs. To our knowledge, there is no equivalent book available about operations against China’s submarines yet (but the subject is touched on by Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt’s China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power, 2020).

Those who talk about superior Chinese submarine operations being able easily to detect US submarines do not know what they are talking about. The fact is that until recently China has depended very much on Russian technology for its SSBNs and SSNs. That includes even relatively straightforward techniques of isolating the noise of the engines and other machinery from the hull.

We need to remember that in the Cold War Soviet ballistic missile firing submarines were known as “boomers” because the loud noises they made were detectable over considerable distances. And when it comes to anti-submarine warfare, the Pentagon stated last year that China “continues to lack a robust deepwater anti-submarine warfare capability”. It is true, of course, that Russia and China are making progress towards quieter submarine operations. But do we believe the US is sitting on its hands and making no technological advances? Of course not. The US Navy continues to invest huge amounts in ensuring its submarines remain at the absolute forefront of hard-to-detect operations under the world’s oceans.

So, when we take delivery of our initial three Virginia-class US SSNs, we can be confident that they will be highly effective and difficult to counter. This is why China is so angry about the prospect of our acquiring them.

China already has a bad case of SLOC anxiety (sea lines of communication) and fears being cut off from critical supplies, such as oil, through the confined waters of Southeast Asia. It will make matters only worse for it when Australian SSNs enter service or when, under AUKUS, the US operates its own SSNs out of Fremantle.

Further, if our Virginias are equipped with current long-range anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 2000km, they will be a formidable strike weapon able to attack deep into our region. For example, it is about that distance from east of The Philippines to the Yellow Sea between South Korea and China.

The geography of China and Russia means that their submarines, on leaving their bases, are relatively vulnerable. In China’s case, its Northern Fleet is bottled up in the Gulf of Bohai opposite South Korea (300km) and Japan (800km), and constrained by the intense surveillance of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea by these allies of the US. Beijing’s main ballistic missile-firing submarine base is on Hainan Island in the south of China, which gives exit to the relatively shallow nearby waters in the South China Sea until its submarines reach deeper water closer to The Philippines and Taiwan. But to get to the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean, they must then pass through a chain of US SOSUS arrays (sound surveillance system, based on passive sonar) that extends from South Korea and Japan to Taiwan, The Philippines and Indonesia.

The US, by comparison, has submarine bases on the east and west coasts of the North American continent that provide prompt access to secure deep waters in the open Pacific and Atlantic oceans. It has no potential adversaries nearby. In a similar way, submarines leaving Australian ports such as Sydney and Fremantle also have quick access to secure deep oceanic waters.

It is important to remember that keeping a capability edge in pro-submarine and anti-submarine warfare is vital for US security. This is especially true with respect to nuclear capabilities, the stability of the nuclear balance and the survivability of American ballistic missile-firing submarines.

It is for this reason that the US continues to invest heavily in matters such as submarine signature management (including radiated acoustic signatures), sensor performance and the through-life upgrade of the Mark 48 torpedo (including through joint research with Australia.

Against this background, we reject the belief of those who say US submarines have had their day. The US has the world’s largest and most potent nuclear-powered submarine fleet and intends to keep it that way. No wonder China is so worried about the prospect of Australia acquiring such a vastly superior capability.

Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith are both former deputy secretaries of Defence. Dibb was also director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation and Brabin-Smith was also chief defence scientist.