How to protect ourselves if we come to blows with China
Ascertaining Beijing’s intent is difficult but past practice provides us with some valuable clues.
As the dust settles on the most consequential month of Australian defence and foreign policy in 70 years, Scott Morrison has signalled unequivocally that he wants a more lethal, capable and agile defence force fit for the times. And he’s not for turning.
Neither is Defence Minister Peter Dutton, who has been given the poisoned chalice of sorting out the procurement mess left by previous Coalition and Labor governments. Dutton is off to a good start. But there is much to do and time is of the essence.
The provocative incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone by waves of Chinese fighter jets and bombers over the past week suggests that President Xi Jinping may not wait much longer to achieve his cherished dream of reclaiming Taiwan into the bosom of the motherland. The trilateral AUKUS agreement will have left him in no doubt that Australia has chosen the US over China although his coercive practices are largely to blame.
As the minister with primary responsibility for defence of the realm, Dutton needs to ask his department whether Xi would use military force against Australia to achieve his geopolitical ambitions. And, if so, what can we do to protect ourselves?
Countries rarely telegraph their intentions explicitly. Strategic ambiguity is the currency of the day. But for the first time, China’s state-run media has made it clear that Australia soon may be a military target. Responding to the AUKUS agreement, the hawkish Global Times issued this warning: “Once the Australian army fights the People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Straits or the South China Sea, military targets in Australia will inevitably become targets of Chinese missiles. Since Australia has become an anti-China spearhead, the country should prepare for the worst.” A follow up tweet on October 5 was even more explicit. “Since Taiwan authorities are preparing for war, let’s see whether Australia is willing to accompany [the] Taiwan separatist regime to become cannon fodder.”
Even in a country where everything is controlled by the state, media commentary is not always a reliable indicator of policy. But these facts are incontrovertible.
China has produced more ships, submarines, aircraft and missiles than any other country during the past 20 years in a vast rearmament program that is unmatched in peacetime since the 1930s. China also has embarked on an expansion of its nuclear missile force. In short, it has the military means to threaten every country in the region, including Australia, should it choose to do so.
The difficulty is ascertaining China’s intent. Short of a major intelligence coup this is essentially unknowable, especially in a state with a penchant for secrecy.
But past practice provides some valuable clues. Chinese leaders are not big on invasions, occupations or nation-building. They prefer to colonise economically and frighten lesser states into compliance. The historical record shows Beijing is prepared to use military force to get its way and teach weaker countries “a lesson” in the realities of hard power.
India was on the receiving end of such lessons during the 1962 border war with China and last year’s clash over the disputed Galwan Valley when 20 Indian soldiers were killed in bloody, hand-to-hand combat with Chinese troops. Beijing sent an estimated 200,000-strong force into northern Vietnam in 1979 before the People’s Liberation Army withdrew after receiving a bloody nose from Vietnam’s battle-hardened regulars. More recent examples include China’s harassment of Japan, Vietnam and The Philippines in the contested seas of the Western Pacific and the provocative incursions by waves of bombers and fighters into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone.
If Xi decides to teach us a similar lesson, the PLA is likely to use different tactics for two reasons. It’s not cost effective or feasible to target Australia in the same way because we aren’t next door and easily reached. We also don’t have any territorial disputes with China, so it would be hard to justify overt military action against us short of war. Instead, China is likely to wage psychological warfare, combining military pressure with economic coercion to maximise the costs of our impertinence. Military pressure might include harrying our naval ships and aircraft passing through the South China Sea; show of force operations by sailing warships into the Arafura Sea; increased monitoring and highly visible intelligence gathering against allied exercises in northern Australia; and allowing occasional sightings of Chinese submarines to demonstrate our reachability.
Should we have the temerity to support Taiwan in defending itself against a PLA amphibious assault, Chinese missile forces could hit high-value defence facilities in northern Australia with long-range ballistic missiles and land-attack missiles delivered by submarines and bombers. But its preference will be to deter us from entering a fight over Taiwan using information warfare to exploit domestic divisions in Australia over China policy. Beijing’s argument of choice is that by aligning ourselves more closely with the US we risk becoming an adversary and military target.
Dutton’s primary task is to ensure that we can defend ourselves, even against a global military power. In doing so, he needs to reject the false assertion that AUKUS signifies an unpardonable outsourcing of Australia’s sovereignty.
Our security policies should not be determined by another country’s threat rhetoric. Bowing to threats is the path to appeasement and a guaranteed loss of sovereignty. Closer defence co-operation with the US is entirely consistent with the foreign policy pursued by governments of both political persuasions since 1941. For a middle power such as Australia it’s a sensible security hedge.
From the time the Spartans resisted the vast Persian army at Thermopylae nearly 2500 years ago to Hanoi’s defiance of the US during the Vietnam War, smaller countries have been able to preserve their independence and freedom of action through a combination of diplomacy, coalition building and asymmetric military strategies that dilute the advantages enjoyed by more powerful states.
North Vietnam’s leaders had no problem accepting extensive Soviet and Chinese military assistance or sheltering under their respective nuclear umbrellas during the Vietnam War. North Korea even allowed Russian pilots to fly their fighter aircraft against US pilots during the Korean conflict. Yet both countries remain fiercely independent, often to the chagrin of their erstwhile supporters.
There is no reason Australia can’t do the same. But it will require a revamped military strategy and rectification of three major weaknesses in our defence capabilities. The first is the ADF’s lack of strike power.
We need a deep arsenal of cutting-edge missiles able to penetrate sophisticated defences and take out the facilities, weapons, communications and command and control systems that are critical to success on the battlefield. The decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and a suite of long-range missiles, and to manufacture munitions and guided missiles under licence from the US are all steps in the right direction.
The problem is that they may be too little and too late to make a real difference should the ADF be called into action in the next few years because of a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
One way of plugging this capability gap is to accelerate the planned domestic production and acquisition of missiles and allow the US and Britain to base one or more of their nuclear attack submarines here in the interim. Even a handful of allied nuclear submarines operating out of Australia would act as a serious deterrent to attack and complicate the military plans of an adversary, as Argentina discovered during its ill-fated Falklands campaign in 1982. A single British nuclear-powered submarine torpedoed the cruiser Belgrano, forcing the rest of the Argentinian navy into port.
A second weakness is the inability to sustain operations for both high-intensity and drawn-out military conflicts. Senator Jim Molan is not far off the mark when he describes the ADF as “a one-shot defence force”. Quality is important but so is quantity. The relatively small number of battle-ready modern ships and aircraft in our inventory is a problem.
But a bigger one is that we lack the missiles, smart munitions and drones needed to defend against attack from a well-armed opponent. As American scientist Cliff Shaw reminds us: “It’s the little things that count, hundreds of ’em.” And we don’t have adequate reserves of fuel or the infrastructure and manufacturing strength to make Australia a difficult country to defeat.
The Prime Minister and Dutton seem determined to address these vulnerabilities. But they will take a long time to fix because of decades of inaction. In the meantime, the Biden administration must be persuaded to relax the export controls and other restrictions that have limited the benefits of Washington’s 2017 decision to allow Australia privileged access to the US National Technology and Industrial Base.
A third weakness is that our defence assets are not where they need to be or optimally configured for the challenges ahead. In defence jargon, we have the wrong posture. The bulk of the ADF is concentrated in the heavily populated coastal fringe running from Perth to Brisbane, but the main threats to our security are from the north. Keeping the bulk of our assets in the south and surging forward when required is not the answer. This might have worked in more benign times. Today’s deteriorating security environment mandates a different approach.
The government should fund a major expansion of defence infrastructure in northern Australia and designate Darwin as an alliance hub and forward operating base for the ADF. Without upgraded infrastructure it won’t be possible to support a stronger defence presence in northern Australia or the projected increase in allied ships, aircraft and troops on rotation for visits, exercises and training. Nor will the navy be able to repair battle-damaged ships or respond quickly to the presence of a Chinese warship in the Arafura Sea. Currently, our frigates and destroyers arebetween five and six days’ steaming time away in Perth and Sydney.
It’s time to have a frank discussion about China’s likely military actions should we come to blows, and to better understand our strengths and China’s weaknesses. This is not warmongering or threat inflation. A realistic threat assessment is a necessary precondition for the development of a fit-for-purpose strategy.
Teaching Australia a lesson may be more difficult than the PLA thinks. Despite the trillions of yuan spent on defence modernisation the PLA is relatively weak in anti-submarine warfare and projecting force at the distances required to strike Australia. The exceptions are the PLA’s long-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range missiles carried on its bombers and submarines.
Our existing Collins-class submarines still pose a credible threat to China’s submarines, which would have to sail a long and dangerous route to ensure their missiles hit home. China’s bombers would have to fly similarly long distances before firing their missiles, risking detection and interception by US and Australian fighter-aircraft. Neither are low-risk operations.
Other options for Beijing are cyber strikes against our critical infrastructure and a naval blockade or interdiction of our maritime trade. A cyber attack no doubt would be painful. But it would be unlikely to bring the country to a halt. An effective naval blockade could pose an existential threat since we are highly dependent on imports. However, a blockade would be challenging to enforce for any length of time. Australia and the US could reciprocate by disrupting equally vital China-bound trade in the Malacca Strait, an obvious choke point and major strategic vulnerability for Beijing.
Nonetheless, these scenarios illustrate the need for a rethink of our existing defence strategy, which has failed to keep pace with emerging threats.
In last year’s strategic update, the government made several important rhetorical adjustments to the 2016 defence white paper. They are that defence planning will focus on Australia’s immediate region; potential adversaries and infrastructure must be held “at risk further from Australia”; and “a different set of capabilities” are required. But there does not appear to be a strategy to ensure these objectives are met.
One is urgently needed. The aim is not to trigger conflict or defeat China militarily, an unrealistic goal. Its fundamental purpose is to deter China from taking military action against us. If deterrence fails, then the strategy must provide a credible pathway to protect Australia by making the country a potent, high-risk target.
We need an Australian version of Singapore’s porcupine strategy but something with more sting. Let’s go with the sea wasp that inhabits the waters of northern Australia and is best left alone because of its potent venom. A sea wasp strategy would have several strands, most of which are already in place or planned. They just need to be better aligned.
Greater self-reliance is a necessity and eminently achievable. Complete self-reliance is unaffordable and unattainable. Alliances are crucial for weaker states in times of uncertainty. That’s why Morrison is on a mission to deepen relations with the US and broaden our defence partnerships with like-minded Japan, India, South Korea and Britain.
A pity about France. But astute diplomacy sugared with new, mutually beneficial defence arrangements to replace the lost submarine deal should help remind the French that their interests coincide with ours in this part of the world.
Establishing a protective umbrella over vital defence installations in northern Australia would also help. An effective anti-access/area-denial defence system extending into the surrounding seas would be difficult for China’s submarines and bombers to penetrate. This should incorporate limited defence against ballistic missile attacks optimised to protect vital installations.
Among the highest priorities are Darwin Harbour; the Australia-US joint defence facility at Pine Gap near Alice Springs, which provides early warning of missile attack; the naval communication station at North West Cape near Exmouth in Western Australia; and RAAF bases across northern Australia. Other places could be added across time.
The quickest way to rectify the ADF’s weaknesses and prosecute this strategy is to lift defence spending to 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product and sustain it for at least a decade. This is Dutton’s next big test.
Alan Dupont is chief executive of geopolitical risk consultancy the Cognoscenti Group and a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
